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This thesis revisits the relationship between ideology and foreign policy in the 
Middle East, particularly that between Arab nationalism and state regional policy in 
the Gulf. It seeks to answer the question: What explains a Gulf Arab state’s policy 
toward regional alignment in the independence phase? In doing so, the thesis explores 
the specific case of Bahrain between 1971 and 1981, a period in which Bahrain 
attained its formal independence and then moved towards alignment in the form of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). To answer this question, the thesis advances 
existing explanations in the study of international relations in the Middle East (IRME), 
especially the constructivist approach to norms and identities in the relationship 
between Arab nationalism and foreign policy. Some constructivists claim that shifts in 
regional norms from ‘Arabism’ to sovereignty allow one to explain foreign policy in 
the Middle East after 1967. While such a claim is received uncritically by IRME, the 
regional policies of individual Gulf Arab states have mostly been examined in this vein 
and thereby assumed to share some commonalities driven by cultural, sectarian and 
institutional homogeneity among these states in the region. However, this thesis offers 
an alternative account of it. By integrating other histories of Arab nationalism with 
IRME and conceptualising nationalism as a modern ideology, this thesis argues that 
internal socio-political dynamics mediate the interplay of ideology and a state’s 
regional policy. It further argues that the formation and evolution of Arab nationalism 
in international relations of the Gulf is best understood beyond norms and identities, 
and examined under a more historical and sociological scrutiny − taking both colonial 
history and the process of capitalist formation into consideration. 
This thesis draws on Antonio Gramsci’s insights to build a theoretical 
framework for conducting a historical sociological investigation of the case of Bahrain. 
Through a reformulation of Gramsci in an alternative Gramscian approach to the 
Coxian one in the study of international relations (IR), this thesis reconstructs three 
interrelated concepts from Gramsci − development, ideology and struggle − to 
examine the social bases that conditioned the formation and evolution of Arab 
nationalism, and the political struggle that shaped a locus in which Arab nationalism 
influenced Bahrain’s policy towards Gulf alignment in the 1970s. It argues that the 
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political struggle included different, contradictory more often than not, social forces 
deriving from Bahraini late-coming capitalist formation under British colonialism. 
Then, the struggle continued to impact on the ideological development of Arab 
nationalism and its interplay with Bahrain’s regional policy. The thesis further argues, 
in a Gramscian sense, that the struggle was a conflict between hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic forces, which escalated along with the rise of the New Arab Left and the 
upheaval caused by Marxist-Leninist revolutions in Arabia from the late 1960s 
onwards. But, it was unresolved after an interrupted process of ‘historical restoration’ 
between 1971 and 1975. As a consequence, the Al Khalifa regime in Bahrain, as an 
incomplete hegemony, faced the dilemma of being open about its alignment with the 
US. Nonetheless, in the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, a series of 
extended regional issues arose, including the Arab cause, the Iranian revolution in 
1979 and the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. The ways in which Al Khalifa responded to these 
issues reflected the dynamic ideological ties between Arab nationalism and Bahrain’s 
regional policy and paved the road to Bahrain’s participation in the GCC in 1981. 
Through an integration of the Bahraini case and the reformulated Gramscian 
framework proposed in this thesis, the thesis offers a more complex account than the 
existing literature of international relations in the Gulf and contributes to the historical 
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This thesis revisits the relationship between ideology and foreign policy in 
international relations in the Middle East. By focusing on the interplay of Arab 
nationalism and regional policy in the Gulf, it answers the following questions: What 
explains a Gulf Arab state’s policy towards regional alignment in the independence 
phase?1 What explains the ideological development of Arab nationalism? How does 
the ideological development of Arab nationalism intersect with and drive the process 
of making a state’s regional policy on alignment? This thesis addresses these questions 
through a case study of Bahrain between 1971 and 1981. Instead of following the 
various existing approaches of identity and norm, threat and security, and regime 
collaborative survival, it offers a historical sociological account of Bahrain’s regional 
policy towards the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its interplay with Arab 
nationalism. 
Following the heyday of Pan-Arab nationalism and decolonisation in the 1950s 
and ’60s, the 1970s witnessed a series of far-reaching influential events inherited from 
the comprehensive legacy of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war in the Middle East and then 
created the socio-political orders we see in the Gulf today: British military withdrawal 
from East of Suez in 1971, the formal independence of previously British protectorate 
Arab states, the fallout of Marxist-Leninist revolutions in South Yemen and Dhofar, 
the rise of counter-insurgent actions organised among Gulf monarchies, a US military 
presence through Nixon’s twin-pillar policy, and more importantly the Iranian 
revolution in 1979 followed by the establishment of the GCC in 1981. This was the 
context wherein Bahrain became a formally independent Arab state after the long 
British colonial era and sought a new regional policy. In 1971, the Al Khalifa regime 
came from one tribal family, among others, that had settled in Bahrain in the late 
eighteenth century and was recognised by Britain as a Bahraini political authority 
                                                        
1 In this thesis, I follow Michael Ward’s definition of alignment, it ‘is a more extensive concept than 
alliance since it does not focus solely upon the military dimension of international politics. Degrees of 
alignments in political, economic, military, and cultural spheres present a multifaceted sculpture of 
national and supranational postures’. Michael D. Ward, Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics 
(Denver: University of Denver, 1982), 7; Thomas S. Wilkins, ‘“Alignment”, Not “Alliance” – the 
Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of 
Alignment’, Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2012): 56–58. 
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through protectorate treaties in 1820; it abandoned a proposed British scheme for a 
nine-shaikhdom federal state, supposedly unifying Bahrain with Qatar and other 
Trucial States. Instead, Al Khalifa declared Bahrain’s independence in August of the 
same year, while signing a secret agreement with the US to keep ‘the West’ onshore.  
The rejection of alignment with other neighbouring Arab states was then 
followed by Al Khalifa’s political reform, which attempted to incorporate different 
social forces into a newly formed Bahraini government. By 1975, however, the 
political reform terminated due to the unsolved contentious issues of a US presence, 
State Security Law and external pressure from Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, a series of 
extended events in the second half of the 1970s opened up alternative alignment 
choices for Al Khalifa, driving Bahrain’s regional policy and paving the way towards 
participation in the GCC in 1981. In a post-colonial context, while this process was 
intertwined with protracted struggles between various social forces and colonial 
legacies, it marked a shift in Al Khalifa’s decision on alignment resonating with 
changes in the ideological development of Arab nationalism. The thesis, therefore, 
offers an alternative explanation of Bahraini alignment and Arab nationalism during 
this period, and more broadly that of the interplay of nationalism and regional policy 
in post-colonial states. It develops, through a theoretical lens of historical sociology 
and Gramsci, I argue, by anatomising such historical processes as social drivers of 
international relations in the Gulf.     
This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of the role of Arab 
nationalism in alignments that have been addressed in studies of international relations 
in the Middle East (IRME). For nearly two decades, the discussion has revolved 
around whether Arab nationalism has retreated since the Naksa, the setback of the 
Arab-Israeli war in 1967. With the influential constructivist intervention into IRME, 
particularly exemplified by Michael Barnett, it appears that the discussion has found 
an answer in that Arab nationalism has been seen as declining regional, parochial and 
cultural norms among Arab states and been replaced by universal sovereignty norms, 
which dictate state regional policy, including alignments. The present chapter then 
outlines the significance and proposed contribution of the thesis and how it offers an 
alternative historical sociological explanation of the case of Bahrain. Furthermore, the 
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chapter reviews the existing IRME literature on the relationship between Arab 
nationalism and foreign policy and identifies the gap that the thesis tries to fill. 
Following a methodological discussion of the thesis, the chapter ends with an overview 
of the thesis’ organisation in which I briefly outline the arguments of individual 
chapters. 
 
1.1 The Puzzle: Twilight of Arab Nationalism in International Relations of the 
Middle East? 
The questions noted at the beginning of this chapter are relevant to a puzzle in 
respect of the role of Arab nationalism in international relations in the Middle East. 
The puzzle derives from a reflection on a seemingly widely accepted statement in 
IRME: The Naksa of the 1967 war brought about the twilight, or even demise, of Arab 
nationalism and made Arab nationalism less politically significant in inter-Arab 
politics, states’ foreign policy and international relations in the Middle East. To put it 
more straightforwardly, in Adeed Dawisha’s words: ‘after 1967, hardly any of [the 
Arabs] believed in their eventual political unity. It was Arab statism not Arab 
nationalism that defined the post-1967 era, wataniya not qawmiya that determined 
political relations among the Arab states’.2 The primary rationale of such a statement 
appeared earlier in Fouad Ajami’s seminal article, entitled The End of Pan-Arabism, 
in 1978 and related to a context of what he saw as the Arab intellectual predicament 
of political thought and practice.3 It was during the time of Anwar Sadat’s Egypt 
making a contentious peace agreement with Israel. To Ajami, such an agreement 
marked a decisive shift from the Pan-Arab state system to ‘a normal state system’ as 
‘a fact of life’ in the politics of the Middle East.4 The 1967 war was ‘the Waterloo of 
Pan-Arabism’ that ‘had underlined the vulnerability of the Arab system of states, the 
bankruptcy of the Arab order and its guardians, whether radical or conservative’. As a 
consequence, ‘The champions of Pan-Arabism were defeated in the Arab system; the 
                                                        
2 Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 254. 
3 Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
4 Fouad Ajami, ‘The End of Pan-Arabism’, Foreign Affairs 57, no. 5 (1978): 355. 
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idea had lost its magic’.5 Furthermore, its role ‘to play havoc with sovereignty’ had 
also lost ground and been left behind in the past while a new form of regional policy 
in the Middle East emerged.6 
In spite of giving no clear definition, Ajami’s use of the notion of Arabism, 
which refers to Arab political unity beyond state borders, seems to register as 
terminology in IRME scholarship. More importantly, his claim of a clash between 
Arabism and sovereignty norms gained currency and has been received uncritically by 
mainstream approaches to the study of international relations (IR), like constructivism 
and neorealism. Arabism denotes either social norms through which Arab leaders 
competed for a desired regional order through dialogue within ‘the game of Arab 
politics’,7 or an ideology as a source of legitimacy seeking the unity of Arab nations 
that ‘could not be openly abandoned’ and became a threat to some Arab regimes.8 
From these analyses, an overarching impression is formed that seems to confirm the 
thesis of the twilight of Arabism or Arab nationalism, which could no more cast a spell 
dictating interstate relations among Arab states in the post-1967 era than statism.  
The arguments of these analyses, however, contradicted another understanding 
of Arab nationalism. As Sune Haugbolle argues,  
…a one-sided focus on these effects of [the demise of Arab nationalism] has 
overshadowed other histories that preceded and did not necessarily dovetail with 
Arab nationalist trajectories … [Also,] it simplifies the complex relation between 
nationalism, socialism and revolution in Arab political culture.9 
This complex relation has been depicted by another strand of scholarship from the 
traditions of Marxism. In such intellectual traditions, the historic moment of 1967 was 
driving the disintegration of the monolithic Pan-Arab doctrine and the disillusionment 
with Arab unity; as Ajami argues for the Palestinian split between Yassir Arafat and 
George Habash10 became instead a critical juncture in the revival of Arab nationalism. 
                                                        
5 Ajami, 357. 
6 Ajami, 365. 
7 Michael Barnett, Dialogue in Arab Politics: Negotiation in Regional Order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 7–12. 
8 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 211. 
9 Sune Haugbolle, ‘The New Arab Left and 1967’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 4 
(2017): 498–99. 
10 Ajami, ‘The End of Pan-Arabism’, 360. 
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For Samir Amin, the 1967 war actually registered the end of Nasserism rather than that 
of Arab nationalism as a whole. The Naksa, as Amin argues, ‘served only to unmask 
the importance of bourgeois and petty bourgeois nationalism, be it supported by the 
West or by the USSR, be it based on local liberal capitalism or on state capitalism’.11 
His statement was not just an assertion or a Marxist manifesto. Instead, it was 
supported by other histories of Arab nationalism from below and around popular 
movements since the late 1960s and early 1970s, especially the wave of the New Arab 
Left whose impact has for a long time been overlooked and underestimated within 
IRME scholarship.12 
From the divergent understanding of Arab nationalism presented by Ajami and 
Amin, for instance, it appears that the different implications of the Naksa of 1967 have 
between them led to varying interpretations of the fate of Arab nationalism in the post-
1967 phase and thus its impact on state regional policy and alignment. What supports 
such variation is not the terms either Arabism or Arab nationalism but the analytical 
locus via which these terms have been defined and referred. Sometimes, as Nazih 
Ayubi reminds, ‘At one level of analysis, it is possible to argue that ‘Arabism’ has 
never in reality been more than a linguistic bond, void of any sociological substance’.13 
And the term and its conceptualisation in IRME have just been inherited from and 
mingled with different intellectual legacies of both area studies and social science.14 
As such, divergent accounts of the fate of Arab nationalism could be argued to derive 
from the different ways in which Arab nationalism has been defined in emphasised 
contexts and intellectual traditions that analysts prefer. 
                                                        
11 Samir Amin, The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggles, trans. Michael Pallis (London: 
Zed Press, 1978), 63. 
12 For some exceptions, see Basil Raouf Al-Kubaisi, ‘The Arab Nationalist Movement 1951-1971: 
From Pressure Group to Socialist Party’ (PhD thesis, American University, 1971); Tareq Y. Ismael, 
The Arab Left (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1976); Michaelle L. Browers, Political 
Ideology in the Arab World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 20–23; Abdel Razzaq 
Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman 1965-1976 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013); John Chalcraft, Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle 
East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Sune Haugbolle and Manfred Sing, ‘New 
Approaches to Arab Left Histories’, Arab Studies Journal 24, no. 1 (2016): 90–97; Haugbolle, ‘The 
New Arab Left and 1967’. 
13 Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London and 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995), 148. 
14 Ewan Stein, ‘Beyond Arabism vs. Sovereignty: Relocating Ideas in the International Relations of 
the Middle East’, Review of International Studies 38, no. 4 (2012): 883–95. 
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If Ajami’s thesis has been received widely among the existing IRME literature 
but contradicts histories from below as Amin has presented, we are waiting for an 
alternative account to those of neorealists and constructivists. In other words, if Arab 
nationalism did not die out but was rejuvenated, one needs to make sense of its role in 
the international relations of the Middle East in the post-1967 phase and its interplay 
with state regional policy. As Haugbolle argues for the case of the New Arab Left, the 
radical leftward current of Arab nationalist movements in the 1960s and ‘70s,  
Even though the New [Arab] Left [movements] − student movements, new 
political parties, radical thought and cultural expression, and revolutionary 
movements attracted to anti-imperialist, Marxist-Leninist or Maoist ideology − 
were never numerically large enough to challenge the regional order, they had a 
profound impact during and after ‘the long 1960s’ in the Arab Middle East.15 
To investigate such a profound impact is, thus, a task this thesis attempts to accomplish. 
But, how does this thesis define and conceptualise Arab nationalism in giving 
alternative accounts to that given by Ajami and among others? In the debate on Arab 
nationalism and nationalism in the Middle East in general,16 I follow a modernist 
definition that refers Arab nationalism to both ‘a set of ideas about how the world is 
run and, equally, about how it should be run’ and ‘a set of movements− political 
movements arising at particular times with specific leadership’.17 That is to say, by 
conceptualising Arab nationalism as a modern political ideology and movement whose 
formation and evolution are both related to structural changes on a macro scale and 
agents’ practices on a micro level, this thesis does not define Arab nationalism as a 
system of prior ideas of cultural identities and norms or political dogmas. Rather, it is 
taken to be a historical and sociological product whose political connotations only 
become meaningful if they are revealed through and based on our understanding of the 
complexity of a social totality, which sees ‘each of the varieties of social structure in 
its components and its totality’ through a sort of ‘sociological imagination’18. In other 
words, Arab nationalism is not historically fixed but can be seen as reflecting the 
                                                        
15 Haugbolle, ‘The New Arab Left and 1967’, 500. 
16 For different approaches to nationalism in the Middle East and their implications, see Israel 
Gershoni and James Jankowski, ‘Introduction’, in Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, 
ed. James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), xiii–xxv; 
Fred Halliday, Nation and Religion in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2000), 31–43. 
17 Halliday, Nation and Religion in the Middle East, 32. 
18 C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 134. 
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political aspects of certain social relations in the Arab world. Its origin, evolution, 
variation and interplay with regional politics will be examined through the empirical 
case of Bahrain in the 1970s and a historical sociological framework of Gramsci, in 
both of which the significance and contribution of this thesis reside.  
 
1.2 The Contribution: Historical Sociology of International Relations in the 
Gulf 
What does historical sociology offer this thesis, and what is the potential 
contribution of the thesis from taking a historical sociological approach? In this section, 
I highlight how historical sociology provides a lens through which the issue of 
compartmentalisation −  a dichotomous reading of the national and international 
sphere, and ideational and material factors − in existing mainstream IR approaches can 
be rectified, and thereby reconceptualise the state as a social and political entity whose 
agency might vary across cases. While adopting such a lens, an oft-conceived 
homogeneous brand of the Gulf Arab states is further reconsidered and thus the 
relationship of Arab nationalism with regional policy can be re-examined beyond a 
commonality of culture. 
1.2.1. Prisms of historical sociology: states under reconsideration 
A common theme can be noted among the interventions of existing historical 
sociologist work into IR: that is, the notion of the state in the conventional IR 
understanding has been reconsidered through a historical sociological lens, mainly that 
of neo-Weberian traditions.19 These attempts have shifted the focus on the unitary 
characteristics of the state in conventional IR readings to a more institutional concept 
                                                        
19 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and 
China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Theda Skocpol, ‘Bringing the State Back In: 
Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’, in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3–38; 
Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in Bringing the State Back In, ed. 
Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), 169–91; Fred Halliday, ‘State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16, no. 2 (1987): 215–29; John M. Hobson, The Wealth 
of States: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997); John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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of the state. The notion of the state is reconsidered through an examination of the 
inward and outward linkages of a ‘Janus-faced state’, ‘an intrinsically dual anchorage 
in class-divided socio-economic structure and an international system of states’.20 It 
allows one to disentangle the national-territorial state, to examine the role of the state 
in more complex relations between social action and structural forces, and to explain 
social processes in which ‘international factors are conjoined with domestic 
variables’.21 It then also ‘unleashes the fetters’ of structural determinants and ‘carves 
the terrain’ of domestic state-society relations, agential traits of the state, and ideology 
in understanding structure-agent relations in IR. 22  Such a reconsideration of the 
institutional dimensions of the state leads to reflection on the neorealist approach of 
omni-balancing to the international relations of Middle East states. As will be shown 
later, it is problematic to assume a highly autonomous role for the state in balancing 
multilevel challenges, and to see foreign policy as a product of the practices and omni-
balancing tactics employed by regimes in presumed dichotomous state-society 
relations.  
Following the traditions of historical sociology, IRME scholarship has 
contributed to a variety of topics. A bridge between area studies and IR disciplines has 
been well established through reconsideration of both historical and sociological 
aspects of the region and states. These topics range from a general historical 
sociological overview of international relations in the Middle East,23 intertwined state 
formation and capitalist development in the Middle East,24 the emergence of a modern 
state system in the Arab world,25 state power in war-making and social change,26 the 
                                                        
20 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China, 32. 
21 George Lawson, ‘The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations’, International 
Studies Review 8, no. 3 (2006): 408. 
22 George Lawson, ‘Historical Sociology in International Relations: Open Society, Research 
Programme and Vocation’, International Politics 44, no. 4 (2007): 347. 
23 Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
24 Simon Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994). 
25 Fred H. Lawson, Constructing International Relations in the Arab World (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006). 
26 Thierry Gongora, ‘War Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East’, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 29, no. 3 (1997): 323–40; Steven Heydemann, ed., War, Institution 
and Social Change in the Middle East (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 2000). 
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challenges of Middle East state formation, 27  intellectuals and foreign policy 
formation 28  to the recent revival of historical materialist traditions in explaining 
political Islam, modernity, the origins of capitalism and alignments in the region.29 
These attempts have more or less acknowledged that, in the Middle East context, state 
autonomy in the process of making foreign policy has been constrained or strengthened 
by the legacy of colonial history, which has had an impact on both the domestic socio-
political establishment and external relationships of a state. Through the prism of 
historical sociology adopted as such within IRME, I further argue that the interplay of 
ideology and state foreign policy can then also be best revisited via an understanding 
of how a reconsidered state is linked to both domestic society and international social 
change. For this, the tradition of historical sociology allows us to go beyond an 
assumed common orientation of regional policy in the Gulf Arab states that has been 
portrayed in the existing literature. 
1.2.2 Regional policy of Gulf Arab states: beyond commonality 
A survey of scholarship on international relations in the Gulf suggests a 
theoretical gap between this sub-region and the general development of some sub-
fields of IR, like foreign policy analysis (FPA), security studies and the dynamics of 
interstate action.30 Nonetheless, for a long time, six Gulf Arab monarchies have been 
treated as a sub-regional bloc in IRME owing to their common cultural, historical, 
economic, geopolitical and even institutional features.31 These features then leave 
                                                        
27 Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Toward a Historical Sociology of State Formation in the Middle East’, 
Middle East Critique 19, no. 3 (2010): 201–16; Adham Saouli, The Arab State: Dilemma of Late 
Formation (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
28 Ewan Stein, Representing Israel in Modern Egypt: Ideas, Intellectuals and Foreign Policy from 
Nasser to Mubarak (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012). 
29 Kamran Matin, ‘International Relations in the Making of Political Islam: Interrogating Khomeini’s 
“Islamic Government”’, Journal of International Relations and Development 16, no. 4 (2013): 455–
82; Kamran Matin, Recasting Iranian Modernity: International Relations and Social Change (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2013); Kerem Nisancioglu, ‘The Ottoman Origins of Capitalism: Uneven 
and Combined Development and Eurocentrism’, Review of International Studies 40, no. 2 (2014): 
325–47; Jamie Allinson, The Struggle for The State in Jordan: The Social Origins of Alliances in the 
Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016). 
30 Fred Lawson, ‘From Here We Begin: A Survey of Scholarship on the International Relations of the 
Gulf’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 3 (2009): 337–57. 
31 Hassan Hamdan al-Alkim, The GCC States in an Unstable World: Foreign-Policy Dilemmas of 
Small States (London: Saqi Books, 1994); Steven Wright, ‘Foreign Policy in the GCC States’, in 




IRME scholarship prone to adopt a multilevel and multi-contextual framework to 
examine the ‘commonalities’ of Gulf monarchies. 
The most oft-identified feature is the patriarchal tribalism of Gulf monarchies 
and Islam, which have a comprehensive impact on social relations, political systems 
and policymaking in these states. The tenets of tribalism and Islam offer ideological 
power sources for social and political systems in the Gulf and have been absorbed into 
state apparatuses.32  These ideological forces have been taken as instruments with 
which the Gulf monarchies fought against Nasserism and communism and fortified 
the domestic patriarchal system. Simultaneously, foreign policy functions as a 
personalised privilege within the coterie of royal family members, and it hampers the 
development of professional bureaucracy in the process of decision-making. 33 
However, the tribalism and Islam mirrored in foreign policy have not been represented 
unanimously in the Gulf. The representation of tribalism sometimes varies among Gulf 
monarchies depending on inter-elite relationships in these states, and this variation 
then influences how foreign policy is formulated. Steven Wright argues that inter-
dynastic power struggles in the royal family do in fact have a substantial influence on 
foreign policy formulation in the Gulf. The previous understanding of king’s privilege 
or the complete fulfilment of the king’s personal objectives in making decisions might 
not reflect the reality. Instead, foreign policymaking is processed through a political 
dynamism within an ‘elite-level alliance network’ in which cooperative or rival 
relationships among elites generate foreign policy output. 34  In other words, the 
variations in dynamic domestic politics might impact on foreign policy orientation. 
As for presenting Islamic values in foreign policy, this cannot necessarily be 
seen as merely an official ideology of seeking solidarity with umma; instead, it is more 
like serving the regime’s interests and increasing influence in the region. Saudi Arabia, 
for example, magnified Islamic value in foreign policy to counterbalance the challenge 
of Arab nationalists and leftists in the late 1960s and ’70s.35 Even though the sectarian 
                                                        
32 F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States 
(New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1994), 10–41. 
33 al-Alkim, The GCC States in an Unstable World: Foreign-Policy Dilemmas of Small States. 
34 Wright, ‘Foreign Policy in the GCC States’, 78–80. 
35 James P. Piscatori, ‘Islamic Values and National Interest: The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia’, in 
Islam in Foreign Policy, ed. Adeed Dawisha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 33. 
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nature of domestic society can be identified, the role of opposition sectarian groups 
sometimes dilutes the potency of Islam as a contributing factor to explain foreign 
policy. Katja Niethammer argues that the current domestic political reform led by 
Islamist groups in the Gulf, especially Shia groups in Bahrain, has an unexpected 
impact on foreign policy in which the orientation of discourse and strategies practised 
by regimes has been changed.36  In this regard, ideologies being conveyed in the 
foreign policy of Gulf monarchies cannot be taken as individual state elites’ thinking, 
but relates to dynamic domestic political development. The representation of 
patriarchal tribalism and Islam in the foreign policy of Gulf monarchies varies with 
the complex social and political relations on the domestic level. 
The other commonality of Gulf monarchies shaping foreign policy refers to the 
tactics of omni-balancing. This has been practised by Gulf monarchies to manage 
multilevel challenges and security predicaments, which have been seen as a residual 
impact left by an unfulfilled process of state formation. Marc O’Reilly has examined 
the case of Oman and how the Qabus regime has effectively exercised ‘omni-balancing’ 
in foreign policy to achieve the regime’s political consolidation, with the support of 
oil wealth. Material resources based on rentier economics allow the Qabus regime to 
build up its education infrastructure and welfare system and maintain cordial ties with 
Iran, Israel, other Gulf monarchies and Western states. 37  His account challenges 
Steven David’s assumption of dichotomous state-society relations, which suggests that 
‘it makes little sense to rely on a theory derived from a different historical experience 
that fails to address the reality of [states]’.38 O’Reilly echoes what Mohammed Ayoob 
notes: the higher degree of ‘political capacity’ or ‘institutional coherence’ that state 
elites have, the higher the level of security that can be achieved by the regime in 
developing the state.39 Moreover, O’Reilly’s account shows that the tactics of omni-
balancing might be practised in Gulf monarchies differently depending on how 
                                                        
36 Katja Niethammer, ‘Political Reform and Foreign Policy in Persian Gulf Monarchies’, in 
International Politics of the Persian Gulf, ed. Mehran Kamrava (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2011), 234–56. 
37 Marc J. O’Reilly, ‘Omanibalancing: Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future’, The Middle East 
Journal 52, no. 1 (1998): 70–84. 
38 Steven R. David, ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’, World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991): 256. 
39 Ayoob Mohammed, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and 
the International System (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 21. 
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economic resources are distributed in the society through the institutional role of the 
state in society. 
From these analyses, the commonalities of the Gulf Arab states have been 
reflected by scholars through culture or strategic tactics. Both ideational and material 
factors have been reconsidered in several empirical cases studies in which their 
influence on state foreign policy has been alluded to. The existing scholarly 
understanding has realised that dynamic domestic politics and social relations between 
state and society do indeed have an impact on the external relations of these states. 
However, how internal social dynamics intertwine and correspond to regional politics 
has as yet rarely been theorised. Theoretical discussions of changing state-society 
relations, the concept of state and the role of other social agents still remain sparse in 
discussions of Gulf Arab states’ regional policies. And this is the gap which the 
theoretical framework proposed in this thesis tries to fill. 
1.2.3 Historical sociology of state regional policy 
What is the historical sociological approach to state regional policy that this 
thesis proposes, and what is its potential contribution? To address this question, it is 
helpful to first consider the intersection of historical sociology and the study of foreign 
policy in a broader sense. As Fred Halliday argues, historical sociology ‘shares 
common ground with foreign policy analysis in looking at domestic context, but 
retains a concept of the state as a distinct institutional category, not the sum of myriad 
decisions’. It offers a theoretical way of looking at ‘the core components of a political 
and social order, the state, ideology and society, [it] focuses specifically on how 
institutions … are established and maintained’. In this regard,  
…foreign policy is a product not just of personal and bureaucratic process[es] 
within [the] state but of the interests, and clashes, of state and class alike. 
Ideology and norms are central, not as the constitutive domain of politics, but 
rather as part of the process of legitimation and coercion.40  
In this vein, some historical sociologists have argued for ‘incorporating micro-
analysis…to focus on smaller scale changes that impact on specific states and on the 
international system as whole… [and to] bring back an often missing dimension of 
                                                        
40 Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology, 35–37. 
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agency to macro-historical accounts of IR’.41 Others have also acknowledged that, for 
example, neoclassical realism ‘bears a family resemblance’ to historical sociology in 
terms of appreciating the international structural factors but without sacrificing the 
complexity within society.42 Following such an observation, I further argue, in the case 
of Bahrain, that the social bases of state regional policy and its interplay with Arab 
nationalism need to be unpacked via reconciled micro-macro approaches. This will be 
examined through a historical analysis of the colonial past and legacy and a 
sociological investigation of the development of capitalist relations both of which have 
influenced socio-political dynamics across the national, regional and international 
levels. As such, the version of foreign policy research presented in this thesis follows 
in the tracks of some scholars who have attempted to link the traditions of historical 
sociology to the study of foreign policy.43 Its research agenda is actually more closely 
affiliated to IRME scholarship than FPA.   
In doing so, I take one of the particular intellectual traditions of historical 
sociology that has recently been revived at the interface of historical materialism and 
IR. These historical materialist approaches to IR are distinct from mainstream 
approaches, such as neorealism and constructivism, in their close attention to inter-
state relations. The historical materialist approaches do instead highlight the 
relationship between social structures in the mode of production and the geopolitical 
system by identifying the traits of ‘the empire of civil society’44 or deciphering ‘the 
myth of 1648’.45 Regardless of any internal debate with this tradition, international 
relations have been conceptualised as inter-societal relations, linked through the 
emergence of global capitalist modernity and interstate geopolitical competition via 
                                                        
41 Bryan Mabee, ‘Levels and Agents, States and People: Micro-Historical Sociological Analysis and 
International Relations’, International Politics 44, no. 4 (2007): 433. 
42 Lawson, ‘The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations’, 408. 
43 Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology, 41–72; Ewan 
Stein, ‘Conceptions of Israel and the Formation of Egyptian Foreign Policy, 1952-1981’ (PhD thesis, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008); Ewan Stein, ‘The “Camp David 
Consensus”: Ideas, Intellectuals, and the Division of Labor in Egypt’s Foreign Policy toward Israel’, 
International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 3 (2011): 737–58; Stein, Representing Israel in Modern 
Egypt: Ideas, Intellectuals and Foreign Policy from Nasser to Mubarak; Allinson, The Struggle for 
The State in Jordan: The Social Origins of Alliances in the Middle East. 
44 Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International 
Relations (London and New York: Verso, 1994). 
45 Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geo-Politics, and the Making of Modern International 
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the abstract notion of ‘the international’. IR is about more than the rise of the nation-
state from Westphalian norms, it also concerns ‘a context of the spread of capitalism 
across the global, and the subjugation of pre-capitalist societies’.46 Through such a lens, 
the notion of international relations in the contemporary context can be referred to as 
‘capitalism, the social formations it generated and the world system they comprise’.47 
And the sociological connotations of international relations are presented not through 
nation-states but classes. As Halliday puts it,  
If within a particular state classes act to subject and control those less powerful 
than themselves, they act internationally to ally with groups similar to 
themselves when this is beneficial, and to compete with them by peaceful or 
military means, when rivalry is preferred … [Thus], each ruling class has been 
able to use the international character of capitalism both to find support for the 
preservation of its own position within society, by allying with others, and to 
see in the international arena a domain for the extension of its own interests 
and power.48 
This understanding considers the logic of international relations as an extension of 
class struggle within society, rather than merely international socialisation as proposed 
by nation-state actors. And ‘the international’ does not denote an international society, 
as the English school might argue, or that a set of Eurocentric values like sovereignty 
norms are universally disseminated across the world as mainstream IR theories assume; 
rather, the encounter between the international, as conceived in Eurocentric accounts, 
and other areas of the world is materialistic in itself.49 
As for the Middle East, its encounter with the West, in various conduits for the 
creation of institutions, ideologies, practices and then socio-political conflict, can be 
traced back to the colonial history of the region. Such an explanation allows an 
understanding of the region beyond a clash of civilisations, one essentialized as 
culturally peculiar area for its Islamic traditions or Arab politics.50 Instead, the Middle 
                                                        
46 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1994), 61. 
47 Halliday, 61. 
48 Halliday, Fred, Rethinking International Relations, London: Macmillan, 1994, p. 63. 
49 Fred Halliday, ‘The Middle East and Conceptions of “International Society”’, in International 
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Gonzalez-Pelaez (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1–23. 
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East has been part of the third world due to its shared history of confronting 
colonialism and the spread of global capitalism, which find its materialistic features in 
this long-term historical progress.51 In this way, an awkward relationship between the 
Middle East and the West (or the international dominated by the West) has not been 
due to ‘the result of an incomplete spread of Westphalian values, or the resistance of 
undemocratic, or Islam, or Asiatic societies and polities to democratic values, but to 
the very character, and violence, of that spread itself’.52 The process of international 
socialisation is ‘the means by which a ruling class or dominant state imposes its values 
on the subordinated classes and seeks to present these values as the only available ones, 
as natural, eternal and immutable’.53 This is a process that can be found extensively in 
the Middle East. IR historical materialism, through its rationale of a ‘social structure 
forming organic [and] systemic totalities’, and thus enables and anatomises 
international relations beyond ‘dichotomous compartmentalisations of social relations’ 
− the domestic versus the international level, and material versus ideational factors − 
employed by neorealism and constructivism.54 
For these reasons, I adopt the insights of Gramsci, which are inherited from the 
traditions of historical materialism and resonate with the research agenda of 
reconsidering the institutional aspects of the state in historical sociology, as a particular 
historical sociological approach to the case of Bahrain. As will be shown later, in 
chapter 2, although Gramsci has already been introduced through Robert Cox and is 
well-known via Neo-Gramscianism in the field of International Political Economy 
(IPE), his merits have rarely been fully appreciated in IR, let alone in IRME.55 Through 
some aspects of Gramsci have recently been reappraised by scholars, this thesis 
reconstructs three major concepts informed by Gramsci − development, ideology and 
                                                        
51 Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East 
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struggle − to examine the social bases that condition the formation and evolution of 
Arab nationalism, and the political struggle that shapes a locus in which Arab 
nationalism influenced Bahrain’s policy towards Gulf cooperation in the 1970s. By 
employing these interrelated concepts reconstructed as a total theoretical framework, 
the thesis sheds lights on the Bahraini case from the aspect of its colonial history and 
late-coming capitalist formation (development), the connotations of Arab nationalism 
as modern ideology (ideology), and the political struggle among different social forces 
(struggle). Then, this Gramscian framework helps this thesis to theorise how internal 
socio-political dynamics drives state regional policy in the independence phase. By 
integrating Gramscian insights with the specific and illustrative case of Bahrain, this 
thesis offers a historical materialist account of the formation and evolution of ideology 
and its interplay with international relations in the Gulf, and thereby contributes to the 
historical sociology of IRME in general.  
 
1.3 The Literature: Identity, State Formation and Social Change around 
Foreign Policy 
To justify my proposal of adopting the historical sociological approach of 
Gramsci in this thesis, this section offers a review of the existing literature on the 
relationship of ideas and foreign policy in IRME and outlines why the literature might 
fail to give convincing answers to Arab nationalism and state regional policy.  
Ever since a call for ‘the return of culture and identity in IR theory’ in the late 
1990s,56 examination of the role of ideas, especially identity, in foreign policy has 
burgeoned as one of the major research agendas in IR following liberalist attempts.57 
It has been conducted via a blend of constructivist and institutionalist approaches to 
the normatively constrained structure,58 the interplay between regional and national-
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state identity politics perceived by state elites,59 the intrinsically political and religious 
cultural characteristics of states60 and ontological security in interstate enmity and 
conflict.61 With scholarly reflection on the linkage of Middle Eastern politics and IR,62 
there has been also an epistemological debate on the approach to this region. How to 
justify taking either disciplinary orientation towards parsimony and generalization, or 
area studies specialization in language, culture and history, has become a threshold 
issue for students of IRME.63 Despite the ongoing debate, there is no doubt that the 
Middle East offers ‘an ideal testing ground for IR’ with respect to scholarly concerns 
of ‘national and state identities, supra- and sub-national challenges to the state system, 
or the politics of ethnic and religious identity’.64  
For my purpose of exploring the interplay of ideas and foreign policy in the 
Middle Easter, a review of existing research on the role of ideas in Middle East state 
foreign policy is imperative for laying the groundwork of this thesis.65 This section 
proceeds with a review of three major approaches − constructivism, eclecticism and 
historical sociology − to ideas and foreign policy within IRME scholarship. It focuses 
on how they understand the provenance of ideas and thus explain a societal context in 
which ideas influence foreign policy.   
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1.3.1 IR Constructivism: identity and norms  
Following reflectivist critiques of the nature of international politics in a 
rationalist paradigm, some IR constructivists have found that the Middle East offers 
valuable cases, substantiating their accounts of conflict and cooperation among states 
based on explanations of ideational factors.66 Through a lens of IR constructivism67, 
the notions of Arabism and Arab nationalism have been used uncritically and 
interchangeably with reference to a cultural and normative structure that derives a 
shared identity among Arab states and shapes their interests and behaviours.68 The 
‘lack of overlap’ between state identity and national identity, as Barnett and Telhami 
argue, usually results in the inherently instability of Arab states due to the process of 
state-building failing to conflate the two. This process is not about domestic political 
dynamics but about how state leaders digest ‘the national imagery from its 
transnational status to the confines of the state’.69 In this regard, Arabism is usually 
taken as a holistic normative structure that constitutes components of identity or ideas. 
For some IR constructivists who see the Middle East as a laboratory for the cultural 
turn of IR theories, the international social structure of this region, with its salient 
cultural characteristics, has been considered a cradle of ideas.  
The ways in which ideas influence foreign policy have also been anatomised 
through a IR constructivist lens, which considers state elites’ perceptions of collective 
identity as embedded in a normative structure. For shaping identity in general, Telhami 
and Barnett argue that ‘[t]he contemporary possibilities in the Middle East are limited 
by history and have typically revolved around one of three influences: statism, Islam, 
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and Arabism’.70 Generally speaking, the formation of national-state identity is closely 
related to the emergence of subnational identity; yet, such possibilities become more 
limited due to the institutionalisation and legitimation of the state in the Middle East. 
In this way, various identities can be sorted out, on either trans- or sub-national levels, 
as ‘a menu of choice’ for the state’s instrumental purposes.71 How state elites select or 
take advantage of identity from the ‘menu’ defines the interests that state elites might 
pursue. This is a device on which constructivists focus regarding the question of how 
exactly identity influences foreign policy. When the objective of foreign policy is 
taken as the pursuit of the state’s interests, identity defines interests and plays a key 
role in affecting foreign policy orientation. As Telhami and Barnett further argue, 
‘identity can be an important source of the state’s national interests’ and, for instance, 
‘only by noting how Arabism shapes the Egyptian national interest are we able to 
explain many significant foreign-policy events’.72  
From Telhami and Barnett’s explanation, it is not difficult to see that their 
rationale tries to challenge not only the definition of state interest based on rational 
calculation in IR, but also neorealist perspectives of a deterministic international 
material structure of state behaviour. The debate with neorealists, however, constrains 
their theoretical locus at the interstate level. For instance, they see the competition 
among Arab states as a struggle for ‘political prestige’ among Arab leaders who were 
desperate to ‘gain tremendous symbolic and political capital by demonstrating that 
they were the fiercest defenders of Arabism’. 73  The competition over political 
discourse on Arabism among state elites generates momentum for the reproduction of 
an existing normative structure.  When the competition no longer revolves around the 
symbol of Arabism, it is then followed by a decline in Arabism and the emergence of 
another normative structure. The new normative structure does not emerge from a 
‘normative vacuum’ but from competitive ‘norm dynamics’,74 it changes the pattern 
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of the ‘dialogues in Arab politics’ and redefines the meaning of state interest. 75 
Accordingly, a normatively constrained structure built upon interstate relations, more 
specifically on inter-state-elite communication and competition, weighs heavily. 
1.3.2 Eclecticism: state formation and identity 
The other approach is through an eclecticist lens of multi-level analysis, and the 
incorporation of ideational and material factors, which has been introduced in the study 
of foreign policy of Arab states, the Middle East and, more broadly, third-world 
states.76 Following this approach, an analytical framework for foreign policy in the 
Middle East is proposed by integrating the perspectives of Marxism, constructivism 
and even neorealism into pluralist readings. As Raymond Hinnebusch argues, ‘state 
elites have an interest in maximizing the autonomy and security of the state’ in the 
process of formulating foreign policy; yet, owing to unfulfilled consolidation of the 
state system in the Middle East as a result of economic dependency and the incongruity 
of sub-, supra-state and state identity, a purely neorealist analysis of ‘system level’ 
applied to the region appears unconvincing and needs to be complemented by other 
theoretical tools. 77  With modified constructivist viewpoints, how ideas influence 
foreign policy is examined by looking at how state elites manage the interplay between 
challenges on the interstate and domestic levels. On the interstate level, a social 
normative structure might lead to interstate elite competition within cross-state 
boundaries of the Arab community. Nonetheless, that is not competition among 
sovereignty states in a conventional neorealist understanding of a material power 
struggle. It was ‘the game’, as Hinnebusch further notes, ‘played by ideological or 
                                                        
75 Barnett, Dialogue in Arab Politics: Negotiation in Regional Order. 
76 Bahgat Korany, How Foreign Policy Decisions Are Made in the Third World: A Comparative 
Analysis (Colorado: Westview Press, 1984); Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, The Foreign 
Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change (Colorado: Westview Press, 1991); Raymond 
Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Colorado 
and London: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Bahfat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, The Foreign Policies 
of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization (Cairo: the American University in Cairo Press, 2008); 
Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds., The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, 
2nd ed. (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2014). 
77 Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘Introduction: The Analytic Framework’, in The Foreign Policies of Middle 




symbolic competition in which leaders were ambitious for Pan-Arab leadership’.78 
Different from IR constructivism, this approach acknowledges that the societal level 
on which Arab nationalist activists challenge local governments and political discourse 
within the Arab community is another factor influencing foreign policy. The 
ideological influence of Pan-Arab nationalism itself might come from domestic power 
struggles, i.e. the new middle class along with the high tide of Arab nationalism 
challenging the oligarchy in the 1950s.79 This multi-level ideological competition then 
affects the influence of ideas on state foreign policy.   
Some features can be identified in this theoretical approach as presented mainly 
by Hinnebusch. A theoretical framework has been proposed to abandon conventional 
IR’s parsimonious methodology. It echoes to a certain extent a historical sociological 
concept of state formation, while explaining how ideas constrain foreign policy. The 
varying processes of state formation usually determine the degree to which identity or 
ideas influence foreign policy in the Middle East. As Hinnebusch asserts, ‘where there 
are high levels of public mobilisation and low levels of state consolidation, elites are 
more vulnerable to Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic opinion in foreign policy making’.80 Such 
a claim draws a parallel with Malik Mufti’s research on the ways in which Arabism 
was instrumentalized by policymakers dealing with the problems of state formation in 
terms of Arab state leaders’ project of forging autonomy and legitimacy. 81  He 
improves the school of balancing within the neorealist tradition by ‘tracing the 
evolution of stateness’, linking ‘the development of foreign policy behaviour to the 
development of domestic political institutions’ in support of his argument: ‘The 
transition from foreign policies driven primarily by internal consideration … to foreign 
policies driven primarily by external consideration … mirrors the formation of 
stronger states in Iraq and Syria’.82 For Hinnebusch, while drawing on a subaltern 
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neorealist concept of omni-balancing to explain foreign policymaking,83 he maintains 
that state elites tend to ‘omni-balance’ various levels of challenges in ‘attempting to 
reconcile demands from domestic actors with threats or constraints from external 
powers’.84 Even though the significance of the domestic level has been noted by this 
approach, it nonetheless sees the extent to which ideas influence foreign policy as 
determined by the role of state elites. It presumes there is state autonomy in the process 
of state formation and the practice of omni-balancing by following a neorealist sense 
of taking a ‘state-centric’ and ‘top-down approach’ to this issue. 
1.3.3 Historical sociology: relocating ideas in social change 
The third approach to ideas in IRME can be traced back to the reflection on 
‘Orientalism’ in area studies that rejects cultural and religious essentialist accounts of 
the Middle East. It takes a more historical and sociological stance that never accepts 
‘religious and cultural convention as independent forces operating across history’ or 
‘a given [and] constant source’.85 Ideas have mostly been conceptualised as ideologies 
related to social relations in which the dominant and dominated groups in social, 
political and economic fields need to be noticed. As Halliday argues, ‘these ideologies 
may be those of groups resisting established states, and calling for alternative forms of 
government, or those of established states, seeking to reinforce their claim to 
legitimacy’.86  In this regard, the provenance and significance of ideas are not as 
claimed by IR constructivism, i.e. deriving from a monolithic structural norm. Rather, 
ideas correspond to social formation, usually underlain by certain forms of the mode 
of production, and they are best understood as social instances articulated on economic 
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and political levels.87 As such, the investigation of ideas needs to incorporate the social 
and domestic context by which one could explicate, as Ewan Stein suggests, how ideas 
in the Middle East emanate along with the rising middle class and intellectuals who 
challenge the old socio-political and economic orders.88 By doing so, ‘a distorted 
picture of ideas’ given by IR constructivism, seeing Arabism and sovereignty norm as 
essentially conflicting  and overlooking ‘the second image’, can be amended.89 
The primary rationale of such a historical sociological lens focuses on 
contestation or cooperation on the societal and domestic levels. Though historical 
sociologists have never denied the efficacy of the international structural factors of 
states, they emphasise the significance of domestic and societal factors in their 
explanations of foreign policy. In this regard, the unitary, monolithic and systemic 
sense of state embedded in the international structure has dissolved into a more 
complex and fluid domestic and societal context.90 In terms of ideas and foreign policy, 
the context that historical sociologists explore does not refer to an ideational base in 
the IR constructivist rationale or cultural idiosyncratic traits in orientalist readings. 
Instead, it is based upon a historicised understanding of a variety of social forces, 
institutional settings and the interaction between regimes and societies.  
In light of this approach, the relationship of ideas and foreign policy has been 
revisited by shedding light on, for example, the intellectual division of labour in 
foreign policy. 91  Identity is not ‘momentarily fixed’ nor understood through ‘the 
somewhat teleological view of national identity as shifting from Arabism to statism’.92 
Ideas, as Stein argues, ‘generated by intellectuals associated with socio-political 
movements in opposition are not marginal to those employed by a government or 
regime, but are part of the overall interpretive framework in which foreign policy is 
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made’.93 As such, the ways in which ideas influence foreign policy depends on the 
ideological linkage of state leaders to civil society. Whether state foreign policy, taking 
Egypt for example, was a question of interpreting Israel as imperialism through a 
discourse of encouraging popular revolution and Arab unification under Nasserism,94 
or Sadat’s composite perception of Israel as another antagonistic state,95 the ideologies 
behind it developed along with various intellectual trends being represented in societal 
movements. These ideologies shifted with the dynamic interaction between societal 
groups and the regime and created Egyptians’ conception of Israel and the ‘double-
instrumentalisation’ of foreign policy for both intellectuals and the government.96 This 
historical sociologist attempt, as shown by Stein’s research on Egyptian foreign policy 
towards Israel, sheds new light on the examination of state-society relations in 
explaining both ideas and foreign policy. It not only adjusts the dominant ‘state-centric’ 
approach in IR taken by Barnett and Hinnebusch, but also reconsiders the identity 
approach. 
From the above discussion, it is argued that the current debate on the approach 
to ideas in the Middle East is neither a conventional epistemological debate between 
the disciplines of social science and area specialization, nor one of differences between 
analytical levels. As universal tools were used by historical sociologists in analysing 
international relations in the Middle East, the debate no longer focused on existing 
disciplinary boundaries. The primary concern is now with a perennial debate within 
social science: how one understands the relationship between agents and social 
structure, and the essence of ideas and structure. Even though Barnett once asserted 
that disciplinary history makes constructivism distinctive from historical sociology, 
regarding different theoretical agendas, he has nonetheless admitted the contribution 
of historical sociology to IR constructivism.97 But what he has done in understanding 
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the origins of ideas is still constrained within the mainstream IR disciplinary tradition: 
taking the interstate level as the major analytical locus and alluding to the 
compartmentalisation of international and domestic levels, and material and ideational 
factors. It makes IR constructivists somehow distort their understanding of ideas, and 
not fully unpack sociological insights as they have claimed.  
To substantiate an explanation that resonates with other histories of Arab 
nationalism, as proposed earlier, the origins and formatting process of Arab 
nationalism and its influence on foreign policy need to be further contextualized along 
with a broader sociopolitical dynamic on international, regional and domestic levels. 
As such, I abandon IR constructivist and eclecticist approaches that uncritically adopt 
the notion of Arabism, accept a subaltern neorealist reading of omni-balancing and 
assume the autonomy of state leaders in making foreign policy. Instead, I follow the 
traditions of historical sociology by which this thesis sets out a historical sociological 
investigation of the case of Bahrain. It examines how internal sociopolitical dynamics, 
corresponding to regional and international social changes, drives Arab nationalism in 
the Bahraini context and generates social drivers for Bahrain’s regional policy. 
1.4 Methodology 
To examine the social bases of the formation of Arab nationalism and Bahrain’s 
regional policy, the primary rationale of my methodological approach lies at the heart 
of the traditions of historical sociology and its merits with respect to IRME. It seeks to 
explore ‘the interplay of meaningful actions and structural contexts’ and shed light on 
‘the particular and varying features of specific kinds of social structure and patterns of 
change’ in time and space.98 However, this thesis does not intend to define itself as a 
work on the intellectual history of Arab nationalism or conventional FPA. Instead, it 
places itself at the interface of historical sociology and IR in such a way that Gramsci’s 
work is reappraised and reconstructed as a viable historical sociological framework for 
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ideology and foreign policy in the Middle East. The following subsections detail my 
consideration of case selection, analytical approach and the data. 
1.4.1 Case selection: why Bahrain?  
The reasons why Bahrain is selected as a case study in my investigation of the 
relationship of Arab nationalism and regional policy derive from an overall 
reconsideration of the political histories of Bahrain in three aspects.  
First, as the third section of this chapter outlines, the study of foreign policy in 
the Gulf tends to assume a commonality shared among the Gulf Arab monarchies. 
Based on such an understanding, the Gulf Arab monarchies have been seen as a sub-
regional bloc in IRME scholarship. The significance of sectarian identity to state 
foreign policy has been overestimated and resonated to a certain extent with IR 
constructivism. Bahrain has never been a major case in the study of foreign policy. It 
has always been referred to as a quintessential case of sectarian conflict due to its 
polarised population being quite between religious sects. This approach to Bahraini 
politics has gained currency recently by alluding to dichotomous state-society relations 
on the basis of primordial sectarianism. However, while taking a closer look at 
cotemporary political histories of Bahrain, it might be surprising to find that the case 
of Bahrain instead offers a counter-argument to the existing sectarian understanding 
as most sociopolitical movements from the 1930s onwards have continuously called 
for labour rights, decolonisation, political participation and national unity. These 
elements open up an avenue for further examination of other histories of Arab 
nationalism. The vigorous intellectual movements and their influence on 
contemporary Bahraini politics contribute useful empirical material for noteworthy 
theoretical alternatives beyond the compartmentalisation of social relations. More 
importantly, this empirical material then resonates with Gramsci’s observations of 
intellectuals, ideologies and political struggles. 
Furthermore, the Bahraini case provides an alternative and particular empirical 
case of Arab nationalism and foreign policy in terms of its non-revolutionary process 
of state formation. Unlike Egypt, Syria and Iraq that went through a revolutionary 
process of decolonisation and independence in the 1950s and ’60s, revolving around 
nuanced versions of Arab nationalism, Bahrain has never been through an identical 
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one. Therefore, most studies of Arab nationalism and its influence on state foreign 
policy usually refer to the quintessential cases of Nasserism or Ba’athism and overlook 
the Gulf region whose empirical merits are mostly presented through the lens of rentier 
state theory. The existing understanding of Arab nationalism and foreign policy has 
been closely tied to and only represented by so-called radical Arab states, rather than 
moderate ones. This derives from an impression that the relation between Arab 
nationalism and foreign policy has been mediated and formed by powerful military 
figures. Having this articulation with an anti-imperialist and socialist agenda, these 
figures were able to deliver their political wills by linking themselves to the people in 
a populist fashion. However, in the Bahraini case, from the British colonial era to the 
first decade of the independence phase, as will be shown in the rest of the thesis, there 
was never a strong ideological linkage between the regime and the people that revolved 
around Arab nationalism as the collective national will. As such, this left a conundrum 
concerning how to locate Arab nationalism in such a non-revolutionary context and 
thus the impact of Arab nationalism on the foreign policy of the post-colonial state that 
historically maintained a rather close relationship with the West.   
The third reason for choosing Bahrain relates to the primary question presented 
earlier in this chapter: what explains a Gulf Arab state’s policy toward regional 
alignment in the independence phase, especially after 1967? Bahrain offers useful 
historical evidence and material showing the histories of the rise of the New Arab Left 
and its comprehensive impact on Bahrain and international relations in the Gulf. Such 
histories, as will be examined in chapters 4 and 5, present alternative accounts of the 
development of Arab nationalism. While this new political momentum was infused 
into nationalist movements, it also qualitatively changed the ideological connections 
among the regime, intellectuals and the people, and then had an impact on Bahrain’s 
state formation in the independence phase. This process was conditioned by British 
colonial history and Bahrain’s late-coming capitalist development. Nonetheless, it also 
evolved along with the struggle among different social forces that were interrelated to 
contingencies around Bahrain’s regional policy in the 1970s and then paved the way 
to Bahrain’s participation in the GCC in 1981.  
In sum, the case of Bahrain offers empirical alternatives to the existing 
understanding of Arab nationalism and regional policy. Also, it provides historical 
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evidence for exploring the social bases of ideologies, foreign policy and, more broadly, 
international relations in a post-colonial and non-revolutionary context through a 
Gramscian lens.     
1.4.2 Analytical approach 
This research follows the principle of a small N case study, it proposes to offer 
an in-depth explanation of the selected case and to show its particularities. It also 
adopts a historical method, a research method that has been widely used in social and 
political studies and provides insights into the topic of social change.  
In conducting a small N case study, this thesis plans to combine two strategies 
to examine the case of Bahrain. The first strategy is to define historical conditions by 
historicizing and process-tracing the collected data. It employs analytical history by 
using data from different sources that help to historicize the causes and consequences 
of critical political events and their fallout around which are the struggles between 
different social forces. I use ‘process-tracing’ to explore how these events became 
critical junctures of social formation, which nurtured the milieu in which the 
articulation among political and social instances qualitatively changed. Such a method 
usually refers to ‘a technique in which the analyst attempts to locate a causal 
mechanism linking a hypothesized explanatory variable to an outcome’.99 For this 
thesis, I instead argue that such a mechanism is best conceptualised in a societal 
context, substantiated by the pattern of late-coming capitalist social formation and 
maintaining a space for explaining the significance of social agents. As will be shown 
later, in chapter 2, it is best understood through the concept of ‘development’ whose 
characteristics of a late-coming capitalist state in a (post-)colonial context underlie the 
social basis for the evolution of ideologies and the interaction among different social 
agents presented in each chapter of this thesis. However, it is not meant to offer a 
deterministic explanation of Bahrain’s regional policy nor to argue over the relations 
of Arab nationalism and foreign policy dominated by development.  
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Therefore, the second strategy is to take historical contingencies into 
consideration. Such contingencies, I argue, derive from the process of political struggle 
and events that are beyond the Bahraini social context but sometimes have a decisive 
impact on how Bahrain’s regional policy is formulated in response to different 
situations. The policy cannot be fully explained by the logic of a rational omni-
balancing strategy or patrimonial cultural norms. Rather, it intertwines with historical 
legacies (conditions) and sometimes leads to unexpected consequences. But how 
contingent is the case of Bahraini regional policy towards Gulf alignments? Or how 
do conditions and contingencies go hand in hand in the case of Bahrain? These 
questions constitute the basic methodological consideration throughout this thesis and 
reflect Karl Marx’s statement that, 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past.100 
My answers to these questions will be fleshed out as the thesis proceeds, with more 
elaboration of Gramscian theoretical insights applied to the case of Bahrain. I argue 
that while Gramsci’s insights are inherited from the tradition of a revolutionary 
socialist understanding of historical materialism, his exploration of the political aspect 
of social formation, especially the struggles among agents who represent different 
social forces, does offer ground for us to explain the interplay between conditions and 
contingencies. A critical instance is the role of revolutionary Arab nationalists, the 
New Arab Left, and their struggle with Al Khalifa. Their rise writes a new chapter in 
the histories of Arab nationalism in a context of decolonisation and anti-imperialism, 
one seeking fundamental change to the existing sociopolitical establishment. Some of 
the instances of the rise can be traced back to the British colonial era and the context 
of the rise is conditioned by the large scale of capitalist social formation. But as will 
be shown, mainly in chapter 6, the influence of Arab nationalism on Bahraini regional 
policy is contingent on the dynamic struggles among different forces on the national, 
regional and international levels. In other words, while attempting to explain the 
relationship of Arab nationalism and Bahraini regional policy towards Gulf alignments, 
                                                        




I consider political struggle as an essential societal context in which this thesis 
investigates the impact of ideology on foreign policy.    
1.4.3 The Data 
To explain the forming process of Arab nationalism and its relationship with 
Bahrain’s regional policy, this thesis uses both primary and secondary data sources. 
For secondary sources, I mainly draw on some historians’ work on the Gulf, especially 
Bahrain. ‘[History] encourages a widening of one’s view to embrace epochal pivotal 
events in the development of social structure’.101 As such, these scholarly narratives 
on and understandings of the history of sociopolitical events relating to early capitalist 
formation in the Gulf set the backdrop for my analysis of the Bahraini independence 
phase. It is the phase in which the primary data points begin, from 1971 to 1981. 
Although using secondary data is quite common in historical sociological studies, one 
must be cautious and avoid ‘be[ing] dictated [to] simply by historiographical fashion’ 
and ‘be very systematic in searching through historical literature’.102  To this end, this 
thesis, by using primary data, not only adds empirical evidence to current explanations 
of some crucial historical events, but also offers an alternative type of data to test 
existing research findings. 
Regarding primary data, they are from two major sources. First, they are from 
three types of archival data: official documents, press data and revolutionary 
pamphlets. These official documents have been declassified by the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and are now preserved at the National Archives, London. 
From the telegrams and reports on the internal and external political situation in 
Bahrain in the 1970s, I mainly focus the data search on the conversations between 
British diplomats to Bahrain and some important figures in the Al Khalifa regime, 
which give information about how Al Khalifa saw and evaluated certain sociopolitical 
events. The FCO documents have been used widely in Middle Eastern studies and are 
recognised as an important primary data source by scholars analysing domestic politics 
and foreign relations in the Gulf.  
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However, as these documents usually address a very subjective and selective 
view of British diplomats on Al Khalifa, a full picture might be lost. Therefore, I also 
use press data, particularly on official statements by Al Khalifa that were published in 
pro-government newspapers and collected from the British Library and the Arab 
World Documentation Unit (AWDU) in the Old Library, Exeter University. If the 
secondary data from existing research by scholars of Middle Eastern studies offer a 
basic historical understanding of and a perspective on socio-political development in 
the Gulf, the primary data from the archives then lead me to delve into the details of 
the struggle around Arab nationalism in Bahrain. For this part, revolutionary 
pamphlets are crucial to elaborate on the political agenda of the New Arab Left from 
which this thesis identifies ideological instances of what I call counter-hegemonic 
forces. These pamphlets are collected from different archives, including the AWDU, 
the British Library and the Halliday Collection at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science (LSE). They were mainly compiled, translated from Arabic and 
published in English by the Gulf Committee, an organisation established by students 
and intellectuals based in London in support of the Gulf revolution in the 1970s.103       
The second source of primary data comes is semi-structured interviews which 
were conducted in Manama in December 2015 and January 2016. They mainly rely 
on oral histories given, first, by those who were politically involved in social and 
political movements during the 1970s and affiliated to varying extents to the New Arab 
Left; and second, by an important retired government figure who was an Arab 
nationalist and put in a crucial position in the Bahraini government in the 1970s. The 
interview data serve as complementary material to archival data, and they expand my 
analyses of the ideological development of Arab nationalism and its relation to 
Bahraini politics and regional policy. They fill a gap left by archival data in terms of 
constructing a more complete picture of Bahraini political development in the 1970s, 
which might not be extracted only from FCO documents.  
                                                        
103 For the role of the Gulf Committee as an oversea revolutionary voice for the Gulf revolution, see 
chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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1.5 Overview of the Thesis’ Organisation and Argument 
As the preceding sections show, this introductory chapter has raised a research 
question about the relationship of Arab nationalism and the regional policy of Arab 
states in the post-1967 phase. It has reviewed how the existing literature of IRME 
scholarship has addressed the relationship of Arab nationalism and, more broadly, 
ideas and foreign policy in the Middle East through different approaches. Also, I have 
stated that this thesis attempts to revisit the question through the case of Bahrain in the 
1970s by following the traditions of historical sociology, particularly Marxist or 
historical materialist insights from Gramsci. My answer is clear: resonating with Amin 
among others, the significance of Arab nationalism in international relations in the 
Middle East can be reappraised through other histories which show that Arab 
nationalism has not died out after the setback of 1967. Neither has its political 
influence on international relations in the Middle East or state regional policy in 
particular diminished. Instead, I argue that Arab nationalism in the post-1967 phase 
evolved with the struggles among different social forces, and its influence on state 
policy on regional alignment can be best understood through a Gramscian lens. In 
support of such an argument, the rest of the thesis sets out its empirical and theoretical 
analyses.   
Chapter 2 explicates the theoretical framework of Gramsci and conceptualises 
some key terms informed by Gramsci that are applied to the case of Bahrain. It 
suggests that the existing Gramscian approach to IR, be that of Robert Cox, needs to 
be modified beyond compartmentalisation of the national and international sphere for 
conducting historical sociological research. Following some scholarly reappraisal of 
Gramsci’s ideas, I reformulate the Coxian brand of Gramsci and further reconstruct 
three key concepts − development, ideology and struggle. For ‘development’, it aims 
to reconsider Gramsci on international relations, which is not noted in the Coxian 
approach. I argue that Gramsci’s own understanding of international relations can be 
encapsulated in the concept of ‘the international’. It is substantiated by his 
acknowledgement of the characteristics of unevenness and a combination of capitalist 
social formation, which also resonates with the recent revival IR historical materialist 
claims. It is then represented in his analysis of the process of state formation of late-
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coming capitalist states. The concept of development underlies how Gramsci cashed 
out the other two concepts of ideology and struggled within a specific national context 
by highlighting the role of other social agents, i.e. intellectuals, and the significance of 
the political aspects of social formation. These two concepts then help this thesis 
unpack a historical process in which the struggles among different social forces in the 
post-colonial phase shaped a societal context in which Arab nationalism influenced 
Bahrain’s policy toward regional alignment. The three interrelated theoretical concepts 
are integrated and correspond, respectively, to each of the following empirical analyses 
in chapters 3 to 5.         
Chapter 3 gives an overview of Bahraini Arab nationalism and social formation 
under British colonialism. It seeks a marriage between the theoretical concept of 
development and the emergence of different social forces around the rise of Arab 
nationalism in Bahrain. In this chapter, I further substantiate the concept of 
development and its application to nationalism by drawing on Tom Nairn’s thesis. I 
argue that the early formation of Arab nationalism related to late-coming capitalist 
social formation in peripheral areas outside Europe whose capitalist sociality was 
realized through colonialist tutelage. While the characteristics of uneven and combined 
development led to nationalism as a modern ideology, they also created polarised and 
contradictory social forces around the evolution of Arab nationalism in Bahrain. For 
this, I further argue that these forces then generated the political aspects of Bahraini 
social formation. These aspects were shot through with two polarised and 
contradictory ideological currents. Conceived in a Gramscian lens, there was the ruling 
class’s willed ideology informed by the British colonial lens on the one hand. The 
subordinate class’s organic ideology cradled in Bahraini civil society along with a 
series of labour and nationalist movements between the 1930s and the 1960s were on 
the other. More importantly, the disconnection between the two and the continuing 
struggles among different forces then set a context in which the thesis further examines 
the evolution of Arab nationalism and its ideological ties to Bahraini internal 
sociopolitical dynamics and policy in the following chapters. 
Chapter 4 follows the rationale of bringing other histories of Arab nationalism 
into IR through a Gramscian approach and mainly corresponds to the second 
reconstructed theoretical concept of ideology. It outlines the rise of the New Arab Left 
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as the major counter-hegemonic force of Arab nationalism. It historicises the context 
in which, and why and how, the New Arab Left created alternative social forces to the 
Arab nationalist movement (ANM) since the 1960s. It explains the ways in which 
Bahraini New Arab Left intellectuals were informed by Marxist-Leninist ideas 
practised in Aden and Dhofar. Also, it focuses on the political agenda of the Popular 
Front of Bahrain (PFB), also known as the People’s Front in Bahrain, and their leading 
role as counter-hegemonic intellectuals while Shia political activism rose up. I argue, 
in the last section of chapter 4, that the political leadership of the New Arab Left 
intellectuals as counter-hegemony against the Al Khalifa regime was rather fractured 
due to their ambiguous alliance relations with some religious groups and the setback 
of Marxist-Leninist revolutions in Arabia in the 1970s. As a result, unified counter-
hegemonic forces were difficult to organise around the idea of Arab nationalism as the 
national-popular collective will in Bahrain, especially in the Parliament (1973–1975) 
and after its dissolution until the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution.   
To examine the influence of the rise of the New Arab Left in Bahrain, and more 
broadly in the Gulf, chapter 5 carries on investigating the last theoretical concept of 
struggle. It offers my explanation of the political dynamics in Bahrain from Bahrain’s 
formal independence in 1971 to the dissolution of Parliament in 1975. Through 
Gramsci’s theorisation of passive revolution, I argue that Al Khalifa’s political reforms 
as a means of reconstructing its hegemonic status in this period ended up being an 
‘interrupted historical restoration’. As a result, Al Khalifa’s rule rested on an 
‘incomplete hegemonic state of Bahrain’ for which the regime relied only on coercion 
without consent. Moreover, its ideological disconnection from the people remained as 
it had done in the British colonial phase. In other words, Al Khalifa’s willed ideology 
failed to link to the organic ideology of Bahraini civil society but was still practised 
through a colonial lens inherited from British colonialism. While the New Arab Left 
found it difficult to organise stronger counter-hegemonic forces, and Al Khalifa did 
not seek the consent of the Bahraini people, I further argue that Arab nationalism in 
the second half of the 1970s can be seen as a ‘floating national-popular will’. It failed 
to resolve the existing political struggles among those social forces and then had an 
impact on the ideological development of Arab nationalism and its ties to Bahrain’s 
policy toward regional alignment during this period. 
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As the final empirical chapter of this thesis, chapter 6 examines Bahrain’s policy 
toward regional alignment in the 1970s, with references to the findings from chapters 
3 to 5. It particularly focuses on the historical process of Al Khalifa’s dilemma in 
making a contentious alignment with the US followed by an alternative choice of 
participating in the GCC. To reflect the section on my review of different accounts of 
Gulf alignment employed by various approaches of threat and security, collaborative 
regime survival, and norms and identity, I argue that the relationship of Arab 
nationalism and state policy towards regional alignment is best understood as a 
political struggle between different social forces around contestation of the ‘subject’ 
of sovereignty rather than the ‘norm’ of sovereignty. The former addresses the 
contestation over who represents and practises Bahraini sovereignty, whereas the latter, 
as IR constructivism has shown, refers to a normatively essential conflict between 
Arab nationalism and sovereignty. Such a contestation of the subject of Bahraini 
sovereignty, I further argue, was as a result of an unresolved political struggle in 
Bahrain and then the absence of an organised national-popular collective will around 
Arab nationalism, especially after the dissolution of Parliament in 1975. Furthermore, 
it was also related more broadly to Bahrain’s policy on the Palestinian question, the 
Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war in an overarching ideological context 
informed by counter-hegemonic forces of the New Arab Left. However, while these 
conditions were a dilemma for Al Khalifa in seeking alignment with the US, a series 
of extended regional issues in the second half of the 1970s did, nonetheless, open up 
alternative alignment choices that eventually led Bahrain to participate in the GCC in 
1981. On this point, chapter 6 presents a more complex historical and sociological 
understanding of the relationship of Arab nationalism and state regional policy than 
existing analyses.  
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis. It recaps the findings of this thesis and reflects 
on some implications for potential further research. The chapter reiterates that the 
framework of Gramsci, reconstructed through three basic interrelated concepts 
informed by himself and late Gramscian scholars, provides a viable lens through which 
the relationship of Arab nationalism and state foreign policy, and more broadly 
international relations in the Gulf, can be best understood through political struggle. 
Furthermore, it also proposes that such a framework, if its usefulness has been 
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successfully demonstrated through the case of Bahrain, may open up potential avenues 
for future research on IRME and, more broadly, the study of historical sociology of 
international relations (HSIR). These claims would be over-ambitious if they did not 
have enough empirical and theoretical support, for which this thesis now starts its 




2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF GRAMSCI: 
DEVELOPMENT, IDEOLOGY AND STRUGGLE 
This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of this thesis, one taking an 
alternative approach to current understandings of the relationship of Arab nationalism 
and state policy towards regional alignment in the Middle East. It draws on the insights 
of Antonio Gramsci to conduct a historical sociological investigation of the case of 
Bahrain, with a focus on what formed Bahrain’s policy towards Gulf alignment and its 
interplay with the formation and evolution of Arab nationalism in the 1970s.  
Within the discipline of International Relations (IR), the usefulness of Gramsci 
has been introduced to IR students through Robert Cox, among others, since the 
1980s.104 While intervening in the debate among mainstream IR theories on the issue 
of the international order, Cox offers a historical IR materialist perspective, pointing 
to the significance of social forces and hegemony. As will be shown, however, this 
chapter does not fully embrace the Coxian application to IR. Instead, the insights of 
Gramsci represented in this chapter, and throughout this thesis, take a great deal from 
other historical materialists who have recently revisited Gramsci’s own understanding 
of politics and international relations.105 Their reconceptualization of Gramsci informs 
a way of problematizing and de-compartmentalising the existing analytical boundaries 
of the national-international, material-ideational and political-social factors employed 
                                                        
104 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55; Robert W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, 
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105 Adam David Morton, ‘Waiting for Gramsci: State Formation, Passive Revolution and the 
International’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35, no. 3 (2007): 597–621; Adam David 
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Eleven 117, no. 1 (2013): 20–39; Roccu, ‘Gramsci in Cairo: Neoliberal Authoritarianism, Passive 
Revolution and Failed Hegemony in Egypt under Mubarak, 1991-2010’; De Smet, Gramsci on 
Tahrir: Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt. 
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by Cox. Moreover, they rectify the Coxian blind side on state-society relations and 
their interplay with international capitalist social formation. While the role of ideas in 
international relations has been mostly anatomised through the Hobbesian, Lockean or 
Kantian logics practised by states in the international arena, 106  Gramscian works 
instead examine ideas as ideologies situated in a social totality that relate to different 
social forces on the national, regional and international scales.  
Following a version of Gramsci reappraised in a recent historical materialist 
investigation, this chapter mainly refers to ideas as ideologies rather than identities, 
seeing Arab nationalism as a type of modern ideology linked to domestic, regional and 
international sociopolitical dynamics. As a historical and sociological product of 
colonialism and capitalist social formation, Arab nationalism became a crucial 
ideological component of intellectual and popular movements in the Middle East, 
especially in the first half of the twentieth century. Its origins relate to the emergence 
of new social forces of capitalist formation. Furthermore, its evolution constantly 
corresponded to the political struggle between ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’, 
the people and the state. In this political struggle, intellectuals usually play critical 
roles in the articulation of political and social instances, and the ideological linkage 
between state and people in sociopolitical formation. In a Gramscian sense, the extent 
to which intellectuals could as such fulfil the task impacted on whether a stable 
‘historical bloc’ could be established and a top-down political reform could be 
successful under the pressure of state geopolitical and capitalist competition. If not, an 
ideological disconnection remains between the people and the state. An ideological 
integral state cannot be imposed on civil society through persuasion and consent, only 
through coercion. Therefore, when a revolutionary moment comes at a historical 
juncture of state formation, the dominant class might have difficulty in integrating its 
world view with that of civil society. To a post-colonial capitalist state, the dominant 
class is usually swamped by the struggles between different social forces and then 
faced with the dilemma of making state policy towards regional alignment within the 
orbit of the Western security pact.  
                                                        




It is in this context that this thesis examines the relationship of Arab nationalism 
and state regional policy, and through it that this chapter seeks to establish a Gramscian 
framework for the case of Bahrain in the 1970s.  
The present chapter describes a framework via Gramsci’s insights into politics 
and international relations, it offers a historical sociological account of Bahrain’s 
policy towards regional alignment and its interplay with Arab nationalism. It begins 
with a review of the Coxian contribution and critiques of it from other later historical 
materialists who seek to clarify Gramsci’s ideas. Following a reappraisal of Gramsci 
as a particular historical sociological approach drawing on historical materialism for 
this thesis, I reconstruct three interrelated concepts of Gramsci based on which I 
propose a historical sociological framework for the case of Bahrain: development, 
ideology and struggle. I then further explicate the notion of these concepts and how 
they are to be employed in the case of Bahrain. Even though this chapter proposes a 
theoretical framework to understand the relationship between ideologies and state 
regional policy, it does not intend to offer an explanation of their interplay by 
deploying positivist connotations. Rather, it seeks mainly to theorise how political 
struggle between different social forces mediates the relationship of ideologies and 
state regional policy, more specifically that of Arab nationalism and Bahrain’s policy 
towards regional alignment, through an integration of historical sociology and Gramsci.  
In doing so, the chapter follows a historical materialist rationale of examining such an 
interplay in a broader historical and sociological context and theorises how social 
drivers influence international relations in the Gulf through a Gramscian lens. 
 
2.1 Reconsidering Gramsci in International Relations 
As the introductory chapter has shown, scholarly attempts to explain ideas in 
international relations in the Middle East have been mostly influenced by a cultural 
turn in IR ever since the 1990s, referring to ideas as identity and norms. If this thesis 
attempts to give alternative accounts through a Gramscian lens, how does it respond 
to existing constructivist critiques? What is left by the Coxian approach? And what is 
the rationale and necessity for a theoretical reconstruction of Gramsci in IRME? These 
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are the questions that this section tries to answer, and then it reconsiders the application 
of Gramsci to IR.   
2.1.1 Historical materialism vs IR constructivism on ideas 
For decades, IR constructivism has been a well-known and oft-adopted approach 
to ideas in IR on the basis of its critiques of neorealism and historical materialism. 
Among these critiques of historical materialism, IR constructivism criticises mainly 
the theoretical status of historical materialism as a reductionist-economic theory. It 
argues that historical materialists fail to capture ‘the character of social and political 
phenomena, including capitalism’.107 As for Alexander Wendt, he admits that the 
material nature is represented in ‘forces of production’ but nonetheless sees ‘relations 
of production’, i.e. capitalist relations, as a cultural form of ‘shot through ideas’.108 
Yet, his attack on historical materialism ‘depends on a question-begging and narrow 
counter-position of the ideal and the material’ in the ways that he reduces the relations 
of production to institutions or rules, and ontologically compartmentalizes ideal-
material relations by overweighting ideas.109 Wendt’s attack shows his misreading of 
historical materialism. As Alex Callinicos argues, ‘the relations of production are not 
reducible to institutions or rules’ that are representations of cultural forms or ideas; 
from human history, we can see that ‘wage-labour can be institutionalized in various 
forms, differentiated, for example, according to the degree to which ‘extra-economic 
coercion’ is involved’.110 This ‘extra-economic coercion’ stems from the completion 
among states by which one impacts on another, and in which ‘the relationality of 
capital’ identifies itself in historical materialism.111  In short, the representation of 
historical materialism in Marx is much more complicated than how Wendt understands 
it.  
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If Wendt’s intention in doing so is to challenge the statement that there are 
always universalized national interests for state survival in the international arena, his 
research agenda, nonetheless, gives ideas an explanatory primacy for defining national 
interests and sees the social ties among states as causal consequences of practised ideas. 
This rationale, as shown earlier in chapter 1, has signposted an approach for IR 
scholars on ideas in the Middle East. The ways in which states perceive politics have 
been determined by how state leaders progress ‘dialogues’ on the basis of a shared 
identity embedded in a cultural normative structure.112 Such a view gives more weight 
to ideational factors than material ones, to the international than the domestic level. 
Furthermore, Arab nationalism has been conceived in an analytically and socially 
constructed term as Arabism in IRME. Its ideational incompatibility with modern 
sovereignty norms sets out different world views and rules for states in the 
international arena and leads to their divergent behaviours. This ideational conflict has 
then substantiated the argument that Bahraini and Gulf politics can be explained by 
the conflict deriving from distinctive sectarian identities, notably the conflict between 
Sunni and Shia Muslims.  
But from a historical materialist perspective, what Wendt overlooks is the class 
antagonism displaced by identifying national interests.113 As such, investigation of the 
linkage of ideational and material factors must be placed within comprehensive but 
sophisticated and dynamic social relations, seeing a dialectical relationship between 
them. Specifically as regards the case of Bahrain, a much deeper materialistic socio-
political structure needs be analytically juxtaposed with ideas in a representation of 
social relations. Moving beyond this compartmentalisation of ideational and material 
factors facilitates an analysis proceeding with what Fred Halliday called a ‘necessary 
encounter’ between historical materialism and IR, if offers an alternative antidote to 
explain ideas in international relations in both a historical and a sociological sense.114 
It then frees one from the fetishism of the widely accepted sectarian explanation of 
Bahraini and Gulf politics.  
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Regardless of a more in-depth discussion of the contrast between these two 
theoretical paradigms, I purposely sketch out only the fundamental differences 
between IR constructivist and historical materialist understandings of ideas in 
international relations. But, how do IR historical materialists explain ideas beyond 
idealist and cultural accounts? This question leads the chapter to the following review 
of Robert Cox’s attempt to bring Gramsci into IR.  
2.1.2 Coxian attempt and its general critiques  
As a seminal intervention into IR, Robert Cox is an important figure proposing 
a Gramscian framework for examining ideas in IR, especially in the field of 
International Political Economy (IPE), from the tradition of historical materialism. 
Cox identifies three constitutive elements of the configuration of forces in international 
relations: material capabilities, ideas and institutions, representing, respectively, 
‘forms of states’, ‘social forces’ and ‘world orders’ among which no unitary causal 
relationship can be assumed but a reciprocal one.115 The dialectic relationship among 
these elements is, for Cox, predicated upon a particular historical structure to which it 
relates, and in which the rise of a rival structure represents ‘alternative possibilities of 
development’.116 Ideas as social forces play a sufficient role, in conjunction with 
material capabilities and institutions, to establish a hegemony, an equivalent concept 
of stability, like Pax-Britannica in the nineteenth century or Pax-Americana in the 
twentieth century117. For Cox, ideas are taken as ‘an historical structure’, much like 
Gramsci’s historical bloc, and ‘collective images of social order’ that register ‘the 
nature and the legitimacy of prevailing power relations, the meanings of justice and 
public good’.118 In the mid-nineteenth century, for example, liberal internationalism 
underlay the global capitalism directed by Britain’s hegemony in a universal form of 
‘comparative advantage, free trade and the gold standard’.119 But in the late-nineteenth 
century, Britain confronted the shift in the balance of power in Europe and the 
emergence of protectionism. Counter-hegemonic forces gradually undermined the 
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established British historical bloc in the world.120 These forces were created by the 
inter-ruling class in an international domain that shaped a global and transnational 
class structure beyond national boundaries.121 As a historical materialist attempt, Cox 
indeed sheds new light on the significance of ideas to IR in a picture of class relations 
in the international arena and substantiates his challenge to neorealist statements. 
However, Cox’s historical materialist explanation of international relations 
suffers from its critiques.122 He categorises historical materialism into two divergent 
forms by their methodological application: one he largely adopts is an emphasis on 
historical methods by reasoning social relations historically; the other one involves 
breaking away from historical knowledge and conceptualising the mode of production 
as a static analytical framework.123 This categorisation of historical materialism serves 
his theoretical purpose of analysing the dialectic historical structure of international 
hegemony by shunning a complex analysis of the mode of production. That is, the 
historical and sociological meaning of mode of production is not fully appreciated in 
Cox. Moreover, Cox’s application of Gramsci actually implants domestic logics by 
making an analogy and a ‘transition’ to international relations124. Although, as Cox 
argues, Gramsci acknowledged that ‘basic changes in international power relations or 
[the] world order, which are observed as changes in the military-strategic and 
geopolitical balance, can be traced to fundamental changes in social relations’,125 Cox 
takes traced as being more like a methodological meaning rather than an 
epistemological one. Thus, Cox takes the mode of production seen historically for 
granted and fails to recognise the expansionist nature of capitalism, a crucial 
sociological characteristic of international capitalist relations. As criticised by Benno 
Teschke, in Cox’s work ‘[t]he attendant emphasis on inter-ruling class relations … is 
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radicalized by a failure to trace the geographical expansion of capitalism across a 
territorially preconstituted inter-state system, which is itself taken for granted, but 
described as being in place by the time of the Treaty of Westphalia’. As such, Cox also 
fails to include historical progress along with the ‘protracted but progressive inter-
national expansion of the capital relation in its encounter with specific territorially 
contained correlations of social forces that gave rise to regionally specific resolutions 
of state-society relations’.126  
While overlooking the progress of expansion and the intrusion of capitalism into 
differentially located societies, unfortunately, Cox’s proposal to bring ideas back into 
IR via historical materialism still fails to fully explicates the historical and sociological 
meaning of ideas in the international arena. Although he maintains that ‘the problem 
of changing world order’ and the place ‘where a historical bloc can be founded’ need 
to rely on explaining the national context,127 he does not unpack further how the 
national context corresponds to international relations in forming a historical bloc. His 
omission of the national-international linkage and the secret of capitalism − its 
expansionist nature − seems to neglect one of the basic elements of historical 
materialism. It is to see social relations as a totality considering the dialectical 
relationship between the national and the international context, the material and 
ideational factors, and political and social instances. Actually, this is how Gramsci 
developed his understanding of historical materialism and thereby his elucidation of 
ideas in politics.  
2.1.3 Reconstruction of Gramsci 
If Cox’s interpretation and application of Gramsci to IR seems problematic, why 
and how do I need to build up an alternative Gramscian framework to the Coxian one? 
A statement by Peter Thomas probably gives a reminder of the task of reconstructing 
Gramsci: 
Gramsci’s vision of Marxism insists upon its constitution as a political moment 
capable of explaining the historical emergence of all ideologies, including itself. 
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It is precisely in that sense, in terms of making the possibilities for social and 
political transformation that are immanent to existing forms of thought 
comprehensible, that a historical materialist interdisciplinary programme still 
has a contribution to make today.128 
As stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis attempts to revisit Arab nationalism 
in international relations in the Middle East in the post-1967 phase. By reconsidering 
other histories of Arab nationalism from below and around intellectual and popular 
movements, it then allows us to challenge and give alternative accounts, which ‘are 
immanent to existing forms of thought comprehensible’ but have been overlooked in 
terms addressing ‘a political moment’ in a different way, to the widely accepted 
argument of the demise of Arab nationalism after 1967 in the region.   
However, as shown earlier, the simplified Coxian version of Gramsci seems 
insufficient to perform such a task. Some aspects of Gramsci have been overshadowed 
by his compartmentalisation of the totality of social relations. First, when Cox 
overlooks the expansionist nature of capitalism, he has already missed out the 
historical dimension of Gramsci’s work, which is not so much about methods as about 
the subject of history. It is about an investigation into what has been driving history 
forward, an analytical history of social formation and transformation and, for IR, an 
‘enquiry into the international dimension of processes’ of these formations.129 Second, 
when Cox refers to social forces as various ideas exercised by states in the international 
arena, he appears to narrow the notion of social forces. Yet, in the tradition of historical 
materialism, the notion of social forces has been mostly juxtaposed with discussion of 
the mode of production, the capitalist one in particular. It relates to the ‘existence or 
non-existence’ of classes of a social formation.130  In other words, social forces are not 
just created by an inter-ruling class and represented in an inter-state competition. They 
also derive from the bottom of society and then underlie the struggle between the 
dominant class and subordinate ones. Third, when Cox uses the notion of hegemony 
in explaining how a historical structure transforms into another through the 
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rearticulation of three constitutive elements, he identifies how, in the inter-state 
competition, he has not touched upon how such an international transformation could 
be exercised in the national context and how the state responds to society if there are 
any repercussions. This omission then leads one to avoid a discussion of hegemony by 
linking other social agents to the national context in the Coxian brand of Gramsci. But 
they constitute crucial parts of Gramsci’s own understanding of hegemony that 
appeared in his seminal article on ‘the Southern Question’,131 and later in the concept 
of passive revolution.   
These aspects, overlooked by Cox, are, however, crucial to my task to examine 
Arab nationalism in the international relations of the Middle East and its interplay with 
state regional policy and the histories of Arab nationalism. Therefore, I move beyond 
and reformulate the Coxian brand of Gramsci by rectifying its rather systemic and 
compartmentalised approach. In doing so, I argue that a theoretical reconstruction of 
Gramsci in IR appears to be necessary via three concepts informed by Gramsci − 
development, ideology and struggle. These concepts are interrelated in a total 
theoretical framework in light of Gramsci’s ‘philosophy of praxis’,132 or what Roberto 
Roccu specifically calls ‘historical dialectical materialism’. As Roccu argues, this first 
refers to:  
Gramsci’s conception of history as both contingency and necessity. The second 
refers to Gramsci’s use of the dialectic as both interaction of opposites within 
unity and process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Lastly, materialism is 
conceived as the transcendence of methaphysical and sectarian conceptions of 
both materialism and idealism, towards an integral philosophy… .133 
Going beyond Gramsci himself, the three interrelated concepts also draw on other 
recent Gramscian works on reconceptualising and reappraising some insights of 
Gramsci. These concepts allow a historical sociological investigation of the case of 
Bahrain by examining: first, Bahraini socio-formation during and after the British 
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colonial era in which Arab nationalism in Bahrain originated and evolved with the 
emergence of different social forces; second, the ideological development of Arab 
nationalism and its connection to both the state and civil society; and third, the struggle 
among different antagonistic social forces and the ways in which they practise 
hegemony and counter-hegemony. The following sections then outline these concepts 
respectively. 
 
2.2 Development: Towards Late-coming Capitalist Formation 
The first concept of development lays the cornerstone for embarking on a 
historical sociological investigation in this thesis. While ‘historical sociology in IR has 
indeed been waiting for Gramsci’,134 to tease out Gramsci’s own understanding of 
international relations seems to be the first step in a reconstruction of him. As Adam 
David Morton argues, Gramsci’s contribution to the historical sociology of IR lies in 
his: 
…articulation of capitalism across different scales, with the argument drawing 
on his specific understanding of the positioning of both ‘national’ relations 
within the conditioning of ‘the international’ to reveal a theory of hegemony and 
passive revolution cognisant of the spatial divisions of geopolitics.135 
But what does ‘the international’ mean and how does it help in the task of 
reconstructing Gramsci through the illustrative case of Bahrain? 
2.2.1 Gramsci on ‘the international’ 
 I argue that Gramsci’s understanding of international relations is best understood 
through the prism of ‘the international’, which has been brought up in recent HSIR. It 
has informed a historical sociological rationale to solve the problematic 
compartmentalisation which, as noted earlier, is a major drawback in Coxian work and 
other mainstream IR scholarship. This rationale encapsulates both international and 
domestic social relations and dialectically links ideational and material factors. Yet, 
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such a rationale has rarely been appreciated and examined properly, i.e. in depth, in 
IR, except for its subfield of FPA.136 Although Cox implants Gramsci’s ideas into IPE, 
he and others, dubbed neo-Gramscian scholars, somehow overlook the most critical 
part of Gramsci on international relations, which is underlain by Gramsci’s 
understanding of capitalism. As Gramsci argues, 
[C]apitalism is a world historical phenomenon, and its uneven development 
means that individual nations cannot be at the same level of economic 
development at the same time. In the international sphere, competition, the 
struggle to acquire private and national property, creates the same hierarchies 
and system of slavery as in the national sphere; and further, competition is 
eliminated in favour of monopoly far more efficiently in the international than 
in the national sphere.137  
From the above passage, it could be argued that the Coxian brand of Gramsci has its 
own blind side on development, which derives from the historical and sociological 
connotations of capitalism. And it is, I maintain, the concept through which the social 
bases for Gramsci regarding his ideas on international relations have been laid out and 
via which my reformulation of Gramsci in this thesis starts.  
 There has been a debate on whether Gramsci’s insights into various political 
aspects of social formation from the Italian historical experience can be applied beyond 
the national context and furthermore ‘internationalised’ beyond the Coxian vein.138 
Following on from this, Morton argues positively for the usefulness of Gramsci’s ideas 
being situated ‘in and beyond their context’,139 and Peter Ives and Nicola Short further 
echo that:  
Gramsci begins analytically from a ‘global’ position focused on politics and 
political community in which the historical formation of the modern nation-state 
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is theorised … [and his insights show] consistent attention to the mutually 
constitutive relationship between [the national and international context], even 
when the ‘national’ was his apparent focus of discussion.140 
In this regard, Gramsci can be seen as:  
…an avowedly ‘international theorist which does not require his concepts to be 
‘scaled-up’ from the ‘national’ to ‘the international’ due to his inherent interest 
in the intertwining of the relations of force across different territorial and 
geographic scales of uneven development.141  
Moreover, while Gramsci shared in Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky’s ‘attempt to 
inherit and transform key elements of previous Marxist concepts of revolution’, albeit 
despite their ‘different strategic consequences’ of ‘passive revolution’ on the one hand 
and of ‘permanent revolution’ on the other, 142  I argue that his understanding of 
international relations did indeed share intellectual affinities with Trotsky in seeing 
‘the international’ as bearing inter-societal logic. This has resonated recently with 
HSIR, since the concept of ‘the international’ has been interrogated by some IR 
historical materialists reformulating Trotsky’s idea of uneven and combined 
development.143 Instead of merely being about interactions among states, IR can be 
examined through social analysis with an ‘international imagination’ that is ‘to grasp 
the rise, the components, the shape of the specifically modern international system as 
a definite, historically developing set of relations between people’144. As such, inter-
societal logic denotes that international relations should be examined as interrelations 
among different social formations, which have brought about ‘an interdependence not 
just of events but also of the structure of social, material and cultural life’.145  
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 In applying such logic to the question of ideas in IR, inter-societal logic helps to 
explain how modern ideologies derive from a historical juncture when capitalist social 
relations expanded into and then combined with a pre-capitalist, or backward, society 
through an advanced capitalist state. Since every society has gone through a different 
historical process, the characteristic of unevenness can be noted among different 
societies by considering their own social formation. In the capitalist epoch, the notion 
of unevenness thus moves beyond its primitive geographical and ecological variation 
by acquiring ‘a sharpness owing to the universalizing logics of capital expressed 
through competitive pressures, leading to an inter-societal process of comparison’.146 
Furthermore, it sets a historical prerequisite for the coming combination of different 
forms of social formation. 
2.2.2 ‘Historically concrete combination’ in development 
 What does such combination mean? Justin Rosenberg sees it in an abstract way, 
as an interdependent structure of social, material and cultural life, so the notion of 
combination might vary in terms of how such a mechanism is defined by what has 
been ‘combined’ concretely in historical analyses. For this, Jessica Evans suggests 
looking for those mechanisms of combination that: 
…condition the integration of so-called backward social formations intro global 
capitalist market relations and…directly affect the transformation of social class 
relations and property relations and, hence, the logics and conditions within 
which reproduction and accumulation are practi[s]ed.147 
As a consequence of such mechanisms being practised, a combined social formation 
revealed in late-coming capitalist societies does not usually copy stories from 
advanced capitalist ones, nor promise a linear trajectory of progression. Rather, the 
process of social formation invariably takes multilinear trajectories under international 
pressure and usually sees exploitation and contestation as a form of colonialism or 
imperialism in these societies. At this point, inter-societal logic becomes concrete in 
various forms of the accumulation, flow and competition of capital in and between 
societies, which generates various social forces and classes defined by their position 
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in the capitalist mode of production. For Gramsci, this way of seeing international 
relations through inter-societal logic in the concept of ‘the international’ underlines his 
understanding of ideas in international relations and has appeared in some historical 
sociological works. 148  Although Gramsci never analysed international relations 
systematically, he nonetheless asserted that international relations do precede such 
logic, given the nature of capitalism and the inter-societal ontology of international 
relations.149 This logic allows us to explain the social conditions and contexts from 
which the meaning of ideologies is substantiated, along with different social forces in 
the political struggle between the people and the ruling authorities. This has been the 
foremost characteristic of the concept of development adopted in this thesis. 
 It must be reiterated that while Gramsci is well-known for his insightful 
investigation of the ideological linkage between ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’ 
on a national scale, as will be discussed later, he did not prioritise ‘the domestic’ social 
logic over ‘the international’, as Cox seems to suggest. Instead, he recognised the 
extent to which international pressure could cause domestic political ripples. As he 
argues:  
[T]he more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to 
international relations, the more a particular party will come to represent this 
situation and to exploit it, with the aim of preventing rival parties gaining [the] 
upper hand.150   
Of this encounter between ‘the international’ and ‘the national’ in the epoch of 
capitalism, the dominant class attempts to seek general interests among subordinate 
ones. The state plays a role in coordinating any conflicts of interest among these groups 
along with the process of state formation. It is a continuous process in which, as 
Gramsci further argues,  
…international relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-sates, 
creating new, unique and historically concrete combinations. A particular 
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ideology, for instance, born in a highly developed country, is disseminated in 
less developed countries, impinging on the local interplay of combinations. This 
relation between international forces and national forces is further complicated 
by the existence within every State of several structurally diverse territorial 
sectors, with diverse relations of forces at all levels.151 
 For the case of Bahrain, Gramsci on ‘the international’ helps to explain 
Bahraini social formation from which Arab nationalism and its related social forces 
emerged, and his reference to a ‘historically concreted combination’ is defined as a 
mechanism for combined different modes of production, which gave rise to capitalist 
modernity realised in Bahrain through British colonialism. The expansion of 
capitalism through British propulsive modernisation in Bahrain and the realisation of 
oil commodification since the 1920s and ’30s resulted in a combination of Bahraini 
society and global capitalism under British colonialism. This combination fed a 
context for the emergence of newly-defined class relations and different contradictory 
social forces, which will be further elaborated in chapter 3 through Tom Nairn’s 
perspective of development and nationalism in peripheral areas. It then led to Arab 
nationalism whose political connotations were represented through intellectual and 
popular movements. Since the 1920s, while these movements have been continuously 
questioning a series of contested socio-political issues in society, Arab nationalism in 
Bahrain has been evolving over time. In response to Bahraini capitalist social 
formation, the demands of Bahraini intellectual and popular movements were 
increasingly corresponding to the political agendas of regional and international anti-
imperialist movements. 
2.2.3 The Crisis and historical restoration: passive revolution 
The concept of development is also useful in that it helps to make sense of the 
moment of crisis in which Bahraini social formation arrived at another historical 
conjuncture: Bahrain’s formal independence and decolonisation. While this thesis 
aims to revisit the interplay of Arab nationalism and state regional policy by 
highlighting other histories of Arab nationalism, the struggle between the people and 
the Al Khalifa regime as result of development comes into focus. In the case of Bahrain, 
the two regional revolutions − Marxist-Leninist and Iranian − in the 1970s had never 
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looked like turning Bahrain into more revolutionary soil, like its counterparts of Oman, 
South Yemen and Iran. But it did bring ‘the crisis’ to Al Khalifa as the ruling class. As 
such, before I further explain how Bahrain’s policy toward Gulf alignment was shaped 
along with the evolution of Arab nationalism, a discussion of Gramsci on the concept 
of crisis and passive revolution is instructive to the concept of development.   
For Gramsci, the concept of crisis refers to the moment when the hegemonic 
status of the ruling class was unstable and no longer reached consensus with other 
subordinate classes but exercised coercive force.152 The crisis  
…occurs either because the ruling [class] has failed in some major political 
undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the 
broad masses (war, for example), or because huge masses (especially of peasants 
and petit-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from a state of political 
passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together, 
albeit not organically formulated, add up to a revolution.153  
To manage a crisis and prevent it turning into revolution, the ruling class appropriates 
‘passive revolution’ to reconstitute a historical bloc and displace the momentum of 
revolution.154 In passive revolution, Gramsci has never given a strict definition of it, 
only elaborated its connotations from the experience of the Italian Risorgimento, the 
Italian unification movement from 1815 to 1871. It is ‘‘revolution’ without a 
‘revolution’’155 and,  
…the fact [is] that what was involved was not a social group which ‘led’ other 
groups, but a State which, even though it had limitations as a power, ‘led’ the 
group which should have been ‘leading’ and was able to put at the latter’s 
disposal an army and a politico-diplomatic strength.156 
                                                        
152 Gramsci, 275–76. 
153 Gramsci, 210. 
154 For passive revolution, Gramsci also juxtaposes a metaphorical concept of Caesarism with it. As 
Gramsci defines, Caesarism is ‘…a situation in which the forces in conflict balance each other in a 
catastrophic manner; that is to say, they balance each other in such a way that a continuation of the 
conflict can only terminate in their reciprocal destruction. When the progressive force A struggles 
with the reactionary force B, not only may A defeat B or B defeat A, but it may happen that neither A 
nor B defeats the other− that they bleed each other mutually and then a third force C intervenes from 
outside, subjugating what is left of both A and B’. Gramsci, 219.  
155 Gramsci, 59. 
156 Gramsci, 105. 
54 
 
As such, its representation can be much grappled with, along with some dynamics one 
finds from historical processes, like ‘top-down transformation or ‘revolution from 
above’, gradual modifications to the existing historical bloc, the extension of the state, 
a technical solution to hegemony, displacement of subaltern agency, the duration of 
capitalism, uneven and combined development…, reformism…’. 157  However one 
conceptualises passive revolution, the most widely accepted notion can be summarised 
as: a critical historical process alongside which newly formative social forces emerge 
and intervene in the existing political struggle between progressive or reactionary 
forces and, if successful, fulfil a historical restoration along with a social 
transformation as a result.  
To resonate with Gramsci on ‘the international’ characterised by uneven and 
combined development, such a historical restoration, notes Gramsci, was distinctive 
between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’, as they might react to a crisis differently. In more 
advanced states like those in the West, state-society relations maintain a more balanced 
complex in which civil society has evolved into a sturdy stage, and might be resistant 
to fundamental changes to this equilibrium and thus avoid disastrous revolutions. On 
the ideological level, a system of ideas within this complex is protected by trench-
systems of modern warfare, a metaphor Gramsci uses. It would not be fully destroyed 
over time or at speed, only challenged by the that adopt a strategy of a ‘war of 
position’.158  
For Gramsci, the distinction between East and West emerges from the different 
historical development since the late 19th century. When the Jacobin experience 
reinforced the role of ‘civil society’ and the concept of ‘permanent revolution’ after 
1789, the experience of the colonial expansion of Europe nonetheless set the stage for 
internal and international changes to the State; it then prepared the State, or political 
society, to carve out its relations with civil society and establish its hegemony through 
a more complex and massive structure of modern democracies from the late 19th 
century onwards. It redirected the opposition strategy from a ‘war of movement’ to a 
‘war of position’, and the concept of ‘permanent revolution’ was to a large extent 
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stifled on European soil. But, historical experiences as such were only applied to 
Europe instead of backward countries and the colonies.159 In more backward states, 
such as in the East, political society plays a dominant role in the state-society complex 
and overwhelms civil society, and the system of ideas is subject to fundamental 
changes. Once the State was shaken by crisis and even taken by revolutionaries who 
waged a war of movement and a ‘frontal attack’ on political society, a reconstituted 
state-society complex might be followed by certain changes to a historical bloc: 
changes to the unity of superstructure and structure along with the success of 
revolution, i.e. a re-articulation of political and social instances of certain social 
formations.  
In the case of Bahrain, crisis came to Al Khalifa with the outbreak of the Marxist-
Leninist revolution in Arabia and the Islamic revolution in Iran. In these revolutionary 
moments, one can see how counter-hegemonic intellectuals questioned and challenged 
some fundamental issues about Al Khalifa and the contested subject of sovereignty. 
More broadly, these issues were also related to intellectual reflections on existing 
social relations on the national, regional and international levels. Meanwhile, one can 
also see how Al Khalifa tried to align alternative social forces against counter-
hegemonic ones by continuously exercising its ruling will over the historical bloc on 
which it relies over time. However, the most remarkable part of the Bahraini case is 
that while counter-hegemonic forces did not overthrow the regime, a historical 
restoration of passive revolution was not achieved either, leaving a dilemma for Al 
Khalifa in forming policy towards regional alignment with the US in the 1970s.  
The concept of passive revolution is empirically supported by the case of Bahraini 
sociopolitical reforms between 1971 and 1975, with a focus on the parliamentary 
experiment in 1973. The evolution of the parliamentary experiment shows that ‘the 
international’, as conceived in Gramsci and noted earlier, resonates with Trotsky’s 
ideas of uneven and combined development of capitalist social formation having an 
impact on Arab nationalism and its dialectical relations with Bahrain’s regional 
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policy.160 While the features of capitalist development seem to substantiate Gramsci’s 
concept of ‘passive revolution’ as a ‘molecular process through which class demands 
from below are absorbed from above’ under the international pressure of other 
societies161, a successful case did not, however, show itself in Bahrain. 
 An incomplete passive revolution, as will be shown in chapter 5, was represented 
in the dissolution of the parliamentary experiment in 1975 and Al Khalifa’s rejection 
of reviving the idea of popular political participation. I argue that this failure was 
because of two major reasons that relate to the broader impact of international 
capitalist social formation conceived in the concept of development. On the one hand, 
the intellectual and popular movements around Arab nationalism at the point of 
Bahrain’s formal independence in 1971 had shifted revolutionarily from their 
predecessor to more leftward leaning Arab nationalists, the New Arab Left movements. 
This revolutionary intellectual shift was a result of the compound effects of 
geopolitical competition and capitalist formation in the Middle East, be it the Naksa 
of the 1967 war or evolution of the oil-producing mode in the Gulf. As a counter-
hegemonic force, the New Arab Left was calling for, or interpellating, a new historical 
bloc vis-à-vis the established one Al Khalifa inherited from the British protectorate era. 
After the British withdrawal, Al Khalifa attempted to connect itself ideologically with 
civil society through organic intellectuals of the old cadres of the Arab nationalist 
movement (ANM). Yet their leadership in popular movements at this point had been 
displaced by counter-revolutionary intellectual ones of the New Arab Left. This meant 
Al Khalifa had difficulty in achieving a successful passive revolution and failed to 
incorporate different social forces. As a consequence, the struggle between civil 
society and the regime was not resolved and carried on with the issue of sovereignty 
conflated with the US military presence in Bahrain in the 1970s. On the other hand, 
this struggle within Bahrain raised the suspicions of neighbouring states, like Saudi 
Arabia, whose economic support to Bahrain was critical to the material resources on 
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which Al Khalifa counted. Under Saudi pressure the parliamentary experiment was 
terminated and never revived in the period covered by this thesis.  Al Khalifa’s initial 
objective of launching a passive revolution as ‘the conceptual antipode of permanent 
revolution’ failed.162 
 In sum, the concept of development informed by other scholars’ reformulations 
of Gramsci’s ideas beyond the Coxian brand helps to explain two historical processes 
in Bahrain in the twentieth century. First, it explains the emergence of social forces 
around the origins of Arab nationalism, along with Bahraini social formation under 
British colonialism. Moreover, second, it explains the historical conjuncture of 
Bahraini formal independence. At this conjuncture, Al Khalifa sought a passive 
revolution to resolve the struggle in Bahrain and then attempted to restore its ruling 
status. While this concept offers a Gramscian lens through which to outline the social 
bases for Arab nationalism, the present chapter has not as yet conceptualised terms 
related to the concept of development, like ideologies, historical bloc, hegemony, 
counter-hegemony and intellectuals. In the following sections, I will elucidate these 
concepts and their application to the case of Bahrain.   
 
2.3 Ideology: Some Political Aspects of Social Formation 
As this thesis will constantly stress, ideas are supposed to be seen as a set of 
ideologies through which people interpret politics and give both normative and 
positivist answers to the established order, be it domestic or international.163  The 
notion of these ideologies does not stem from ‘timeless and continuous culture’ but is 
driven by sociopolitical dynamics as ‘creatures of historical and sociological 
forces’. 164  Therefore, the representation of ideas, or ideologies, in international 
relations has its own universality across cultural differences and is best understood 
through examining both the structure and practices to which it is related. As such, ideas 
in international relations in the Middle East are not exclusively understood as religious 
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and ethnic components, but correspond to broader sociopolitical dynamics along with 
capitalist social formation. This is the task of conceptualising ideologies beyond 
culture and state boundaries, which the chapter now undertakes through the integration 
of historical sociology and my own interpretation of Gramsci.  
2.3.1 Ideas as ideologies: willed vs organic  
For those who have ever attempted to shed light on the international dimension 
of ideas and give an alternative explanation of how ideas work in international 
relations through a historical materialist lens, it seems that this task has been achieved 
neither completely nor theoretically. Fred Halliday argues that ‘ideas … must rather 
be seen in relation to the totality and to this material determination within it, defined 
by the forces and relations of production’.165 But, while he recognizes that ideas as 
ideologies ‘are not necessarily simply modular or mimetic but are reflections of the 
different [and uneven] geo-temporal effects of capitalism’, he nonetheless does not 
detail the context theoretically and empirically in IR, let alone further unpack how the 
domestic political dynamic corresponds to it.166 The statement that ideas should be 
considered as historical and sociological products still needs further investigation in 
order to evaluate the rationale of historical materialism in IR. 
Gramsci’s theorisation of ideology offers a supplement, it ‘signifies not [a] 
falsity as opposed to a truth, but the way in which social groups make sense of their 
world and construct themselves as social groups’.167 Therefore, ‘ideologies are such 
only when historically effective and operative in the organisation of a society that 
extends beyond merely individual ideas’.168 For Gramsci, ideology has its own aspect 
of ‘sensationalism’ that is associated with religious faith and can be investigated 
through scientific analyses of ideas. But, when it passes to a specific ‘system of ideas’, 
the notion of ideology needs to be understood in a historical sense as a superstructure, 
which constitutes a unity with a structure conceptualised by Gramsci as a historical 
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bloc, a historical materialist theorisation of the state, which will be covered in detail in 
a later section. Seeing ideology in this way, I would nonetheless like to highlight the 
concept of ideology per se by noting the nuance of ideology elaborated by Gramsci. 
This nuance informs a crucial analytical avenue for this thesis by examining the 
evolution of Arab nationalism and its interplay with the ideological ties between state 
and society, i.e. willed ideology and organic ideology. As Gramsci reminds us: 
One must … distinguish between historically organic ideologies, those, that is, 
which are necessary to a given structure, and ideologies that are arbitrary, 
rationalistic, or ‘willed’. To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary 
they have a validity which is ‘psychological’; they ‘organise’ human masses, 
and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their 
position, struggle, etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary they only create 
individual ‘movements’, polemics and so on.169 
Such a Gramscian lens of willed and organic ideology has also been applied to the 
Middle East. It explains how some Middle East regimes, like Egypt, Syria and Iran, 
exercise Ba’athism and Islamism as willed ideologies, and how they establish an 
‘ideological hegemony’ to which the organic ideologies of popular movements and 
willed ideologies are linked and thereby buttress state foreign policy towards 
alignments.170   
In the case of Bahrain, the historical conditions and processes generated by 
uneven and combined development have, however, made such congruency difficult 
and instead lead to more contradictory sociopolitical bases for a linkage between the 
willed ideology of Al Khalifa and the organic ideology of Bahraini civil society. This 
ideological disconnection was conditioned by the Bahraini capitalist social formation 
conceived in the concept of development. As will be shown in chapter 3, it took root 
ever since the moment when Bahrain kicked off the process of its encounter with the 
global capitalist market via oil commodification under British colonial tutelage. Since 
then, this process has been feeding the content of Bahrain’s contested capitalist 
modernity via which state-society relations have been conceived through a British 
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‘colonial ethnosectarian gaze’, as Omar AlShehabi terms it, since then.171 Moreover, 
the view through such a colonial lens, as I will argue later in the thesis, supported by 
historical evidence, of a demarcating society along ethnosectarian lines then feeds Al 
Khalifa regime’s willed ideology and its rule. 
Beyond such a form of willed ideology, the development from the late 1930s to 
the 1960s also gave momentum to the evolution of an organic ideology in Bahraini 
civil society. A series of labour and popular movements exposed the contradictions 
between the regime and society. It then facilitated bringing ‘foreign political subjects’, 
informed by various ideological trends of anti-imperialism, into those movements and 
reflected upon the sociopolitical linkage of Bahrain to its external surroundings. The 
trajectory of labour movements was evolving from the demands for better working 
conditions to challenges to the British colonialism behind the Al Khalifa regime, and 
from latent political reform agendas to more conspicuous revolutionary goals 
propounded by pan-Arab nationalist and socialist ideas in the 1950s and ’60s. The 
conflictual sociopolitical bases, as result of ‘the international dimension of social 
transformation’,172 then polarised the different social forces within Bahrain, especially 
between the New Arab Left intellectuals and Al Khalifa and its allies. By the time 
Bahrain attained its formal independence during the crisis of regional revolutions, 
Arab nationalism was not yet seen as a congruency between willed and organic 
ideologies.   
2.3.2 National-popular collective will  
If ideology is categorised into willed and organic ones, as suggested by Gramsci, 
what do they mean to Arab nationalism? And how do we conceptualise Arab 
nationalism through Gramsci in the case of Bahrain, although he seemed to rarely 
address directly the issue of nationalism?  For this, I argue that Arab nationalism could 
be conceptualised within the concept of ‘national-popular collective will’ proposed by 
Gramsci.   
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Resonating with the preceding discussion on willed ideology, a collective will is 
a political will, which is usually referred to ‘as [the ruling class’s] operative awareness 
of historical necessity, as [its] protagonist of a real and effective historical drama’.173 
It is ‘a creation of concrete phantasy which acts on dispersed and shattered people’ by 
organising an alternative collective will,174 which ‘is to be sought in the existence of 
certain specific social groups’ within civil society as the national-popular collective 
will. 175  For Gramsci, the formation of a national-popular collective will usually 
depends on the awakening of a Jacobin force, a revolutionary bourgeois force, and it 
is the foundation of modern states.176 Historically, such a force derives from urban 
social groups whose emergence is due to ‘an adequate development in the field of 
industrial production’ and who have obtained ‘a certain level of historical-political 
culture’.177 However, their emergence does not necessarily lead to the  formation of a 
national-popular will unless ‘the great mass of peasant farmers bursts simultaneously 
into political life’. 178  Such an alliance between the urban bourgeoisie and rural 
peasants is crucial, as Gramsci also highlights in ‘the Southern Question’ on the 
necessity of a class alliance between Northern workers and Southern peasants,179 in 
order to organise a national-popular collective will and then unify counter-hegemonic 
forces to oust an existing hegemonic ruling class.  
Following the above rationale, Gramsci further notes that the concepts of 
‘national’ and ‘popular’ and their connotations for sovereignty might vary across 
contexts due to the varying extent of ideological linkage between intellectuals and the 
people.180 This variation, I argue, leads to contestation of the subject of sovereignty as 
shown in the Bahraini case in this thesis. As such, I further argue that Arab nationalism 
is best understood as a ‘national-popular collective will’ rather than the shared identity 
and structural norms mainly suggested by IR constructivists. Moreover, its 
connotations for sovereignty go beyond the IR constructivist binary perspective of 
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Arab nationalism and sovereignty and are examined through a process in which 
different social forces struggle with each other. The process, as will be shown in 
chapter 4, speaks to the rise of the New Arab Left as a counter-hegemonic force of 
Arab nationalism. Also, it speaks in chapter 5 to Al Khalifa’s tactics to prevent such a 
‘national-popular collective will’ from being organised within Bahraini civil society, 
as well as to preserve ‘the consciousness of the subordinate masses at the level of 
corporate consciousness’181 through an attempted passive revolution in support of the 
regime’s hegemony.      
 
2.4 Struggle: Hegemony and Counter-hegemony 
In the preceding sections, I have sought to outline two concepts − development 
and ideology − informed by Gramsci in support of my reformulation of Gramsci as a 
historical sociological framework for ideas in IR. While considering, nonetheless, the 
significance of social bases to understandings of ideologies, I do not intend to argue 
that their evolution and influence on state foreign policy are determined by 
development. Instead, I will argue that the relationship of ideologies and foreign policy, 
more specifically that of Arab nationalism and state policy towards regional alignment, 
is mediated by a political struggle between different social forces. Then, the struggle 
affects whether a stable historical bloc and hegemony can be established by the ruling 
class in support of its policy. For this, this chapter draws on Peter Thomas’ 
interpretation of Gramsci and turns to elaborate the last concept of my reformulation 
of Gramsci: struggle. 
2.4.1 Historical bloc and hegemony 
If historical materialism has been criticised for not having a theory of state for a 
long time, Gramsci’s elaboration of ‘historical bloc’ and ‘hegemony’ did try to defend 
such critiques and carve out a terrain for a historical materialist discussion of state, 
which is an alternative one to a Weberian account, within the traditions of historical 
                                                        




sociology. For Gramsci, a historical bloc refers to a unity of structure and 
superstructure in which,  
…precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though 
this distinction between form and content has purely dialectic value, since the 
material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the 
ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces.182 
While the historical and sociological sense of ideas is explicated by Gramsci’s 
dialectical relationship of structure-superstructure, the dialectics gives a theoretical 
foundation to my understanding of the state of Bahrain in this thesis. In such a 
dialectics, ideas are not anchored in a timeless cultural context so that, for example, 
they give birth to a unitary and uncontested notion of Arab nationalism. Rather, Arab 
nationalism has been seen as representing realpolitik as ideology, which sometimes 
reflects, or envisages, a form of the actual material content. As such, a stable historical 
bloc does not rely on a mysterious and unfathomable culture shared among the ruling 
class and subordinated ones. Instead, it mirrors and relates to social relations in which 
one usually finds a political leadership, which enables the creation of a dialectical unity 
of political and social instances through a particular formation and helms historical 
processes through different social forces. 
As such, for Gramsci, political leadership represents a hegemony. It does not 
only refer to a material dominance through the coercive means of economic and 
military power. It denotes a particular kind of political power exercised in a dynamic 
process through which the ruling class attempts to acquire consent from the 
subordinate classes; and if successful, the former derives ideological resources from 
the latter to exercise its will. Such a process is also one of the state being ideologically 
linked to civil society through the connection between willed ideology and organic 
ideology, as noted earlier. Therefore, hegemony is not a ‘fixed definition or close 
system’ but best understood as a process highlighted by certain ‘moments’.183 As Peter 
Thomas adds,  
…first, hegemony as social and political leadership; second, hegemony as a 
political project; third, the realization of this hegemonic project in the concrete 
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institution and organisational forms of a ‘hegemonic apparatus’; and fourth, 
ultimately and decisively, the social and political hegemony of the workers’ 
movement. These four moments constitute a ‘dialectical chain’ along which 
Gramsci deepens his researches throughout the Prison Notebooks; beginning 
from the ‘primordial fact’ of hegemony as leadership, an immanent and 
expansive dynamic leads him to uncover the determinations of hegemonic 
political practice as the foundation for a new type of politics that could move 
beyond the forms of domination of political modernity.184 
As discussion of hegemony is usually juxtaposed with that of passive revolution, 
Thomas’ elaboration on hegemony is instructive to the case of Bahrain in two ways. 
On the one hand, the first three defined moments of hegemony offer a non-Coxian 
brand of Gramscian lens to examine the process of Bahraini state formation after its 
formal independence until at least 1975. In this process, as will be shown in chapter 5, 
building a hegemony within Bahrain appeared to the Al Khalifa regime to be the first 
step for the state of Bahrain in the independence phase. As such, a series of top-down 
sociopolitical reforms was initiated by Al Khalifa. In doing so, Al Khalifa sought an 
ideological connection to Bahraini civil society, which was crucial for its strategic plan 
to align with the US after the British withdrawal. On the other hand, the fourth defined 
moment speaks to the rise of the New Arab Left as a political leadership of counter-
hegemonic forces around Arab nationalism. It conceptualises the ways in which New 
Arab Left intellectuals mobilised their support in both the street and the Parliament, 
and thereby organised ideologically a national-popular collective will in light of their 
version of the Arab nationalist manifesto informed by socialism, anti-imperialism and 
even Third Worldism to some extent.  
Following Thomas’ elaboration of different moments of hegemony, it must 
nonetheless be stressed that such a process does not register as a linear trajectory of 
state formation. In other words, the completion of a preceding moment does not 
necessarily lead to the next one. Therefore, as John Chalcraft and Yaseen Noorani 
argue:  
[H]egemony is … a process, an open-ended form of construction, not a once-and-
for-all achievement. Hegemonic forms are contingently strong. They are partial, 
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relatively thick or thin and include latent contradictions and fractures, as well as 
meanings and resources that are not fully controllable.185  
Those contradictions and fractures come from forces that run counter to an existing 
hegemony, and they can be conceptualised as counter-hegemony, which is ‘a gradual 
process of criticism … involving reform, disarticulation and rearticulation of 
ideological elements in such a way as to create a new collective will − a political, moral 
and intellectual unity’186 − organised by an alternative leadership. 
In the case of Bahrain, counter-forces refer specifically to one of the currents of 
Arab nationalist movements post-1967, and their discussion highlights my 
consideration to bring other histories of Arab nationalism into IRME, as argued in the 
introductory chapter. They were led by the so-called New Arab Left movement. As 
will be shown in chapter 4, its manifesto was informed by a revolutionary turn in the 
1960s and later Marxist-Leninist revolutions in Arabia in the late 1960s. Moreover, 
Bahraini intellectuals in relation to such a movement then attempted to organise a 
national-popular collective will around Arab nationalism against Al Khalifa’s 
monarchical rule after Bahrain’s formal independence in 1971. The evolution of this 
movement corresponded not only to regional and international anti-imperialist 
movements but also to political struggle in the national sphere along with the process 
of Bahraini state formation throughout the 1970s. Resonating with this process of 
passive revolution and its open-ended form, the case of Bahrain offers historical 
evidence for how such a passive revolution was interrupted in 1975. 
2.4.2 Organic and counter-hegemonic intellectuals 
Following Gramsci’s elaboration of a historical bloc and Thomas’ 
complementary interpretation of hegemony, it could be argued that the ideological 
connection between the ruling class and subordinated ones appears to be critical. In 
this regard, it is important to see how such a connection is established. For this, 
Gramsci on intellectuals is instructive and constitutes the last brick for my 
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reformulation of Gramsci as a historical sociological framework in this thesis. 
Furthermore, it helps to understand ideology via a more agent-oriented focus, which 
fills the gap left by IR constructivist and eclecticist approaches to the ideas reviewed 
in the previous chapter. 
While anatomising ideology, Gramsci also makes theoretical sense of 
intellectuals as critical agents ideologically linking a ruling class and subordinate ones. 
Following his understanding of development, what constitutes the crucial context for 
Gramsci’s discussion of intellectuals comes first with his distinction of state-society 
relations between Russia and Western Europe, ‘the East’ and ‘the West’. As Gramsci 
notes: 
In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; 
in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when 
the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The 
State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of 
fortresses and earthworks: more or less numerous from one State to the next, it 
goes without saying − but this precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance 
of each individual country.187 
His observation shows the different nature of state-society relations for which the 
unevenness between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’ sets historical and sociological 
conditions. For Gramsci, such a distinction between so-called ‘advanced’ and 
‘backward’ characteristics was also represented in the unevenness between urban and 
rural areas, a non-fully-fledged capitalist society or a pre-capitalist society at least, 
from which intellectuals arise.    
There are two different types of intellectuals identified by Gramsci, shaped by 
historical processes. On the one hand, there are ‘organic intellectuals’ who come into 
existence as organisers including different social strata organically creating 
sociopolitical conditions beyond the realm of economic production in favour of their 
own class.188 They rise from certain ‘specialisations of partial aspects of the primitive 
activity of the new social type’ that come to prominence in the existing sociopolitical 
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establishment, and thus become another social group driving historical processes.189 
On the other hand, there are ‘traditional intellectuals’ who have existed throughout 
history and are particularly represented in the type of ecclesiastics that were the main 
ideological (political) source ‘bound to the landed aristocracy’, sharing ‘the exercise 
of feudal ownership of land and the use of state privileges connected with society’.190   
The sociological and historical functions of intellectuals lie in their connections 
with all social classes, including the ruling and subordinate ones. For any class, the 
development of connections is dynamic in the form of a struggle that must ‘assimilate 
and conquer ideologically the traditional intellectuals’ while they are becoming the 
dominant group and developing their organic intellectuals. 191  And this is also a 
historical process through which intellectuals reconceptualise their relationship with 
‘the world of production’ by mediating ‘the whole fabric of society’ and ‘the complex 
of superstructures’. By superstructure, Gramsci then further identifies two major 
superstructural levels as ‘civil society’ on the one hand, and ‘political society’ on the 
other. They are critical concepts, conceived by Gramsci, that help to elucidate how a 
historical bloc becomes a stable superstructure through which the ruling class exercises 
hegemony in society and commands politics via the State, and in which intellectuals 
play its deputies to exercise power in the social and political realm.192 This subaltern 
function exercised by intellectuals, according to Gramsci, then generates the division 
of labourers who van be differentiated by their positions; and thus, by the way, they 
practise as articulators in society and some areas with different degrees of development 
of the capitalist system. Alongside the developments in capitalist social relations, as 
Gramsci further shows, ‘intellectuals of the urban type’ are more like subaltern officers 
in an army who are rather apolitical and purpose-orientation articulators situated 
between entrepreneurs and the instrumental masses.193 But ‘intellectuals of the rural 
type’, mainly in the form of dominance by traditional intellectuals, exercise their social 
and political functions of articulating the peasant masses to the petite bourgeoisie, such 
as priests, lawyers and doctors, in relations with the state administration. And social 
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relations as such not only posit the rural intellectual at the top of the social ladder 
which the peasant might be aiming to climb, but also make the peasant subordinate to 
the intellectual. 194  More importantly, ‘every organic development of the peasant 
masses, up to a certain point, is linked to and depends on movements among the 
intellectuals’.195  
The distinction between urban and rural intellectuals investigated by Gramsci 
here is understood by the extent to which the capitalist system has developed in 
relations to politics. In urban areas, the reason why intellectuals are organic might be 
seen as a representation of capitalist modernity and attributed to the intrinsic nature of 
the expansion of capitalism. This expansionary nature then pushes the needs of the 
intellectuals to increasingly and organically include different social strata as the base 
of a historical bloc, and it attempts to forge an ideological system in connection 
between civil and political society. This ideological system, with organic intellectuals 
playing articulators between two superstructural levels, not only circulates ideas that 
justify the capitalist mode of production in the economic realm but also legitimises the 
State in a modern form that thrives along with capitalist markets.  
This is the case in the rise of Arab nationalism among the middle classes who 
inherited liberalist traditions from Nahda (renaissance) in Egypt, since the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and evolved throughout the era of ‘Arab 
awakening’,196 and later the heyday of Pan Arab nationalism in the 1950s and ’60s. 
However, such an ideological linkage of organic intellectuals to civil society was not 
stable. Once the impact of capitalist social formation on civil society feeds back to an 
established historical bloc, organic intellectuals might not be able to play their role of 
maintaining ideological connections between civil and political society. Moreover, 
their role of representing civil society is usually challenged by another group of 
intellectuals, alongside the rise of new social forces. These intellectuals are ‘counter-
hegemonic’ ones who attempt to rearticulate the ties of material (social) and 
ideological (political) instances underlying an existing establishment. In doing so, to 
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redefine their ideological connection with the people is imperative when they forge an 
alternative political leadership within civil society.  
For the case of Bahrain, my focus on intellectuals lies particularly in the 
distinction between organic and counter-hegemonic intellectuals. I refer to organic 
intellectuals as conventional Arab nationalists ideologically affiliated to Ba’athism or 
Nasserism, and some Shia intellectuals in Bahrain. In the 1970s, they were crucial to 
ideological linkages of Al Khalifa seeking to intervene in ‘civil society’ and thus resist 
‘exotic ideas’, be they Marxist-Leninist ideas or Khomeinism in crisis. However, 
echoing George Habash’s revolutionary call for the liberation of Palestine and 
revolutions in Arabia, a new generation of Bahraini Arab nationalists, the New Arab 
Left, emerged in the late 1960s. It is another category, noted as counter-hegemonic 
intellectuals of significance to my discussion of Arab nationalism and Bahrain’s 
regional policy in the 1970s. Having close ideological ties to Marxism-Leninism, the 
New Arab Left emerged from its harsh critiques of conventional Arab Nationalist 
movements. When challenging the sociopolitical structure on which a conventional 
historical bloc was built, the New Arab Left also rejected established social relations, 
seen as the British colonial legacy that Al Khalifa managed to sustain. These forces 
catalysed radicalisation in the Bahraini Arab Nationalist movement through the 1970s 
and gave political momentum to the struggle between Al Khalifa and civil society.  
Seeing the Bahraini case through a Gramscian lens, the most noteworthy part 
about intellectuals includes several trends, along with the ideological development of 
Arab nationalism. It relates, as will be shown in chapter 4, to the failure of the old 
cadres of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) to connect themselves ideologically 
to Bahraini civil society as Al Khalifa expected; the rise and retreat of the New Arab 
Left as counter-hegemonic intellectuals between the early 1970s and the late 1970s; 
and the internal split of Shia political activism and the changing role of some Shia 
intellectuals toward revolution in the same period. These intellectual trends showed 
that Gramsci’s observation of intellectuals might not be static and timeless. Under 
revival pressure after the British withdrawal in 1971, these intellectual movements 
corresponded to the interplay between national, regional and international socio-
political dynamics and then had an influence on Bahrain’s regional policy in the 1970s. 
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Again, such intellectual movements also corresponded to the process of passive 
revolution in Bahrain during this period. This interplay then reflects the extent to which 
intellectuals can be identified as either counter-hegemony or just opposition. The 
major difference between these categorisations lies in whether or not they reject ‘the 
systemic, ideological and institutional bases of the regime as a whole’.197  Furthermore, 
it also relates to a counter-hegemonic project beyond a ‘simple coalition among 
different social groups [and their] own autonomous interests’, one of unifying different 
social forces around the formation of a national-popular collective will. 198 That is, in 
the case of Bahrain, Arab nationalism. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to elaborate the theoretical framework of Gramsci 
through an integration of historical sociology and later Gramscian scholars’ 
reconceptualizations of Gramsci’s insights. It has also displayed signposts indicating 
how such a reconstructed Gramscian framework is to be empirically linked to the case 
of Bahrain in this thesis. As the introduction stated, this thesis aims to offer an 
alternative approach to IR and eclecticist ones by following in the same vein as some 
scholars who have attempted to intervene in the discussion of foreign policy in IRME 
from the traditions of historical sociology.199 Therefore, the chapter has outlined three 
interrelated concepts − development, ideology and struggle, informed by Gramsci, that 
allow a historical sociological investigation of ideologies and their interplay with 
socio-political dynamics, which becomes social drivers for state regional policies in 
international relations in the Middle East. In particular, I highlight, in the last section 
on struggle, how other histories of Arab nationalism can be brought into IRME, and 
through these I further explain Bahrain’s policy towards regional alignment in the 
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1970s. Through the reconstruction of Gramsci in this chapter, I will reason in the 
following chapters how the formation and evolution of ideology is conditioned by late-
coming capitalist social formation (development), but its impact on state regional 
policy may also be contingent on a political struggle among different social forces. 
More significantly, I will argue that Bahrain’s policy towards regional alignment 
between 1971 and 1981 closely pertains to the ideological development of Arab 
nationalism and evolves with the political struggle between hegemony and counter-
hegemony in this period. Such a claim certainly needs more historical evidence to 








3 DEVELOPMENT AND BAHRAINI SOCIAL FORMATION 
UNDER COLONIALISM: CONTRADICTIONS, CLASS AMD 
MOVEMENTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate Bahraini social formation under 
British colonialism and thereby the social bases for Arab nationalism as a modern 
ideology are examined through the concept of development introduced in the previous 
chapter. It mainly addresses two questions: first, what explains the origins of Arab 
nationalism in Bahrain along with the emergence of different social forces in this 
period? And second, what were the results left by British colonialism as to the 
ideological development of Arab nationalism in Bahrain? By further elucidating the 
concept of development in the Gramscian framework outlined in the theoretical 
chapter, this chapter also serves as a background for the remaining empirical chapters 
in this thesis. While the concept of development lays the analytical foundations of my 
application of Gramsci’s anatomies of ideologies, intellectuals and 
(counter-)hegemony, this chapter sets a departure point for this thesis to conduct a 
historical sociological investigation of the case of Bahrain. Therefore, it must be noted 
that my focus at this stage, in the present chapter, does not proceed to the analysis of 
Bahrain’s regional policy; rather, it moves on to an analytical history of Bahraini social 
formation and its relation to Arab nationalism in the British colonial era through the 
lens of political economy. 
As noted earlier, in chapter 2, although Gramsci acknowledges the capacity of 
social agencies in his analysis of ideology, he never rejects the significance of 
analysing social structures. With the inheritance of Marxist traditions, he also 
acknowledges the significance of seeing histories through an abstraction of the 
changing mode of production as a historical conjuncture. Such a conjuncture usually 
occurs under international pressure at the moment when capitalist social relations are 
introduced to, combined with and transformed in certain societies. This rationale 
substantiates the concept of development in my reformulation of a Gramscian 
framework and supports the main argument of this chapter: Under the influence of 
British colonialism as a conduit through which Bahraini social formation was 
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connected to international capitalism, Arab nationalism formed as a modern ideology 
representing the contradictions and emergence of different social forces in Bahrain. 
Ever since deriving from and evolving as intellectual and popular movements, Arab 
nationalism tended to expose the contractions within Bahraini society, in addition to 
its ultimate goal of Arab national unity. Therefore, by the time of Bahrain’s 
independence, different social forces around nationalism continued to fuel the struggle 
within Bahraini society, which influenced the extent to which a ‘national-popular 
collective will’ could be organised.   
To substantiate my argument, this chapter draws on other sociological and 
historical work to complement my reformulation of Gramsci as it applies to the case 
of Bahrain, and thus to examine the early formation of Arab nationalism in Bahrain 
under British colonialism. To this end, the chapter takes a particular approach to the 
origins of Arab nationalism by examining its relationship with capitalist development. 
The first section of this chapter proceeds with a juxtaposition of Tom Nairn’s and 
Nazih Ayubi’s insights and conceptualises how uneven and combined capitalist 
formation relates to the origins of nationalism in peripheral areas. It specifies how 
contradictory social forces around nationalism arose due to inter-societal logics. Then, 
the chapter outlines Bahraini social formation along with the role of British 
colonialism in this process, especially Bahrain’s modernisation whipped up by 
colonial rule. The process of modernisation corresponds to British imperial interests 
involved in geopolitical and capitalist competition in the Gulf and to changing class 
relations in Bahrain. When the process polarised social relations, it also had some 
effects on Arab nationalism in Bahrain. In the final section of the chapter, I outline 
these effects and argue that the process, also called ‘willed ideology’, as conceived by 
Gramsci, of the ruling class, was informed by British colonialism. Such an ideology 
was used in support of colonial-rule tactics of dividing ethno-sectarian groups. It was 
contradictory to bourgeoning Arab nationalism, which derived from civil society as an 
‘organic ideology’ and one of the major social forces attempting to build a national-
popular collective will. Therefore, I further argue, there are two characteristics of Arab 
nationalism in Bahrain that can be identified: first, labour activism is one of the crucial 
components of understanding Arab nationalism as a modern ideology in Bahrain; and 
second, Arab nationalism had an ideological disconnection with the Al Khalifa regime 
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in the British protectorate era. In the final section of the chapter, I outline the results 
of the long British colonial era.  
 
3.1 Understanding the Formation of Nationalism: Thesis of Development 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a historical sociological explanation of 
the relations between Arab nationalism and Bahrain’s policy towards Gulf alignment. 
It seeks to go beyond some existing accounts by looking through a Gramscian lens. 
This lens allows an investigation of the social bases for the formation of Arab 
nationalism and its relation to state regional policy by examining some characteristics 
of colonial history and late-developing capitalist social formation, in countries like 
Bahrain. In doing so, in this chapter, it is important to reiterate that Gramsci, as shown 
in the previous chapter, noticed the significance of international capitalism to the late-
developing social formation of ‘the political’ and ‘the social’ instances that are 
rearticulated following what Gramsci called a ‘historically concrete combination’ in 
the encounter between pre-capitalist and capitalist social relations.1 In particular, he 
knew that the ‘unevenness’ between advanced and late-developed capitalist formation 
created variations in the development of ideologies and intellectual orientations. 
Furthermore, a ‘combination’ of different social formations gave rise to newly 
amalgamated social relations, which have intrinsic contradictions that are expressed in 
the struggles among various social forces, along with the process of capitalist 
production. What do unevenness and combination, the most remarkable characteristics 
of the concept of development, mean to an ideology like Arab nationalism? And how 
do contradictions and social forces derive and have influence on the formation and 
ideological development of Arab nationalism?         
3.1.1 Capitalist development and periphery 
 In departure from the traditions of Marxism, Gramsci’s concern with the 
development of capitalism laid the foundations of his analysis of various topics, albeit 
including his rejection of economicism and class reductionism that has sometimes 
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been unduly stressed or else interpreted as a post-Marxism version 2  of ‘soft 
Gramscianism’.3 His understanding of capitalist formation encompassed the interplay 
of international and internal relations of nation-states. It shows a ‘tendency to establish 
a world system of which individual social formations are component parts’.4 This 
social formation then results in a ‘historically concrete combination’ through which 
ideologies are disseminated from advanced developed countries to less developed ones. 
I argue that nationalism conceived in this thesis is counted as a modern political 
ideology and movement of a kind sharing some characteristics reflecting the impact of 
social change. It originated from its first manifestation in the French Revolution and 
later spread to other parts of the world. The dissemination, however, did not usually 
lead to the expression of qualitatively identical nationalism between its birthplace and 
other destinations. Nor did it occur through a peaceful process of promulgating 
European values but rather via ‘coercive diffusion’, usually through imperialist 
expansion. 5  Thus, a ‘historical concrete combination’ has never been seen, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, as alike between these two sites, between advanced 
and late-coming capitalist formation, and between imperial heartlands and colonies. 
 Following the claim noted here, it is useful to draw on the insights of Marxist 
readings of nationalism, such as Tom Nairn’s work on uneven (and combined) 
development. As a supplement to the reconstructed Gramscian framework adopted in 
this thesis, Nairn’s work helps our discussion on the social bases of nationalism 
forming in late-coming capitalist society, particularly the case of Bahrain as a British 
protectorate: a social formation in a given period of time during which capitalist 
development came into being as the dominant mode of production linking Bahraini 
society to international society. For Nairn, ‘Nationalism is a crucial, fairly central 
feature of the modern capitalist development of world history’.6 Its origins were driven 
                                                        
2 The oft-referred post-Marxist Gramscian work is Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 2014); David 
Howarth, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and Post-Marxism’, in Antonio Gramsci, ed. Mark McNally 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 195–213. 
3 Thomas, ‘Modernity as “Passive Revolution”: Gramsci and the Fundamental Concepts of Historical 
Materialism’, 65. 
4 Alex Callinicos, Making History: Agency, Structure and Change in Social Theory (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1987), 245n10. 
5 Halliday, ‘The Middle East and Conceptions of “International Society”’, 10–13. 
6 Tom Nairn, ‘The Modern Janus’, New Left Review I/94 (1975): 5. 
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by ‘the machinery of [the] world political economy’ and ‘associated with more specific 
features of that process’, including uneven development. 7  Ever since capitalism 
evolved in the first place in Western Europe, the agenda of progress informed by the 
Enlightenment and classical political economy was employed by bourgeois classes, 
which later fermented imperialism. 8  On the periphery, the late-developing area 
conceived in the idea of progress, such a new ideological force did, however, bring 
about the dark side of progress. As Nairn further adds:    
In these less-developed lands the elites soon discovered that tranquil 
incorporation into the cosmopolitan technology was possible for only a few of 
them at a time. The other, the majority, saw themselves excluded from the action, 
rather than invited politely to join in; trampled over rather than taught the rules 
of the game; exploited rather than made partners.9 
Despite sharing the nature of nationalism as an ideological form corresponding to the 
content of capitalist and geopolitical competition among states, the formation of 
nationalism on the periphery was rather distinctive, more than its counterparts in the 
capitalist heartland of Western Europe. It was fuelled by the peripheric elites, or 
intellectuals, who expected to catch up with progress by learning and ‘adopting the 
cutting edge technologies, institutions and practices from the leading state in the 
international system’.10 Yet, they attempted ‘taking things into [their] own hands’ and 
contesting a concrete form of the progress that ‘had taken them by the throat’. 
Although mimetic reforms were necessary for the progress they wished, they resisted 
‘the mere implantation of these things by direct foreign intervention or control’.11 To 
achieve this goal, forging the idea of separation from European counterparts became 
necessary to peripheric intellectuals for the mobilisation of material resources needed 
in support of their take-over project. This international-national interplay also 
represented a process of combing pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production in 
different instances into a sociological amalgamation that fed content into nationalism. 
More importantly, this was, I argue, a historical process of rearticulating ‘the political’ 
                                                        
7 Nairn, 8. 
8 Nairn, 10. 
9 Nairn, 11. 
10 Alexander Anievas, ‘Revolutins and International Relations: Rediscovering the Classical Bourgeois 
Revolutions’, European Journal of International Relations 21, no. 4 (2015): 846. 
11 Nairn, ‘The Modern Janus’, 11. 
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and ‘the social’ aspects in dialectic ways whereby intellectuals organise the people’s 
will as a national collective will in a spirit of nationalism.   
 However, as these projects were envisaged and even delivered, such a 
combination was not without a cost. The periphery was not in fact inducted into a 
‘single forward march’ so that take-over projects could have a full-version copy of the 
experiences of other advanced developing cases. As Nairn further argues,  
…in reality, these lands [of the periphery] found themselves compelled to 
attempt radical, competitive short-cuts in order to avoid being trampled over or 
left behind. The logistic of these short-cuts brought in factors quite absent from 
the universalizing philosophy of Progress.12 
There was a sense of ‘historic backwardness’ corresponding to the periphery’s 
objective of catching up. It was driven by a philosophy of progress, but under the 
pressure of capitalist competition, which usually came along with geopolitical 
competition. In the Middle East, this was an overarching theme applicable to and 
underlying the early formation of Arab nationalism, or ‘the Arab awakening’ in the late 
nineteenth century,13 and its later rigorous bourgeoning after the first Arab-Israel war. 
What was more important to Arab nationalism itself is that it shared, I argue, some 
traits of nationalism in other peripheral areas. That is, while capitalism ‘spread 
remorselessly over the world to unify human society into one more or less connected 
story for the first time’, it also brought about the inevitable result of not just uneven 
development but also combined development of capitalist formations in peripheral 
areas: ‘a perilous and convulsive new fragmentation of that society’. 14  This 
fragmentation was not abstract but concrete, when seen along with the emergence of 
somewhat reassembled social forces in new amalgamated social relations that 
corresponded with changes in the mode of production. These forces, more often than 
not antagonistic, gave succour to nationalism on this soil economically exploited and 
politically dominated by colonial powers. As a result, nationalism on the periphery was 
also ‘the so[c]io-historical cost of this rapid implantation of capitalism’, 15  which 
                                                        
12 Nairn, 12. 
13 Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement. 
14 Nairn, ‘The Modern Janus’, 12. 
15 Nairn, 12. 
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shaped ‘awareness of the European danger’ as well as being ‘an attempt to imitate 
Europe in order to offer a better resistance to it’.16 That was the most noteworthy 
characteristic of nationalism in most cases on the periphery, not least Bahrain. 
3.1.2 Class and contradictions   
 I ague that Nairn’s overall analysis of the nationalism in peripheral societies seen 
through the lens of uneven and combined development resonates with Gramsci’s 
account of ideology from the perspective of ‘the international’. As noted briefly, earlier, 
the origins of nationalism in these societies were accompanied by their social 
transformation, which redefined individuals and the social relations of intrinsic 
contradictions. Such relations can be conceptualised in the tradition of historical 
materialism as ‘class’ among various definitions; but, as Erik Olin Wright argues, ‘the 
hallmark of Marxist discussions of class is the emphasis on the concept of 
exploitation’.17 Class is ‘the collective social expression of the fact of exploitation, the 
way in which exploitation is embodied in a social structure’ defined by production. 
Accordingly, class also refers to ‘a group of persons in a community identified by their 
position in the whole system of social production, defined above all according to their 
relationship (primarily in terms of the degree of ownership or control) to the conditions 
of production … and to other classes’.18 In this vein, exploitation substantiates the 
meaning of intrinsic contradictions or ‘intrinsic antagonism’ among classes that 
anticipate an inevitable struggle19.   
 However, from his observations of peripheral European societies like Poland, 
Spain or Portugal, Gramsci once reminded us that unlike more advanced capitalist 
societies with quite polarised class relations− antagonism between the capitalist and 
proletariat classes − but where ‘the ruling class possesses [more] political and 
                                                        
16 Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism, 
trans. Brian Pearce (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976), 300. 
17 Erik Olin Wright, Class Structure and Income Determination (New York and London: Academic 
Press, 1979), 14. For a typology of definitions of class, see also Wright’s discussion in the same book 
particularly chapter 1. 
18 G. E. M. De Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to 
the Arab Conquests (Duckworth, 1983), 43–44. 
19 Wright, Class Structure and Income Determination, 22. 
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organisational reserves’,20 peripheral societies see that:  
…a broad spectrum of intermediate classes stretches between the proletariat and 
capitalism: classes which seek to carry on policies of their own, with ideologies 
which influence broad strata of the proletariat, but which particularly affect the 
peasant masses.21. 
When peripheric elites or intellectuals that were derived as new social forces and major 
social agents driving nationalism in these societies became such intermediate classes, 
a picture of class relations in the Middle East emerges due to the characteristics of 
development. As Nazih Ayubi notes,  
…modes of production in the Middle East are often not singular and uni-
dimensional but rather are articulated (i.e. two or more modes can often coexist 
and interlink) … [and there is] little correspondence among the various 
‘instances’ or manifestations of structural power in society.22  
Such co-existence and amalgamation of modes of production, revealing its particular 
meaning in a form of combination, usually created contradictions within society. But, 
neither of these productive forces could ever crush the other; instead, they were only 
dominated and compelled by one of them in the process of social formation.23 These 
forces generated a distinctive configuration of class relations. This distinctiveness was 
usually muddled with colonial intervention and gave rise to some crucial ideological 
components of intrinsic contradictions represented in nationalism on the periphery. 
 When we take such contradictions as one of the basic traits of capitalist 
formation on the periphery, the critical question for understanding the case of Bahrain, 
as this thesis proceeds, does not hinge on why the political struggle has never been 
solved by one single dominant class in support of creating Arab nationalism as a 
national collective will. Bahrain is not like some other Arab states, e.g. Egypt, Syria 
                                                        
20 Gramsci, Antonio Gramsci: Selections from Political Writings 1921-1926, 408. 
21 Gramsci, 409. 
22 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, 26. 
23 Jamie Allinson has made a contribution in specifying the difference between articulation and 
combination. For the former, it is applied to the analyses of certain relations of production by seeing 
different socio-political instances operated so as to move beyond ‘mode of production’ as an abstract 
to social formation as a concrete historical investigation. For the later, as Allinson notes, it ‘is a 
particular subset of articulation in which one of the modes… impels the simultaneous transformation 
and reconstitution of the other’.  See Allinson, The Struggle for The State in Jordan: The Social 
Origins of Alliances in the Middle East, 37. 
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and Iraq, where the will of the dominant class maintained its close ideological links to 
popular movements in civil society and was encompassed within Arab nationalism in 
various ways after revolution. ‘Owing to the lack of class hegemony’, as Ayubi further 
argues, ‘politics in such a society [of oil-producing Gulf states] is not characterised by 
an orderly process of aggregating demands but by acts of capturing the state and acts 
of resisting the state’24. Therefore, an alternative question this thesis seeks to answer 
is how such a political struggle proceeded in a dynamic equilibrium, corresponding to 
late-capitalist formation and nationalism on the periphery, of state-society relations. 
This is a process, in Gramsci’s term, in the struggle between hegemony and counter-
hegemony, which not only described Bahraini social formation in the British colonial 
era, but also carried on in Bahrain’s independence phase.  
 At this point, it is not difficult to find that this chapter has, thus far, gradually 
taken a detour from Nairn’s discussion and initial concerns. Nairn continues in his 
seminal article to investigate how nationalism on the semi-periphery, i.e. Germany, 
Italy and Japan in the first half of the twentieth century, injected new elements into 
nationalism in the core, e.g. in England and France, that shaped ‘the new climate of 
world politics’, of nationalism.25 As a result, a more chauvinistic and reactionary 
version of nationalism involving ‘a metropolitan ruling-class conspiracy’ emerged and 
was inflamed by geopolitical and capitalist competition among these states. 26 
Contradictions, intrinsic to capitalist relations and lying beneath nationalist ideologies, 
among different socio-political loci then demonstrated themselves in physical and 
violent ways such that inter-state relations experienced a ‘cataclysm’ on the 
international scale, especially in the first three decades of the twentieth century.27 
Despite it is important to know how such contradictions resulted in a nationalism that 
substantiated the ideological dimension of interstate competition, as Nairn shows, I 
maintain that in the case of Bahrain it is more illuminating to explicate contradictions 
represented within nationalism on the national scale than those shown among 
                                                        
24 Emphasis added. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, 25. 
25 Nairn, ‘The Modern Janus’, 15. 
26 Nairn, 17. 
27 For the social origins, development and consequence of the First World War, see Alexander 
Anievas, ed., Cataclysm 1914: The First World War and the Making of Modern World Politics 
(Leiden: Brill, 2015). 
82 
 
nationalisms in the international arena. While the latter demonstrated the conflict 
among capitalist forces on the international scale, the former was affected by its 
resonance. During the period that the British informal empire was deeply involved in 
imperial competition and mobilising resources needed in support of its geopolitical 
and capitalist interests, the ‘national’ context of Bahrain within British colonialist 
tutelage became ‘a point of arrival within the international conditioning of capitalist 
expansion’.28 This is the foremost claim running through the following sections and 
chapters in support of the task of highlighting the evolution of Arab nationalism in 
Bahrain and the internal sociopolitical dynamics of Bahrain’s policy towards regional 
alignment in this thesis. 
 Therefore, the purpose of shifting my focus to contradictions within nationalism 
is to help substantiate my argument in the present chapter and beyond: British colonial 
rule played a crucial role in linking Bahraini social formation to international capitalist 
relations. Such a process of uneven and combined development with its intrinsic 
contradictions, however, derived antagonistic social forces around the origins of 
nationalism on the periphery. In the case of Bahrain, the struggle among them 
corresponded to not only Bahraini state formation but also the ideological development 
of Arab nationalism throughout both the British colonial era and Bahrain’s 
independence phase. In other words, Arab nationalism derived from contradictions and 
evolved through struggles. Such a statement deviates how Arab nationalism has been 
treated in mainstream IR studies, which see it as an identity attached to either political 
culture or norms. Moreover, it also takes another approach to Arab nationalism by 
defining it as a modern ideology in relation to capitalist formation. The following 
sections and the rest of the thesis will proceed by centring around this statement. 
 
3.2 Bahraini Social Formation under British Colonialism 
What does a theoretical claim about nationalism in peripheral areas through the 
lens of uneven and combined capitalist development mean to the Bahraini case? And 
                                                        
28 Morton, ‘Waiting for Gramsci: State Formation, Passive Revolution and the International’, 615. 
83 
 
how does it integrate with a Gramscian framework to explain the social bases of the 
relationship of Arab nationalism and state regional policy? These questions were left 
open in the abstract picture of nationalism on the periphery as seen through the 
theoretical lens of development in the previous section.  
The abstract certainly needs more historical evidence to support it and give rise 
to the concrete. 29  Thus, the present section sets out a historical and sociological 
investigation of Bahrain in the British colonial era with two takes on Bahraini social 
formation. First, it examines Bahraini social formation under British colonial tutelage, 
especially Bahraini modernisation initiated in the 1920s corresponding to the British 
imperial design for geopolitical and capitalist competition in the Middle East. Second, 
it then outlines changing class relations in Bahrain following Bahraini modernisation 
and the discovery and commodification of oil. 
3.2.1 Beyond geopolitics: combination with global capitalism  
 As suggested in the thesis under development, it is argued that the origins of 
Arab nationalism in Bahrain were related to Bahraini capitalist formation under British 
colonialism. This statement, however, does not mark the arrival of the British informal 
empire in Bahrain in the early nineteenth century as the starting point of Bahraini 
capitalist formation and the origins of nationalism. The formation of Arab nationalism 
in Bahrain, I argue, was a response of civil society to the realisation of the sociality of 
capitalist relation whose genesis of such a social formation lay in the secret of primitive 
accumulation: a ‘process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’.30 
Following the thesis of uneven and combined development, this is a historical 
conjuncture at which the pre-capitalist relation was then dominated by the capitalist 
one and to which international socio-political dynamics gave incentives.31 As Robbie 
Shilliam suggests, ‘…when the imperatives imposed by the capital relation travelled 
                                                        
29 Karl Marx, ‘Grundrisse’, 2015, 34, Marxist Internet Archives, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/grundrisse.pdf. 
30 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1990), 875. 
31 In his case study of Jordanian social formation, Jamie Allinson has integrated the concept of 
primitive accumulation into the lens of uneven and combined development, which could be applied 
broadly to post-colonial cases (late-coming capitalist states). See Allinson, The Struggle for The State 
in Jordan: The Social Origins of Alliances in the Middle East, 30–31. 
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from the heartland of English capitalism into differentially developed socio-political 
orders, these different constellations of social forces gave rise to different forms of 
social transformation’.32 From this historical moment, ‘the political’ and ‘the social’ 
instances were rearticulated along with the advent of capitalism, and the capitalist 
mode of production was combined with the other pre-capitalist one. The combination 
set some historical conditions as well as compelled the process of social formation. 
 Since the sixteenth century, social relations in the Gulf were closely tied to the 
trading network and situated in the middle of trade routes between the Indian Ocean 
and Europe.33 The predominant social relation in this area was a tributary mode of 
production practised in the concrete form of speculative trade (mudarabah), upon 
which the ties of tribal families and merchants, or traders, were built through a form 
of protection fees (Khuwa): the former offered military protection to the latter and 
other inhabitants of coastal towns as well as subjugated them to its absolute authority.34 
Such a social relation and mode of production, as Khaldoun Hasan Al-Naqeeb argues, 
lasted for at least two centuries until the British grand imperial design in the nineteenth 
century was employed in the Gulf area. Imperial supremacy was realised by 
subjugating speculative trade ‘to the complete control of commercial agencies, and the 
ruling [tribal] families to protectorate treaties’. Imperial subjugation eliminated ‘the 
seasonal impact of [speculative trade]’ and ‘in the end destroy[ed] local, long-distance 
mercantile fleets’.35 However, at this point, British imperial interests were mainly 
driven by strategic motives rather than economic ones, for the major concern was how 
‘to establish a cordon sanitaire around British India’, and thus most places in the Gulf 
area, with the exception of the ports of Aden and Muscat, were able to preserve their 
social relations to a certain extent.36  
 
                                                        
32 Shilliam, ‘Hegemony and the Unfashionable Problematic of “Primitive Accumulation”’, 63. 
33 Khaldoun Hasan Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: A Different 
Perspective, trans. Kenny L.M. (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 6–8. 
34 Al-Naqeeb, 9–15. 
35 Al-Naqeeb, 27. 
36 Emphasis in origin. James Onley, ‘Britain’s Informal Empire in the Gulf, 1820-1971’, Journal of 
Social Affairs 22, no. 87 (2005): 42–43. 
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 As such, though signing the General Treaty of Peach with Al Khalifa, among 
others, in the 1820s,37 the British colonial intervention, in the case of Bahrain, was 
quite late, not until 1900, as the forward policy of the British Viceroy of India was 
employed in Bahrain in competition with other European powers.38 It was followed by 
advanced British penetration into Bahraini affairs post-World War One, in the 1920s, 
through modernisation.39  While social and political instances of existing tributary 
relations were rearticulated through the process of modernisation supervised by British 
colonialism, it was also the historical conjuncture at which Bahrain began its combined 
social formation with a dominant capitalist mode of production, followed by a nascent 
stage of industrial oil development.    
 It is noteworthy during this process that ‘the international’ factor was a 
significant driving force behind the modernisation process. It brought the 
consequences of geopolitical and capitalist competition, in which Britain was deeply 
involved, to Bahrain. Ever since the dawn of the twentieth century, Britain was 
changing its policy toward Bahrain. In support of the competition in the Gulf and 
Indian area, British political agents in Bahrain were granted more powers by the 
Government of India. So, Bahrain was integrated ‘into the sphere of informal empire 
as an overseas imperial territory and laid the foundations for the establishment of the 
new administration’, which then supported the British mandate in Iraq.40 After 1919, 
this was through ‘instructions to seek the amelioration of local government and to turn 
public opinion in favour of British rule’. 41  The colonial enforcement by British 
political agents, as historian Nelida Fuccaro argues, was driven by their aim for a 
‘civilising mission of empire as a process of regeneration of state and society’. 
However, since the process was opposed by some tribal leaders in Bahrain who saw it 
                                                        
37 David Commins, The Gulf States: A Modern History (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 
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38 Omar AlShehabi, ‘Political Movements in Bahrain across the Long Twentieth Century (1900-
2015)’, in The Oxford Handbooks of Contemporary Middle-Eastern and North African History, ed. 
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39 Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: A Different Perspective, 27. 
40 Nelida Fuccaro, Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf: Manama since 1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 113. 
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as ‘the imposition of a colonial regime’,42 it did not proceed smoothly and there was 
uncertainty in the internal debate in the British government until 1934 and  the 
commodification and export of oil.43   
 This was a critical conjuncture in Bahraini social formation whose capitalist 
sociality was realised through oil commodification, and thus the characteristics of 
uneven and combined development were ‘fully activated under the specific socio-
historical conditions of generalised commodity production’.44   Following the collapse 
of the pearling industry in 1929, oil commodification gave substantive content to 
Bahraini capitalist social formation. The material resources of Al Khalifa rule no 
longer solely relied on tributes. Oil commodification at the hands of foreign oil 
companies offered Al Khalifa another source of income. It then portrayed the state of 
Bahrain as representing some characteristics of the rentier economy realised after 
World War Two in the 1950s. As Al-Naqeeb notes:      
[T]he national economy of this kind of state does not depend directly upon 
petroleum but in an indirect way, namely state or public expenditures which 
become a conduit for pumping in oil revenue. This brings out the central role 
which the state plays (from the standpoint of its being the receiver of the oil 
revenue) in the economic and social life of the inhabitants, but which is different 
from the role of other states which depend upon taxes and the productive service 
sectors of the national economy. Oil revenue makes the rentier state relatively 
independent of the customary sources of power and authority in other states, and 
the rentier state therefore enjoys a flexibility of action and a freedom of 
manoeuvre which to a large extent surpass situations in which the state gets its 
revenue from taxes and productive activity.45  
Such a process brought about an effect of combined social formation in Bahrain: the 
political authority of Al Khalifa was preserved along with modernisation supported by 
oil commodification. The process towards transformation was directed by British 
political agents, and it qualitatively changed the trajectory of Bahraini development 
and its linkage to the global capitalist system. While Al Khalifa’s political authority 
counted on oil revenue from the global capitalist market, the ways in which political 
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and social instances were articulated, along with Bahraini social formation, were 
closely tied and subject to sociopolitical dynamics on the regional and international 
scales ever since. More importantly, for Bahraini social relations per se, this process 
also changed the state-society equilibrium and witnessed changing class relations. 
3.2.2 Changing class relations 
In the Gulf area, the application of class analysis can sometimes be tricky as 
social stratification also corresponds to different categorisations. In the case of Bahrain, 
although its population has a diverse ethnic and sectarian background, a picture of pre-
capitalist social relations (defined earlier as social relations in the pre-modernisation 
and pre-oil commodification phase) can be also drawn, by and large, by the ways in 
which Bahraini people acquired the means of production for living. Accordingly, on 
the one hand, even though Bahraini Sunni had been mainly composed of two traditions 
of origin − Hawala and Najdi, of which the former refers to families originating from 
coastal areas of the Gulf, and the latter tribes from Najd area in Arabia, they had mostly 
resided in urban areas, living on pearls, dates, trading and controlling primary 
economic resources.46 On the other hand, when Bahraini Shia had arguably consisted 
mostly of some original Arab inhabitants before Al Khalifa came and other Persian 
immigrants − the former referred to as Baharna and the latter Ajam47 – most of them 
had resided in villages and lived as peasants.48 The categories here are certainly not 
absolute when one considers some exceptions; for example, there had been some urban 
Shia working in trade and commerce and some Ajams had been Sunnis. Yet, such a 
categorisation helps us to set a departure point for class analysis, seeing class as a 
social relation for Bahraini transformation from pre-capitalist relations to capitalist 
ones. 
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By highlighting the contours of Bahraini pre-capitalist social relations along the 
lines of urban areas and villages, the significance of knowing such relations lies in 
knowing that this change corresponded to the later formation of different classes and 
social forces under international pressure. In other words, when this thesis later 
explores the political aspects of Bahraini social formation, it is necessary to locate 
class formation in the Gulf in a picture in which ‘Gulf capitalism arose as an integral 
part of the making of the global political economy’.49 For Bahrain in the pre-capitalist 
epoch, in addition to the symbiosis between merchants and Al Khalifa tied together by 
Khuwa, Al Khalifa also allied itself with the chiefs of other tribes by granting them 
conquered lands. As a land-owning class, they had accumulated capital which some of 
them later invested in the pearl industry, becoming merchants in urban areas and the 
subaltern class of Al Khalifa’s rule. In contrast, other members of tribes that had not 
been granted lands became peasants, pearl divers and fishermen, gradually forming 
another class along with other the original inhabitants of villages in subordinate 
strata.50 Within such relations, the social ties between these two classes had bonded 
with the coercive power of the ruling class so that ‘production’ was due to political 
compulsion rather than purely economic incentives: 51  ‘slavery was common and 
several thousand were pearl fishermen. There was no public market but slaves 
sometimes changed hands’.52 Al Khalifa and its allied merchants and landowners had 
dominated various roles in politics, whereas the other majority had been what 
Mohammed Ghanim Al-Rumaihi, a Bahraini scholar whose research on Social and 
political change in Bahrain since the First World War was ‘rather frowned upon by 
[Al Khalifa] as having a leftist tone’,53 called ‘the politically unconscious masses’.54 
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Until the 1920s and 1930s, class relations in Bahrain changed their formation 
following the logics of primitive accumulation: ‘the historical production of the 
precondition of capitalism: the potential wage labourer free from both means of 
production and from the (direct) coercion to produce’. 55  These changes brought 
political effects to Bahrain in two ways under the pressure of international social 
change. First, due to more competitive pearling production in Japan, the collapse of 
the pearl industry in Bahrain in the 1930s led to a power reshuffle within the ruling 
class.  Some landowners, having survived the collapse of pearling production, became 
the new upper class with Al Khalifa. As Al-Rumaihi notes, they ‘were the main 
beneficiaries of the transfer of their allegiance to the British. Many of them became 
ever richer as oil revenues began to be paid and land values rose with the needs of the 
oil company’. 56  However, other merchants who no longer relied on pearling 
production retreated from the circle of the ruling class, and they formed another middle 
class by working in trading businesses affiliated to the oil industry.57 Second, while 
pearling production was replaced by oil production, people who used to be direct 
producers of pearls under political coercion were freed from such relations and became 
waged labourers working in new industries. Their ties to the dominant mode of 
production were now not bound by their political subservience but more by yielding 
to surplus labour. In the sense of what Allinson called ‘dual freedom’,58 they were 
freed from the status of slavery in pearling in tributary relations and in turn sold their 
labour freely to the market in capitalist relations, acquiring a new means of production 
for living. 
3.2.3 The emergence of ruling capitalist class and ‘intermediate classes’ 
As for my concern with such class relations during change, their significance lies 
at the historical moment in which, first, the Al Khalifa regime came into being a ruling 
capitalist class and, second, various groups of merchants and intellectuals emerged as 
middle classes.  
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The rationale of seeing the Al Khalifa regime as a ruling capitalist class has its 
analytical purpose in this thesis. It does not completely reject a neopatriarchical 
reading, such as Hisham Sharabi59, but just to highlight a tribal regime’s status in a 
social structure of which its material substance is revealed through capitalist formation. 
For the modern state of Bahrain, the status of the Al Khalifa regime as a capitalist class 
has been formed and operated by a circulationist rentier economy and through a 
patronage system. Such a social structure enables the accumulation of the regime’s 
capital yielded from oil commodification and export and thereby, with colonialist 
backing up as well, capital transforms into the regime’s political leverage among 
different newly formed classes. That is to say, the rationale behind the ways in the Al 
Khalifa regime intervenes politics goes beyond a patrimonial understanding of a trail 
regime’s survival. But it is about its survival as an emerging ruling capitalist class.        
As a ruling class, the Al Khalifa regime’s dominant political and economic 
influence in Bahraini society increased along with Bahrain’s late-developing capitalist 
state formation from the 1930s onwards. Such pervasive influence is exemplified by 
the case of Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman, Bahraini Prime Minister from 1970 until today, 
who has arguably been the pivotal figure of Bahraini politics and its connected vast 
capitalist networks as well. As J.E. Peterson notes, Shaikh Khalifa 
 appointed government officials including the cabinet, supervised the build-up of 
the security forces, arid allegedly became the richest person in Bahrain with 
extensive holdings in land, hotels, commercial property (including office 
buildings leased by government ministries), and profits on government contracts. 
Family and tribal allies grew rich with him60. 
Regardless of the intra-regime royal factionalism61 and at the expense of its potential 
impact on Bahraini politics, I therefore consider the Al Khalifa regime as a Bahraini 
ruling capitalist class for my analytical purpose of conceptualising its role in a 
modernist sense. As such, by using a shorthand of ‘Al Khalifa’ throughout the rest of 
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the thesis, I then examine how Al Khalifa as a ruling capitalist class initiated Bahrain’s 
passive revolution in the 1970s shown in chapter 6.  
As for the so-called middle classes, they arose between the upper ruling class 
and the lower subordinate class as ‘intermediate classes’. As noted earlier, Gramsci 
suggested that the intermediate classes occupy a broader spectrum in peripheral 
societies and have much more political influence both upwards and downwards. As 
such, as Aijaz Ahmad argues, they occupy,  
…a strategic field in the economy and politics of their countries, thus obtaining 
powers and initiatives which make it possible for them to struggle for political 
dominance over other classes, including the bourgeoisie. Thus, these classes play 
a key role in the construction of political reaction as well as in the process of 
radicalization and even revolution.62    
In Bahrain, and more broadly in the Gulf, even though its larger size and diverse 
composition was subject to the regime’s policy of circulation and distribution of lands 
and oil wealth, we can still clearly identify them as a newly formed class distinct from 
the landed aristocracy and traditional merchants63.  
As a result of the improved educational system in Bahrain, part of the regime’s 
policy of circulation in the scheme of modernisation, the skeleton of the intermediate 
classes formed  by doctors, journalists, lawyers, engineers etc. harboured more liberal 
ideas.64  Unlike traditional intellectuals, such as clerics whose political role in society 
had been represented in issues of ethnicity and religion, these newly formed classes of 
professionals turned to modernistic tendencies along with the process of Bahraini 
capitalist formation, and they also highlighted their political role instead in labour 
problems, social reform, nationalist issues and so on.65 In this sense, they therefore 
gradually shaped a role that was able to link both upwards and downwards 
ideologically to the ruling class and subordinate ones in the process of state formation 
of Bahrain. Furthermore, their rising political awareness had political implications for 
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Bahraini society as civil society, along with capitalist formation. For this, a Gramscian 
approach to politics of a late-capitalist state formation presents its value by improving 
a historical materialist understanding of ‘state’ beyond class reductionism.  
 
3.3 Results of British Colonialism: On ‘the Political’  
How do we explain the political aspect, particularly the origins of Arab 
nationalism in Bahrain, from a Gramscian perspective by understanding Bahraini 
social formation? The political aspect of Bahraini social formation was, I argue, mainly 
highlighted by an ideological disconnection between the Al Khalifa regime and 
Bahraini civil society. In a Gramscian sense, Arab nationalism in Bahrain is best 
understood as an organic ideology that derived from civil society and contradicted Al 
Khalifa’s will ideology informed by what Omar AlShehabi called the ‘British colonial 
lens’. Such a disconnection was definitely not due to differences in ‘false 
consciousness’ between people in society and the regime, rather it derived from a 
historical process, conceived in the concept of development. With a colonial lens 
employed to correspond to Bahraini social formation under British colonialism, an 
ideological disconnection between the Al Khalifa and Bahraini society existed during 
this time. In other words, Arab nationalism did not project the willed ideology of the 
ruling class in Bahrain but only related to intellectual movements driven by the 
Bahraini middle classes in civil society. It was a time when an organic ideology made 
political sense in forging a national-popular collective will, which not only resonated 
with grand ideas of Arab national unity but also linked closely to labour and local 
nationalist movements in Bahrain.  
3.3.1 Colonial lens and willed ideology 
It has been little contested that the discovery and export of oil in the 1930s set 
the historical conditions for Bahraini sociopolitical development in the rest of the 
twentieth century, and even until today. Most of the literature on Bahrain and more 
broadly on the Gulf has explained how authoritarian regimes were evolving with and 
supported by the rentier economy. As Al-Naqeeb has shown above and other rentier 
state theorists have demonstrated so far, an understanding of the state of Bahrain 
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revolves around its institutional dimension resonating with Weberian wisdom. In 
particular, it sheds light on how Bahraini bureaucratic development and Al Khalifa’s 
increasingly authoritarian powers went hand in hand with British colonialism and 
rentier economic development.66 As Khuri says:  
Colonial rule and the development of oil are the two major processes that 
modified the authority system in Bahrain; the first by creating a bureaucracy, and 
the second by transforming the economic order and the social organization 
associated with it. The institutionalization of bureaucracy changed the formal 
structure of authority and modified the mode of interaction among tribe, 
peasantry, and urban society.67  
I follow the existing explanation that considers colonialism and rentier economy as 
offering a basic understanding of the political development of Bahraini social 
formation. Yet, while this thesis intends to make sense of the formation of Arab 
nationalism through the lens of development, I focus closely on the ideological 
dimension of the process of Bahrain’s state formation. When oil commodification gave 
content to Bahraini social formation, what did British colonialism feed ideologically 
into the historical process alongside which it had an impact on the formation of Arab 
nationalism?  With this question in mind, it also leads us to reflect in a Gramscian 
sense on whether and how the superstructure (the political) corresponded to the 
structure (the social) in Bahrain under and after British colonialism.    
As shown earlier, nationalism on the periphery derived to represent 
contradictions as a product of uneven and combined capitalist development. If we 
accept what Nairn and others have suggested, it could be further argued that the 
formation of nationalism, a kind of modern political ideology and movement, was 
inscribed into the process of international social transformation. It was a process 
alongside which capitalist sociality was realised through British colonialism in 
Bahrain, one that also led to sociopolitical struggle. As Shilliam suggests from his 
investigation of the process of knowledge production by illuminating its international 
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In the struggle over political authority an attempt is often made by certain classes 
(or elements within these classes) to import aspects of a ‘foreign’ political subject 
that are deemed to valorize their own project for reform. But in grafting on this 
‘alien’ political subject, various substitutions are required to compensate for the 
institutions of social reproduction that, present in the ‘home’ of the ‘alien’ subject, 
are missing in this foreign domain … Knowledge production [therefore] has to 
be understood as deriving from more general processes associated with the 
international dimension of social transformation.69 
In this regard, when combined Bahraini social formation resonated with British 
imperial interests, a system of knowledge production derived ‘from more general 
processes associated with the international dimension of social transformation’,70 the 
expansion of capitalist sociality into the periphery through colonialism. Furthermore, 
such a system of knowledge production was imported and imposed on the colonised 
society of Bahrain, thus representing the political and ideological side of Bahraini 
capitalist relations.     
This ideological dimension of Bahraini social transformation, I maintain, was 
generated in the form of Al Khalifa regime’s willed ideology, which was fed by British 
colonialism for the arbitrary and rationalistic purpose of organising and mobilising 
individuals under certain sociopolitical orders.71 Its validity and concreteness were 
substantiated through what Omar AlShehabi calls ‘a colonial ethnosectarian gaze’ and 
then appropriated by ‘contested divided rule’. 72  The colonial lens, as AlShehabi 
suggests, first appeared in a British semi-official census, entitled Gazetteer of the 
Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, conducted by John Gordon Lorimer between 
1903 and 1915. It later offered British political agents in Bahrain a knowledge toolkit 
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for colonial rule on the basis of the demarcations of ethnic and religious sectarian 
groups. As AlShehabi further argues, it was,  
…a systemic approach that saw ethnic-sectarian cleavages as the underlying 
epistemic fault lines that determine political power, practice, and discourse … 
[Under its shadow,] other socio-economic-political factors such as class, 
geography, profession, etc., although still playing a role, would take a backseat 
to these ‘primordial’ elements in shaping the contours of the local political map 
from the British viewpoint.73 
This knowledge system served as instruction in British colonial rule. Also, it offered 
momentum in different trends of political mobilisation within Bahraini civil society 
and has more importantly taught Al Khalifa’s tactics of divide and rule ever since.74 
Nonetheless, it does not mean that such a colonial lens and tactics demarcating along 
ethnic and religious sectarian lines remained identical and effective over time. The 
tactics inherited from the colonial approach, as will be shown in later chapters, were 
used in the 1970s by Al Khalifa in allying itself with religious groups in a counter-
balance to the rise of the New Arab Left intellectuals. It functioned as a ruling strategy 
ensuring Al Khalifa’s survival, as well as preventing the emergence of counter-
hegemonic forces organised collectively among different social forces,75 when an ad 
hoc alliance was organised between the People bloc and the Religious bloc in the 1973 
parliamentary experiment, as will be shown in chapter 5. In other words, the tactics 
were not patrimonial but best understood as practices which articulated the political 
and social instances of Al Khalifa rule. 
I argue that ever since the colonial lens was employed as a willed ideology of 
the ruling class, it contrasted with Arab nationalism in the Bahraini context and thereby 
distinguished Bahrain from other cases in the Middle East. In the cases of Egypt, Syria 
and Iraq after revolutions in the 1950s and 1960s, the willed ideologies used by those 
revolutionary military figures were not only infused with a repertoire of anti-
imperialism, anti-Zionism and socialism but also linked organically to social and 
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political movements within civil society.76 In a Gramscian sense, that was a way in 
which the dominant class sought consent from its subordinate classes and political 
support from the people in order to build up its hegemonic status. Arab nationalism 
was organised by a populist regime as a national-popular collective will, which was 
then reflected itself in foreign policies with more revolutionary orientation. Yet, in the 
Bahraini and probably other Gulf cases, Arab nationalism was rarely considered in the 
same way. When Bahraini capitalist formation was fully activated through the 
realisation of oil commodification and export, a mechanism of Bahrain combining with 
global capitalism was established through foreign oil companies linking to British 
colonial interests. It was a British colonialist monitored conduit through which Al 
Khalifa obtained foreign capital as the major material basis of its rule. Such a structure 
contradicted the oft-seen rationale of nationalism on the periphery that derived from 
civil society and upheld the idea of self-determination and liberation from colonialism. 
Instead, the existing structure corresponded to a superstructure that was shot through 
a colonial lens, in which Bahraini people were demarcated. At the same time, while 
contradictions were aggravating as a consequential cost of Bahraini early capitalist 
formation, new social relations were defined along with the emergence of new classes 
and the rise of various sociopolitical movements as a response from civil society, to 
which this chapter now turns to examine. 
3.3.2 Labour activism and nationalism 
As I argued in the first section of this chapter, the formation of Arab nationalism 
is best understood through a late-developing capitalist context and its linkage to 
international capitalism. Bassam Tibi is right to argue:  
The history of Arab nationalism is a history of the interplay between the actors, 
be they writers, politicians or soldiers, and the social structures in which they 
were acting. Social theory should view societal change as based on such an 
interplay between the actions of man and structural changes.77 
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The structural changes, conceived in a widely accepted understanding in IRME 
scholarship, refer to the cataclysm of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the later 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire. These changes demarcated Arabia and Mashreq into 
different areas of imperial mandate, anchored a general imperial policy of dividing the 
Arab world and set a historical benchmark for the rise of Arab nationalist movements 
in the region.78 More importantly, the changes paved the way for a new scheme for 
constructing international relations in the Arab World with the creation of a 
contemporary state system around the ideas of Westphalian sovereignty.79  
However, the emergence of Arab nationalism at a time of cataclysm 
corresponded with more than just being ‘an articulation related to the real setting of 
the modern international system… [and referred] to the nation-state as an organisation 
unit of this international system [of sovereignty]’.80 The changing social structure 
underlying the early formation of Arab nationalism also registered a simultaneous 
capitalist competition and social formation in peripheral areas. As noted earlier, it saw 
a socio-economic transformation that brought about new emerging social groupings of 
labours, students and civil servants. In new forms of social networks, social relations 
changed qualitatively and quantitatively beyond established and localised religious 
and tribal bonds among the people.81 It then created a variety of social bases upon 
which social mobilisation relies and from which contemporary political ideologies 
derive. In Bahrain and more broadly the Gulf region, the driving forces behind the 
genesis of new types of social relations were certainly due to the commodification and 
export of oil.  
While ‘the machinery of the world political economy’ substantiated the social 
bases of formation of Arab nationalism in Bahrain, it also infused labour activism into 
nationalist movements in the local beyond ethnosectarian lines. In the late 1920s, 
labour activism, related to a political agenda opposing colonial rule, began to get a 
foothold in Bahraini civil society through Arab migrants and those Bahraini students 
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who had studied abroad in Mashreq.82 The discovery of oil by the Bahraini Petroleum 
Company (BAPCO) in 1932 helped Bahrain to weather the Great Depression and 
relocated Bahrain in the world economy from reliance on the pearling industry to 
counting on oil. But its subsequent development generated momentum for labour 
movements throughout the 1930s and ’40s. Accumulating grievances over poor 
working conditions resulted in a strike and a petition for improvements to labour rights 
in Bahrain in 1938. The strike, however, forced BAPCO to look for other sources of 
labour, from India and Iran. Those expatriate workers who would accept lower wages 
than local workers posed less of a political challenge to the authorities. The 1938 
petition and another general strike in 1943 saw cross-sectarian cooperation in Bahrain 
that was believed to be a series of actions signalling to the authorities to pursue reforms 
including better education, judicial system, Bahrainisation in employment and the 
establishment of trade unions.83 However, the conflict between the two sects during 
the celebration of ‘Ashura in 1953 rather fortified the colonial practices of divide and 
rule by the Anglo-Bahraini ruling class’.84  
The sociopolitical dynamics in Bahrain in the 1920s were the first scene in other 
histories of Arab nationalism. The development of Arab nationalism in its early stages 
actually went hand in hand with a series of movements in civil society demanding 
labour rights, political reform and less colonial interference. While these demands 
were raised and proposed beyond sectarian lines, which had been demarcated and shot 
through a colonial lens as noted earlier, a national-popular collective will was also 
increasingly organised among Bahraini intellectuals, who were informed by Arab 
nationalist ideologies across the Arab world. They then carried forward this 
momentum to the next stage, calling for more political rights when the heyday of Arab 
nationalism arrived and swept the Arab world in the 1950s and ’60s.  
3.3.3 The 1954 liberal nationalist movement 
In July 1952, the Free Officers Movement in Egypt toppled King Farouk and 
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opened up a new era of Arab nationalism in the Middle East from the 1950s onwards. 
In the existing literature, this decade is usually taken as a turning point from which 
Arab nationalism as an ideological force unifying Arab peoples started to represent its 
substantial political connotations beyond the region. Pan Arab nationalism was 
spreading throughout the Arabic-speaking world, usually travelling on the back of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s personal charisma and populist image. For those conservative 
Arab regimes and their external West allies, any popular movements in the Middle 
East during this period could be de-contextualized and seen as Nasserist plots, toppling 
conservative regimes and unifying Arab peoples against colonial boogeymen. One can 
easily find such accounts across IRME scholarship that allude to a binary 
understanding of Arab nationalism and modern sovereignty as two contradictory 
structural norms. However, as already shown, the ideological development of Arab 
nationalism actually links to societal contexts and changes, which have been unduly 
stressed in claims for a shift in international structural norms. Other histories of Arab 
nationalism, which was evolving along with popular and labour movements and 
calling for a more specific sociopolitical agenda beyond Arab unity, were usually 
overlooked.   
It could be argued that the backdrop of Bahraini nationalist movements in the 
1950s represented a historical trend of new effendiyya, which comprised newly formed 
social groupings of students, civil servants, teachers or urban bourgeoisie, professional 
middle classes and intelligentsia in sociological terms. 85  They were the major 
recipients of the ideas of Arab nationalism and those peripheric intellectuals who, in 
Nairn’s words, were seen as ‘taking things into [their] own hands’ and contesting a 
concrete form of progress that ‘had taken them by the throat’. Following the end of 
World War Two, with the commodification of oil in the international capitalist market 
and the decline in British imperial control of the colonies, both Al Khalifa tribal rule 
and the newly formed Bahraini middle classes increasingly grew in strength. Along 
with the process of modernisation, the former tried to have a tight grip of the private 
industrial and commercial sectors through the state apparatus, whereas the latter, 
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relying on trading enterprises, found such state intervention threatening to its growing 
business. Combined with the impact of the influx of South Asian labour on the job 
opportunities for local Bahraini, the sectarian accident conflict in 1953 and the strike 
by taxi drivers in August 1954,86 Bahraini middle classes then led the first organised 
political movement beyond sectarian lines in the form of the Higher Executive 
Committee (HEC).  
The political movement called for a series of reform projects, including the 
establishment of a legislative council, a judicial system and the creation of trade unions, 
among others. These demands delivered a message that the Bahraini people were 
supposed to be seen as political subjects ready to air their views under British colonial 
rule. As this proceeded, the movement encompassed a wider spectrum of social forces 
for political and labour representation through petitions and labour strikes, whereas the 
authorities kept practising tactics of divide and rule. Nonetheless, the HEC maintained 
its rather institutional approach to reform until the emergence of wider popular support 
for Egypt in the Tripartite Aggression in late 1956.87 Though the movement was 
cracked down on and eventually dissolved, with the forced exile of three major figures 
to Saint Helena island, it substantiated political meaning within modern Bahraini 
nationalism and had a far-reaching impact on subsequent nationalist movements on 
the island, e.g. the radical leftward shift in clandestine movements and its close ties 
with labour movements. 88  More importantly, with the radical shift of clandestine 
movements towards a more outspoken anti-colonialism and anti-regime standpoint,89 
various Bahraini social forces were reorganised corresponding to broader regional and 
international socio-political dynamics that evolved with the development of Arab 
nationalism. 
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3.3.4 The 1965 popular uprising 
The 1960s, as historian Abdel Razzaq Takriti argues, ‘witnessed a shift in the 
Arab community of revolution from empirical radicalism to radical rationalism, from 
an experiential epistemology to a theoretical one’.90 The role of intellectuals in popular 
and nationalist movements was increasingly important for their infusion of different 
ideologies into Bahraini civil society. After the failure of the HEC and the first 
organised Bahraini nationalist movement in the 1950s, two major radical political 
trends emerged in Bahrain, and more broadly in the Gulf. One was the Arab Nationalist 
Movement (ANM), a regional Pan Arab nationalist movement. It was spreading across 
the Gulf through students returning to Bahrain from Mashreq and expanded rapidly 
especially with Nasser’s growing reputation after the 1956 war against Israel, Britain 
and France. The other one was the National Front of Liberation (NFL), a Bahraini 
communist movement established in 1955, influenced by the Tudeh Party in Iran and 
the Communist Party in Iraq, especially some Tudeh members who fled to Bahrain and 
became key figures in the NFL.91  
These radical ideological turns beyond Bahrain in the Arab world and their 
influence on Arab nationalism received different scholarly interpretations. For 
example, Hisham Sharabi maintains that the radical ideological change in the Arab 
World in the 1960s was an intellectual ‘ideological rebellion’ against Western 
sociopolitical values. He saw it as being the result of three generations of Arab 
intellectual movements: the pre-World War One, inter-war and post-war generations. 
From the 1870s onwards, during which time European penetration became concrete, 
to the modern nation-state system coming after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, and 
then to the confrontation between the two camps in the Cold War era, the Arab world 
witnessed a comprehensive intellectual rejection of European ideas and values. This 
came from both traditional religious elites and ‘Westernised’ secular elites in the Arab 
world. In turn, it seemed to be that ‘the more firmly European ideas and institutions 
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implanted themselves, the more hostile and negative the reaction to Europe became’.92 
This ‘ideological rebellion’, as Sharabi terms it, originated from the Bilad al-Sham 
(Greater Syria) and Maghreb areas and then nurtured another more active 
revolutionary generation. In addition to Sharabi, Tareq Ismael saw such a radical turn 
as a response to the failure of the liberal nationalist movement, which was an inevitable 
development, for,  
…neither the social forces that fostered liberal nationalism (the landed 
aristocracy and the prosperous commercial and industrial bourgeoisie) nor 
imported Western institutions were compatible with the social milieu and the 
new rising social forces. In consequence, liberal nationalist regimes collapsed in 
Syria, Egypt, and Jordan in 1949, 1952, and 1957 respectively. Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, and Iraq either never had the chance to 
experience liberalism at all or, despite all appearances, never indeed practiced it. 
The Sudan and Morocco vacillated between liberalism and oligarchy until both 
succumbed to authoritarian regimes, military and civilian, respectively. These 
developments, whether towards a military hegemony or towards a civilian 
oligarchy, constituted two different responses to the same challenge: namely, the 
rise of the new, more radical, social forces of the middle class. While the civilian 
oligarchies represented a self-defense measure on the part of the old traditional 
establishments against the new rising social forces, the military regimes, on the 
whole, were manifestation of the ascendance to power of some sectors of the 
middle class with their radical nationalism (in contrast to the outdated liberal 
nationalism).93  
Ismael, nonetheless, argues that the failure was due to the incompatibility between two 
philosophical traditions: the individual liberty inherent in Western Liberalism vs the 
collectiveness superior to the individual in Arab society. To Ismael, this also explains 
the radical turn to a totalitarian state ‘as the representative of the society or nation [with] 
certain rights as against the individual’.94   
Beyond these rather idealist explanations, the radical ideological turn in Bahrain 
since 1965, however, offers an alternative account that reflects the social changes 
conceptualised by the concept of development, as noted earlier. It is best understood 
as a struggle between intellectuals, mainly having a middle-class background, and the 
ruling Anglo-Bahraini class, which derived from contradictions as a result of late-
                                                        
92 Hisham Sharabi, ‘The Transformation of Ideology in the Arab World’, Middle East Journal 19, no. 
4 (1965): 471–74. 
93 Ismael, The Arab Left, 11–12. 
94 Ismael, Tareq Y., The Arab Left, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1976), pp. 14-17. 
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coming capitalist states. The struggle showed itself when an unexpected strike broke 
out in BAPCO in March 1965 and soon escalated to a country-wide uprising led by a 
collaboration between clandestine groups of the ANM (and some Ba’athist factions) 
and the NFL. These two shared the same goal of overthrowing British colonialism and 
the Al Khalifa regime. But, ideological and strategic divergences existed in terms of 
embracing either Arab nationalism with a regional focus or a comprehensive object of 
revolution beyond the Arab world. The ANM hoped to link the strike to broader 
regional ideas of Arab nationalism, whereas the NFL just concentrated on local labour 
movements. As a consequence, the collaboration did not last long and disintegrated 
into two major political currents. This disunity soon weakened the collective force of 
the movement and led to a brutal crackdown by the authorities throughout the 1960s.95 
Nonetheless, the March 1965 popular uprising was still a watershed for Arab 
nationalist movements in Bahrain. First, it gave rise to another wave of political exile 
from 1965 to 1975 during which some Bahraini exiles increasingly built their 
affiliations with other popular movements in the Middle East and beyond. 96  For 
example, Abd al-Rahman Al-Nu’aimi, fleeing Bahrain in 1968, later led the PFB with 
Abdulnabi Al-Ekry from Damascus; since his return to Bahrain in 2011, he became 
the Head of the National Democratic Action Society, also known as Wa’ad as the heir 
of the PFB, until 2007.97 Second, the fallout of the March 1965 uprising, a series of 
labour and student movements up to June, showed that increasingly close connections 
between civil society and those clandestine political groups were being established. 
Third, a national collective will against colonialism and ineffective tribal rule was 
being organised and demonstrated through the ability of these political groups to 
mobilise a countrywide general strike and movement.98 Furthermore, the 1965 popular 
                                                        
95 AlShehabi, ‘Divide and Rule in Bahrain and the Elusive Pursuit for a United Front: The Experience 
of the Constitutive Committee and the 1972 Uprising’, 105–7. 
96 Lawson, Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy, 85; Claire Beaugrand, ‘In and Out Moves of 
the Bahraini Opposition: How Years of Political Exile Led to the Opening of an International Front 
During the 2011 Crisis in Bahrain’, in Transit States: Labour, Migration and Citizenship in the Gulf, 
ed. Abdullhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh (London: Pluto Press, 2015), 200–202. 
97 Claire Beaugrand, ‘Abd Al-Rahman Al-Nu’aimi: Forty Years of Bahraini Opposition’, 
OpenDemocracy, 20 September 2011, https://www.opendemocracy.net/claire-beaugrand/abd-al-
rahman-al-nuaimi-forty-years-of-bahraini-opposition. 
98 Abdullhadi Khalaf, ‘Contentious Politics in Bahrain: From Ethnic to National and Vice Versa’ (The 




uprising, as will be shown in later chapters, created a moment in the inception of 
Bahraini counter-hegemonic forces around Arab nationalism, the New Arab Left, 
which formed the major social forces having an impact on the following process of 




The chapter has sought to examine the origins of Arab nationalism in Bahrain 
and Bahraini social formation under British colonialism. Through the lens of 
development applied to the inception of Bahraini capitalist formation, the present 
chapter has identified the legacy of the long British colonial era to the evolution of 
Arab nationalism in Bahrain. First, it was seen that contradictions as a result of 
Bahrain’s uneven and combined development derived different social forces around 
Arab nationalism, among which newly-formed middle classes were the primary 
driving force. Such contradictions were represented in the political struggle, which 
was shown on the ideological level between the ruling class’s will ideology informed 
by the British colonial approach and civil society’s organic ideology in response to the 
cost of British colonialism and late-developing capitalist formation. The political 
struggle then became the first task that Al Khalifa tried to oversee in support of 
Bahrain’s regional policy towards alignment after independence. Second, it was seen 
that intellectuals’ critiques of Bahrain’s political establishment had evolved from 
criticising British colonial rule to challenging Al Khalifa’s tribal rule, especially since 
the 1960s. Along with this process, more political implications were attributed to the 
development of Arab nationalism in Bahrain. The idea of the people as a major 
political subject for sovereignty gradually formed among Bahraini intellectuals. It 
evolved to be the nucleus of Arab nationalist movements in Bahrain. While such an 
idea fundamentally challenged the ruling legitimacy of Al Khalifa, it also showed how 
Bahraini intellectuals were attempting to organise a national-popular collective will 
related to Arab nationalism in sociopolitical movements. As noted earlier, and as will 
be shown in the next chapter, this intellectual attempt took a revolutionary turn along 
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with the rise of the New Arab Left movement in the Middle East and then became the 
major counter-hegemonic force in Bahrain, and more broadly in the Gulf area.          
I argue that these legacies can be further summarised as a representation of the 
ideological disconnection between Al Khalifa and Bahraini civil society. It 
differentiated Bahrain from other cases that had been through revolution, like Egypt, 
Syria and Iraq. Moreover, it gave a historical sociological meaning to the state of 
Bahrain, while this thesis analyses the interplay of Arab nationalism and Bahrain’s 
regional policy in chapter 6. In a Gramscian sense, it registers a disconnection between 
the will ideology of the ruling class and the organic ideology of civil society. However, 
such a disconnection does not suggest dichotomous and static state-society relations 
but dynamic state-society equilibrium as this thesis proceeds. It was subject to national, 
regional and international socio-political dynamics and further related to how different 
social agents responded. More importantly, it substantiated the context in which the 
political struggle among different forces continued and revolved around the evolution 








4 IDEOLOGY AGAINST REVOLUTION: THE NEW ARAB 
LEFT AND FRACTURED COUNTER-HEGEMONY 
This chapter elucidates a critical intellectual shift in the development of Arab 
nationalism since the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, from which New Arab Left 
intellectuals emerged as a new leadership in popular and Arab nationalist movements. 
Following the previous chapter on the social origins of Arab nationalism and popular 
movements in Bahrain under British colonialism, the purpose of the present chapter is 
to continue to apply Gramsci as the theoretical framework for a historical sociological 
investigation. By exploring the reconstructed concept of ideology introduced in 
chapter 2, this chapter focuses on how New Arab Left intellectuals in the Gulf 
established their leadership in popular movements and qualitatively changed the tenets 
of Arab nationalism that became new social forces. I argue that New Arab Left 
intellectuals formed counter-hegemonic forces in the political struggle around 
Bahrain’s internal and external politics in the 1970s. Informed by Marxism-Leninism 
from the late 1960s, New Arab Left intellectuals infused a new revolutionary 
momentum into nationalist and popular movements in Bahrain under the pressure of 
geopolitical competition and capitalist formation after the British withdrawal. In 
contrast to the conventional Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), they embraced a 
popular version of Arab nationalism. On the one hand, they adopted a popular 
approach by linking themselves to civil society through engagement in popular and 
labour movements in Bahrain. On the other hand, they saw these movements as 
counterparts of other anti-imperialist movements in the third world. Moreover, one of 
the tenets of popular Arab nationalism, to pursue the goal of the Bahraini people being 
the sovereign subjects, substantiated the political struggle in Bahrain. This 
revolutionary ideological shift in Arab nationalism allowed the New Arab Left to 
become counter-hegemonic intellectuals vis-à-vis the old cadres of the ANM as 
organic intellectuals were to the Al Khalifa regime after Bahrain attained formal 
independence in 1971. As chapters 5 and 6 will show, the intellectual division in 
Bahrain and the contestation of sovereign subjects in Bahrain then influenced the 
formation of a unified counter-hegemony among different social forces, how Al 
Khalifa resolved political struggles and the formulation of Bahrain’s policy towards 
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regional alignment.   
The other purpose of this chapter is to give alternative accounts to the statement 
about the political twilight of Arab nationalism after 1967, around which centres an IR 
constructivist explanation of the rise of sovereignty norms and regional order.1 In 
examining the New Arab Left and its relation to nationalist and popular movements, I 
argue that the development of Arab nationalism and its impact on state regional policy, 
and thus alignment in the post-colonial phase, is quite complicated. In the 1970s, for 
the New Arab Left, Bahrain’s formal independence brought neither ‘utopia’ nor 
freedom. In effect, the potential state geopolitical competition and capitalist formation 
aggravated both intellectual and materialistic contradictions in Bahrain, fuelling a new 
momentum in the struggles among different social forces, especially that between the 
people and the regime. The story of uneven and combined development in the Gulf, as 
Halliday once commented on, continued while ‘the rulers of the oil-producing states … 
were intent on gaining a more influential position within world capitalism; [and] the 
anti-imperialist movement wanted to destroy this system altogether’.2 The New Arab 
Left encompassed the ideas of class struggle, militancy and international solidarity 
related to the revolution in Dhofar, South Yemen and even popular movements in the 
third world. A radical and popular version of Arab nationalism emerged as a new 
paradigm to substantiate the world view of New Arab Left intellectuals. From the mid-
1970s, the New Arab Left faced a setback when Al Khalifa and other Gulf monarchies 
engaged in counterinsurgency and took action against to the Left. This action somehow 
demoralised the New Arab Left and popular Arab nationalist movements. Nonetheless, 
this overarching anti-imperialist agenda was active on the other shore of the Gulf, 
catalysing the Khomeinism of the Iranian revolution in 1979. It was later subsumed 
into Khomeinism and Shia political activism in Bahrain as well. However, the rise of 
Khomeinist movements in Bahrain, I argue, did not rejuvenate unified counter-
hegemony among different social forces. Instead, it resulted in fractured counter-
hegemonic forces of popular Arab nationalism with a fragile leadership of New Arab 
Left intellectuals. 
                                                        
1 Barnett, Dialogue in Arab Politics: Negotiation in Regional Order; Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in 
the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, 252–81. 
2 Emphasis in original, Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans (London: Saqi Books, 2002), 17. 
109 
 
The present chapter expands on the statements of Fred Halliday, John Chalcraft 
and Sune Haugbolle, in that popular and counter-hegemonic movements and the 
revolutionary momentum of the New Arab Left did indeed play a role in forming 
contemporary politics in the Middle East;3 and it substantiates Gramsci’s insights into 
ideology, intellectuals and counter-hegemony by examining the case of the New Arab 
Left and popular Arab nationalism. In doing so, I first historicise the context in which 
the New Arab Left derived from the ANM’s self-reflection on historic backwardness, 
both intellectual and materialistic, in the 1960s. I outline the elements of this leftward 
ideological turn in the Middle East, including critiques of the bourgeois leadership of 
the ANM, the setback of the 1967 war and the necessity of engaging in class struggle. 
These elements delivered a utopian world view informed by Marxism-Leninism, as a 
substitute for the conventional ANM approach prior to the late 1960s. Second, I turn 
to the case of the New Arab Left movement in the Gulf, comprising: The People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in Aden, the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) in Dhofar and, particularly, the Popular 
Front of Bahrain (PFB). This section examines in particular how the Bahraini New 
Arab Left attempted to take a leading role in popular Arab nationalist movements, but 
maintained ad hoc alliances with other communist and religious groups. Also, it 
outlines their manifesto and political agenda for how they understood some 
sociopolitical issues at the national, regional and international levels. The leadership 
of New Arab Left intellectuals in popular movements faced a predicament after the 
dissolution of parliament in 1975 and the subsequent rise of Khomeinist movements, 
along with the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s. Therefore, I turn 
to a discussion on why unified counter-hegemonic forces around popular Arab 
nationalism were absent when another revolutionary moment came with the Iranian 
revolution.  
                                                        
3 Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans; Chalcraft, Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle 
East; Haugbolle, ‘The New Arab Left and 1967’. For Haugbolle’s part, he has presented a thorough 
analysis of the genealogy of the New Arab Left on its historical origins, intellectual influences in the 




4.1 Marking the Revolutionary Moment of Arab Nationalism    
The leftward turn within the ANM in the 1960s was, by and large, the 
cornerstone of a paradigm shift. It rearticulated the relationship of ‘theory’ and 
‘practice’ in Arab nationalism and opened up another possible path along which other 
‘histories’ of Arab nationalism evolved following the leftist movements in Arabia and 
the Gulf.4 As an intellectual self-criticism on the failure and disillusionment of an 
unfulfilled project of Arab unity in previous decades, this turn gave rise to a new 
generation of Arab nationalists seeking to re-examine the ideological linkage between 
Arab nationalism and society in the Middle East. Being fuelled by the regional and 
international geopolitical earthquake, they further redefined the nature of international 
relations and attempted to maintain and intensify the revolutionary momentum. The 
intellectual transition was a sort of ‘dual revolution’,5 which self-revolutionised the 
existing paradigm within the ANM for a new historical bloc and created a counter-
hegemony by learning from Marxism-Leninism. As Ali Qasim Rabia, a member of the 
Arab nationalist movement in Bahrain who was influenced by New Arab Left ideas 
and elected as a member of parliament in 1973, says: ‘[To us] even nationalists were 
also holding Marxist views, reading about Marxism, the literature of Marxism, about 
Marx, Engels and that sort of literature at that time. We enjoyed it very much because 
it was what we call ‘real transforming and thinking’.6 This was a critical turning point 
for Arab nationalism, giving birth to the so-called New Arab Left movement in the 
Middle East: a new generation of Arab nationalists emerged as counter-hegemonic 
intellectuals who decried ‘the historical backwardness’ of the Middle East, especially 
the Gulf, looking through a Marxist-Leninist lens.   
                                                        
4 A thorough survey of the Left organisation in Arabia and the Gulf, see Abdulnabi Al-Ekry, Al 
Tantheemat Al-Yasariya Fi Al-Jazeera Wa Al-Khaleej Al-Arabi (The Left Organisations in the 
Peninsula and the Arab Gulf) (Bahrain and Beirut: Faradees, 2014). On the New Arab Left, see 
particularly chapter 2.  
5 In its original term, ‘dual revolution’ was coined by Eric Hobsbawm to analyse ‘the transformation 
of the world between 1789 and 1848’ in the fallout of ‘the French Revolution of 1789 and the 
contemporaneous British Industrial Revolution’. Here, my use of ‘dual revolution’ is to emphasise 
‘revolution in theory and practice’ within the intellectual transition of the Arab nationalist movement. 
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848, Abacus (London: Sphere, 1977), 11. 
6 Interview with Ali Qasim Rabia, Manama, December 13, 2015. 
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4.1.1 Fermenting leftward turns  
The first strike to the ANM was the dissolution of the Egyptian-Syrian coalition, 
in the form of the United Arab Republic (UAR), in September 1961, which was 
followed by polarised disintegration within the ANM. The dissolution of the UAR 
caused many to reflect, particularly among the left-wing cadres of the ANM, on the 
idea of unifying Arab lands into one Arab state through republicanism. Yet, such 
reflection did not lead to an immediate break between the left-wing of the ANM and 
Nasserists, whose leadership in the ANM was quite influential then. Until Nasser’s 
rightward shift on the Yemeni issues after 1964 and his instrumentalisation of the left 
wing as an intelligence apparatus, some left-wing cadres of the ANM then separated 
from Nasserists at the end of 1966.7 Muhsin Ibrahim, one of the leading left-wing 
figures of the ANM in Lebanon, argued that national unity collided with the interests 
of landowners, capitalists and some in the bourgeoisie. While this collision was 
intertwined with the interests of the colonial powers, the ANM needed to reflect on its 
liberal heritage; nonetheless, he did not intend to negate and delegitimise the basic 
elements of the ANM but urged a break from its fascist elements and sought political 
solutions from below. 8  This leftward current took a turn seeking radial political 
changes and became what historian Abdel Razzaq Takriti termed ‘radical 
rationalism’.9 It was ‘radical’ due to its proposal for a popular armed struggle approach 
to pursue revolutionary fundamental sociopolitical changes. And it was ‘rational’ 
because its ideas drew on the philosophy of ‘scientific socialism’ in Marxism-
Leninism, theoretically signposting the objectives and strategies for revolution. This 
intellectual enlightenment then sowed the seeds of a later wave of self-reflection and 
critiques in the ANM about the leadership and strategies of Arab nationalist 
movements.  
The 6-year fermenting process for the leftward turn eventually ripened and 
became conspicuous after the setback (Naksa) of the 1967 Arab-Israel war and the 
                                                        
7 Fred Halliday, ‘Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World, Habash and His Comrades from 
Nationalism to Marxism (Book Review)’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 6, no. 3 (1976): 355–56; 
Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman 1965-1976, 93. 
8 Al-Kubaisi, ‘The Arab Nationalist Movement 1951-1971: From Pressure Group to Socialist Party’, 
138–40. 
9 Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman 1965-1976, 91. 
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tarnished reputation of Nasser.10 Some suggested a radical enlightenment, liberation 
from ‘religious obscurantism’, while others encompassed appeals from Islamic groups 
into their political programmes on the basis of national unity.11 Although this leftward 
ideological turn in Arab nationalist movements was a rather materialist self-reflection, 
the divorce between Islam and Socialist ideas has never been emphasised, not least in 
the manifesto of New Arab Left intellectuals in the Gulf.12 While it was encouraged 
by Guevarism, the Vietnam war and Communist China, its essence of a popular 
nationalist struggle corresponded to anti-imperialist movements in the third world. 
Soon after Naksa, a report called ‘The Arab Revolution in the Face of the Battle of 
Destiny’ was concluded at an ANM meeting in which George Habash, the founder of 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), convened. This report 
denounced the petty bourgeois leadership of the ANM that distrusted popular 
movements. 13  It was a manifesto that self-criticised and blamed the bourgeois 
‘hegemony’ within the ANM that failed to establish a powerful historical bloc against 
imperialists.   
The emergence of radical left-leaning nationalist movements, therefore, created 
new and different social forces. This process then brought about the disintegration of 
ANM following three trends. First, as Halliday observed, some ex-ANM members 
merged with local communist parties, as in South Yemen and Lebanon.14 Second, after 
Naksa, some ex-ANM members, for example in Bahrain, became disillusioned and 
withdrew their support for military regimes in the Middle East. They were received by 
the Al Khalifa regime as significant governmental bureaucrats and this facilitated a 
variety of state-led developmental projects in preparation for British withdrawal and 
Bahrain’s formal independence. More importantly, as will be shown in chapter 5, they 
                                                        
10 AlShehabi, ‘Divide and Rule in Bahrain and the Elusive Pursuit for a United Front: The Experience 
of the Constitutive Committee and the 1972 Uprising’, 107. 
11 Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World, 22–23. 
12 In an interview, as one of the cadres of the Gulf New Left movements once stated: ‘We have chosen 
to against imperialism and feudalism. If we take up the principle of scientific socialism it is to apply 
them exclusively on the economic and social level. We are Muslims and it would never occur to us to 
give up Islam’. See The Gulf Committee, ‘The Gulf Bulletin No.5: Eight Years of People’s War in 
Oman’, June 1973, 10, British Library. 
13 Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman 1965-1976, 93–94. 
14 Halliday, ‘Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World, Habash and His Comrades from 
Nationalism to Marxism (Book Review)’, 356. 
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played a primary role that ideologically linked Al Khalifa and Bahraini society.15 Third, 
the crystallisation and empowerment of radical left-leaning nationalists in the form of 
popular fronts was seen across the Middle East, e.g. the PFLP and the PFLOAG. 
Among these trends, the third one had more influence on the ideological turn in 
popular movements across the Middle East. Its reformed but radicalised anti-
imperialist agenda delivered a tone of popular revolution. While criticising the 
conventional ANM, this trend also attacked the Arab communist parties due to their 
rigid and non-resilient doctrines, which were isolated from real circumstances and 
obsessed with the Soviet model and leadership. It saw the communist parties as nothing 
but ‘the revolutionary progressive wing of the petty bourgeoisie’, 16 and therefore 
turned these radical left-leaning nationalists into New Arab Left intellectuals who 
forged new counter-hegemonic forces among others.  
4.1.2 Critiques of hegemony 
Following the rise of the New Arab Left movement in the 1960s, critiques of the 
bourgeois leadership of the ANM gained currency in nationalist and popular 
movements in the Gulf. The grievances of the leadership, as Takriti argues, stemmed 
from two regional events in the 1960s. First, the existing leadership of the ANM failed 
to support the strikes and popular uprising in Bahrain in March 1965. This led to the 
announcement by some Bahraini nationalists, who later joined the PFLOAG, that 
Bahraini movements had not received enough attention from the Kuwaiti leadership.17 
And the Kuwaiti ANM was only concerned with the west of the Arabian Peninsula, 
rather than the Gulf.18 Second, the ANM leadership did not side with the National 
Liberation Front of South Yemen when Nasser turned his back on it.19 These events, 
and Naksa in 1967, then re-oriented the revolutionary programme of the ANM in the 
Gulf. By declaring its separation from the ANM branch in Arabia, adopting Marxism-
                                                        
15 Interview with Ali Fakhro, Manama, January 5, 2016. 
16 Ismael, The Arab Left, 114–16. 
17 Although Takriti does not specify which faction of the ANM that was not in support of the 
movements, it is believed that the silence of Ba’athists to the nationalist-communist demand for 
terminating the British rule compelled the dissatisfaction of the left-wing of the ANM in the Gulf. See 
Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman 1965-1976, 95. 
18 AlShehabi, ‘Divide and Rule in Bahrain and the Elusive Pursuit for a United Front: The Experience 
of the Constitutive Committee and the 1972 Uprising’, 108. 
19 Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman 1965-1976, 95. 
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Leninism as its primary ideology and taking on an armed-struggle approach to 
liberating Arabia, some nationalists reorganised as ‘The Popular Revolutionary 
Movement in Oman and the Arab Gulf’ (PRM) under the banner of the New Arab 
Left.20 
On the basis of self-criticism of the ANM and the adoption of Marxism-Leninism, 
the New Arab Left reconceptualised social relations in the Gulf. To them, an Arab 
bourgeois-feudalist-imperialist hegemony was seen as the major hegemonic social 
force behind the existing historical bloc. It should be held responsible for Naksa and 
the failure to unleash the imperialist fetters of the Arab states. As an overseas 
revolutionary voice in support of the New Arab Left movement in the Gulf21, the Gulf 
Committee issued a periodical called the Gulf Bulletin in the 1970s that denounced 
this hegemony and corresponded to the revolutionary agenda in the Gulf.22 For New 
Arab Left intellectuals, the British withdrawal in late 1971 did not actually bring 
substantial national independence to the Gulf Arab states. Instead, it was followed by 
the creation of Bahrain, Qatar and the Union of Arab Emirates as spurious independent 
states that preserved British interests.23 This arrangement sharpened the contradictions 
in this region and turned the war in Oman into ‘Britain’s Vietnam, fought and run by 
Whitehall’ in London.24   
For New Arab Left intellectuals, popular revolutions in the Gulf were not merely 
                                                        
20 AlShehabi, ‘Divide and Rule in Bahrain and the Elusive Pursuit for a United Front: The Experience 
of the Constitutive Committee and the 1972 Uprising’, 108. 
21 For the New Arab Left and its ideological ties with the global New Left, see Haugbolle, ‘The New 
Arab Left and 1967’, 499–502. 
22 During the high tide of the wave of New Left in Britain since 1960s and its later intellectual turn to 
support the Palestinian movements after 1967, the Gulf Committee was established by young 
Lebanese historian Fawwaz Traboulsi, Fred Halliday, Helen Lackner, Ken Whittingham, Nigel 
Disney and some oversea Middle East students in London, mainly in the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS). The primary objective of the Gulf Committee in support of the Gulf 
revolutions was clearly stated in the first issue of its periodical publication, the Gulf Bulletin, on June 
9, 1971, the sixth anniversary of Dhofari revolution: ‘to give maximum solidarity to liberation forces 
in the whole Gulf area, to expose the ‘withdrawal’ charade being played out by the Tory government, 
and to link the revolution in Dhofar with the struggles in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the 
Gulf’. See ‘The Gulf Bulletin No.1’ (The Gulf Committee, June 1971), 1; Fawwaz Traboulsi, Sourat 
Al-Fata Bi Al-Ahmar: Ayam Fi Al-Salam Wa Al-Harb (A Portrait in Young Men in Red: Chronicles of 
Peace and War) (London-Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1997), 78–80, and interview with Helen 
Lackner, Durham, June 20, 2016. 
23 The Gulf Committee, ‘The Gulf Bulletin No.4’, 1972, 1, British Library. 
24 The Gulf Committee, ‘The Gulf Bulletin No.1’, 1. 
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extended decolonisation movements but, more broadly, a striking back to the 
consequences of the longstanding capitalist formation in the Gulf. The contradictions 
between the ruling class and the people would be much severer than in the 1960s, 
alongside a changing global capitalist market. ‘When both imperialism and the 
revolution have adopted strategies that are markedly different from those of 1965’, 
lamented the Gulf Committee in 1973, ‘the clash takes a sharper and more extensive 
form than ever before’. The Gulf region, with its oil resources, became necessary to 
secure the overall demands of the global capitalist market, especially with an expected 
economic downturn in the US in the early 1980s. While there were financial outflows 
from advanced capitalist states to the Gulf region for the purchase of oil, another circle 
of the capitalist game was launched simultaneously. The ‘oil money’ soon became 
‘chips for the Gulf States’ to make massive arms purchases from the West and to invest 
in the global capitalist market. For New Arab Left intellectuals, while this circle 
economically and politically empowered counter-insurgency, it nonetheless reaffirmed 
their solidarity agenda: ‘the need for a joint struggle by Arab and Iranian workers’. 
Their call came with the confidence to launch a comprehensive and successful 
revolution in the Gulf that ‘could seriously weaken the economies of the capitalist west’ 
and ‘be a powerful and dynamic ally for revolutionaries throughout the world’25. In 
doing so, they thought that an armed class struggle with popular support was necessary.  
4.1.3 The voice of popular revolution: class and armed struggle 
While the Arab military bourgeois regime had proven to be a failure in the 1960s, 
critiques of Arab bourgeois-feudalist-imperialist hegemony came, unsurprisingly, with 
the adoption of an armed class struggle approach from New Arab Left intellectuals. 
And such an approach became a new ideological linkage between counter-hegemonic 
forces and civil society across the Gulf. This was a moment, to use a Gramscian term, 
when some attempted to rearticulate ‘the political’ and ‘the social’ instances in existing 
social relations and thereby ‘the people’ were interpellated by counter-hegemony. 
As a group pursuing a popular armed struggle and the most influential 
revolutionary movement in the Gulf, the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) had been a 
                                                        
25 The Gulf Committee, ‘The Gulf Bulletin No.5: Eight Years of People’s War in Oman’, 1. 
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revolutionary vanguard against British colonialism and monarchical feudalism in the 
region since the mid-1960s. After the Hamrin Conference in September 1968, the DLF 
changed its name to the PFLAOG and claimed this was a stride forward on a Marxist-
Leninist revolutionary path. This move registered as a cornerstone for New Arab Left 
intellectuals with regard to their ideologies and strategies against imperialists and their 
proxies in the Gulf. An ideological turn to ‘scientific socialism’ as a core tenet within 
Marxism-Leninism offered the Dhofari revolution a framework. It theoretically 
identified ‘revolution’ as a class struggle between the poor masses and the imperialists, 
bourgeoisie and feudalists. This turn appeared on the PFLOAG’s agenda for adopting 
revolutionary violence, coordinating the Dhofari struggle with the masses in other 
parts of the occupied Gulf and assaulting the tribalism within Gulf society.26 As Takriti 
points out concerning ‘the battle for society’ in the PFLOAG Charter, which saw:  
The tribal structure as a divisive presence in society retarding the anti-colonial 
battle. It was also a response to tribalism’s perceived nature as obstacle to the 
development of new economic and social relations. Amongst the revolutionary 
vanguard the nationalist impulse for the creation of a whole out of fragments–the 
patching of a society out of tribes–was present and so was the will for socialist 
modernization.27 
Takriti shows that the ideological development within the Dhofari revolution was a 
turning point in the Gulf popular movements, in that revolutions must continue beyond 
national independence in a political sense. This ideological turn denounced the 
conventional ANM agenda that disregarded the problems entrenched in the tribal 
structure and established economic and social arrangements designed by both tribal 
shaikhs and colonialists. Upholding a more explicit left-leaning revolutionary agenda, 
the Dhofari revolution committed itself ideologically and strategically to Marxism-
Leninism at both the regional and international levels. In the Gulf, the PFLOAG 
continued its role of revolutionary vanguard by giving support to popular movements 
and recruiting cadres from the Gulf States, mainly Bahrain.28 In the international arena, 
since 1969, it was encapsulated in a broader anti-imperialist movement in the world 
and given support from Chinese communists who further informed the PFLOAG about 
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Maoism and criticism of the Soviet Union’s revisionism. Nevertheless, the PFLOAG 
avoided jumping into the ideological conflict between Communist China and the 
Soviet Union, and it kept its efforts and focus on liberation movements in the Gulf.29 
The ideological development of the Dhofari revolution since the late 1960s 
portrayed several different characteristics of New Arab Left intellectuals in the Gulf 
from the past, having a far-reaching impact on the agenda of Bahraini nationalist and 
popular movements in various aspects. The commitment to a popular armed struggle 
approach to revolution showed pessimism towards established social relations. Non-
violent methods could be useless and futile in the long run unless fundamental change 
was realised via violence. This violent approach did indeed encourage some offshoots 
of clandestine cells in the Gulf to adopt radical means, but it should not be exaggerated 
or simplified and applied completely to nationalist and popular movements across the 
Gulf, especially in the Bahraini case in the 1970s. Violent armed struggle was just one 
of the methods. Despite the large scale of labour movements in Bahrain in March 1972, 
sit-ins, demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts of parliamentary elections were more 
frequently seen in Bahrain. Even before the March movement in 1972, a petition for 
the establishment of unions, to deal with labour issues, was organised legally by the 
Constitutional Committee, it took on different methods from clandestine cells and 
brought Arab nationalists from various social ranks together.30 The overall strategy of 
a popular armed class struggle is supposed to be best placed in a loose definition and 
in a broader picture of the New Arab Left’s disappointment. It is much more sensible 
to hold the idea that revolutions should be achieved through an organic revolutionary 
body coordinated among counter-hegemonic intellectuals, progressive students, 
labourers and peasants in the Gulf.   
To sum up, the rise of the New Arab Left signposted a new overarching paradigm 
for the nationalist and popular movements in the Gulf. ‘Revolution’, to the New Arab 
Left, ‘meant revolution of society from the bottom up, occupation of public space as a 
means to social transformation, the creation of alternative life forms, cadres, 
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communes and a general reinvigoration of political life by engagement at the local 
level’,31 Though it offered an overall strategic and ideological revolutionary manifesto, 
it did not impose an organisational hierarchy within the movements, among so-called 
revolutionary heartlands and peripheries, as did communist parties or the conventional 
ANM, which the New Arab Left movement avoided. This gave New Arab Left 
intellectuals in the Gulf some flexibility in their linkages to civil society, highlighting 
the people as the main political subject. As will be shown later, organisational 
flexibility was followed by different trajectories of intellectual development among 
South Yemen, Dhofar and Bahrain that corresponded to the political realities they faced. 
 
4.2 Revolutionary Vanguard in Aden and Dhofar 
Going beyond just revolutionary upheavals that might be taken as an anomaly in 
international relations in the Gulf, the rise of the New Arab Left in Arabia and the Gulf 
was argued as being revenge for the effects of uneven and combined capitalist 
development through colonialism, as Halliday once identified. Not only did it bring 
about an intellectual turning point in the evolution of Arab nationalism in the Gulf, it 
fused sociopolitical dynamics into the process of decolonisation and state formation in 
this area. Thus, this section and subsequent ones examine three cases of the New Arab 
Left in the Gulf − the PDRY in South Yemen, the PFLOAG in Dhofar and the PFB in 
Bahrain − in a transitional stage towards formal independence from British colonialism. 
I outline how the infusion of Marxism-Leninism and Arab nationalist movements was 
practised and represented in New Arab Left intellectuals’ understanding of 
sociopolitical relations across national, regional and international levels.  
The purpose of this section is to substantiate the characteristics of the New Arab 
Left as a counter-hegemonic force. While critiquing the bourgeois leadership of the 
ANM and the dogmatic strategies of the communist party, New Arab Left intellectuals 
embraced a more autonomous and resilient approach to the struggle. This approach 
made it less hierarchical than the ANM, giving it more latitude to ally itself with 
different social forces and tie in to popular movements around Arab nationalism. But, 
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in addition to continuing counter-insurgent suppression, the strong counter-hegemonic 
forces were difficult to unify on both the regional and national levels. As a result, when 
another revolutionary moment came with the emergence of Khomeinism in the late 
1970s, popular Arab nationalism found it was a fractured counter-hegemony, relying 
upon a fragile leadership of New Arab Left intellectuals.  
4.2.1 Short-lived revolutionary policy of PDRY 
For both the tribal regimes that expected an extension of the British ‘informal 
empire’ into the 1970s and the revolutionaries who anticipated the realisation of utopia 
in the Gulf, nothing was more shocking and inspiring than the successful Marxist 
revolution in South Yemen and the establishment of the PDRY.  
As a result of the sociopolitical contradictions stemming from British colonial 
occupation, the spread of Arab nationalism in the 1950s, the Yemeni civil war in the 
1960s and the British withdrawal from Yemen, the PDRY was formed as an 
independent state in November 1967. 32  It was the first and only Arab state that 
officially embraced Marxism, siding with anti-imperialist movements, supporting the 
New Arab Left movement and undermining Britain’s hegemony in the Gulf. On the 
one hand, when the British army was overwhelmed on the Dhofari battlefield, the 
genesis of a Marxist state like the PDRY in South Arabia threw Britain between two 
fires. The British objective was to extinguish the Marxist-Leninist revolution in Dhofar, 
but it could not be achieved unless the Marxist government led by the National 
Liberation Front in South Yemen was overthrown. On the other hand, the success of 
the PDRY became a potential gateway for an international Marxist revolution in the 
Gulf, and the PDRY’s commitment in support of the popular struggle was a catalyst 
for popular revolutions in the Gulf, especially for the PFLOAG. 33  Although 
reconciliation talks between the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) of North Yemen and the 
PDRY were embarked upon to discuss the possibility of unification after November 
1971,34 the National Liberation Front of the PDRY nonetheless continuously played a 
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crucial role as a revolutionary vanguard in both the domestic and regional contexts. 
As an exemplary revolutionary government, the PDRY put Marxist ideologies 
into practice via its internal and external polices, along with consolidation of the 
leadership of the National Liberation Front of South Yemen. In the fifth congress in 
March 1972, the PDRY announced a ‘national democratic phase’ that sought 
‘deepening of the political and organisational strength of the National Liberation Front 
itself’. In particular, it ‘passed a housing law limiting each family to the possession of 
one dwelling each. All rents were lowered by 25%, all property in excess of the limit 
was to be confiscated without compensation, and all previously existing contracts 
between landlords and tenants were abolished’. Furthermore, the PDRY’s foreign 
policy orientation showed its international solidarity with the third world, especially 
by giving ‘political and material backing to the Palestinian and Eritrean guerrilla 
movements’. It also actively communicated with Cuba, North Korea, Communist 
China and the Soviet Union. In the regional context, in addition to its adamant support 
for the PFLOAG, the PDRY refused to recognise the formal independence of Bahrain, 
Qatar and UAE granted by Britain in 1971. It also rejected establishing official ties 
with Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman.35 To end British colonial rule in the Gulf 
and pursue the independence of the Gulf Arab states had been common objectives for 
Arab nationalists in the Gulf. But, the wave of independence in 1971, for the PDRY, 
was somehow spurious and unfulfilled when the British colonial legacy was still 
politically and economically rooted in the Gulf.   
However, the developments in regional politics in the 1970s had adverse effects 
on the PDRY’s revolutionary approach. The PDRY’s non-recognition policy was 
supported by its political campaign throughout the Middle East, intended to be carried 
out among members of the Arab League; yet it did not receive broader support in the 
region so that its revolutionary foreign policy was re-oriented in the early 1970s. Since 
1972, and particularly since 1974, the PDRY held back from exporting Marxist 
revolution in the Gulf. It deviated from a revolutionary approach to a more pragmatic 
one. The PDRY reframed its policy towards newly independent Gulf Arab states, i.e. 
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Bahrain, Qatar and UAE, and expected the normalisation of diplomatic ties with its 
neighbours by abandoning its harsh critiques of their relations with Britain. This policy 
shift was due to the revival of geopolitical competition in the event of Iranian military 
intervention in the Dhofari revolution in 1973, which then posed a direct challenge to 
the PDRY’s border.36 One of the critical consequences, as Halliday argues, brought 
about by the shift in PDRY’s policy following the Iranian intervention was the divorce 
of the Dhofari revolution from wider Gulf revolutionary movements, which used to be 
a common context for the New Arab Left in the Gulf.37 At this point, the PDRY’s 
‘inevitable’ improvement in its relationship with the Gulf Arab monarchies confirmed 
the principles of ‘non-interference’ and ‘non-aggression’.38 Although Marxist-Leninist 
ideas still appeared to be widely received among New Arab Left intellectuals, unified 
counter-hegemonic forces around popular Arab nationalism were increasingly 
disintegrating across South Yemen, Dhofar and Bahrain at the regional level from the 
mid-1970s. 
4.2.2 PFLOAG’s popular struggle and Marxist-Leninist ideas 
Other than the leading role of the PDRY as a form of sovereign state, the 
PFLOAG’s commitment to popular and armed struggle was the most influential 
counter-hegemonic force and a representation of ‘politics from below’ in the Gulf since 
1968. Its unequivocal Marxist-Leninist manifesto influenced Bahraini nationalist and 
popular movements throughout the 1970s. As a critical part of the international anti-
imperial movement, the PFLOAG received international backing from Communist 
China in support of the Dhofari revolution. For the PFLOAG, while other Arab states 
were not interested in its struggle, Chinese communist support gave a timely material 
and ideological basis for popular movements in Dhofar.39 From 9–19 June 1971, the 
third congress of the PFLOAG re-affirmed its revolutionary strategy and stance, 
proposing to implement Marxist-Leninist ideas after British withdrawal. In liberated 
areas in Dhofar, the PFLOAG affirmed the role of ‘a mass revolutionary party to lead 
the revolution through all stages of development guided by the fundamental and 
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scientific theory of ‘Marxist-Leninism’’. Meanwhile, it was also crucial to unite 
nationalist groups in support of an extension of ‘the scope of the mass armed struggle’ 
and the increase in ‘the number of guns’. This popular armed struggle approach, 
however, needed concrete policies that crystallised social justice revealed in the course 
of revolution. Thus, the PFLOAG decided to form the People’s Council to administer 
and organise social and political affairs in liberated rural areas. Very much like the first 
steps taken by Marxist revolutions throughout history, the PFLOAG de-structured the 
established social relations by, first, abolishing ‘all the remnants of slave relations and 
the legal ban on ownership of one man by another fellow man’. And it then launched 
land reform by transferring ‘all lands in the liberated rural areas to the ownership of 
the people’.40  
In addition to the policies delivered in Dhofar, the PFLOAG demonstrated its 
commitment to international solidarity with its counterparts in other places. It was to 
reflect a broader regional and international context and to relate its project to anti-
imperialist movements beyond Dhofari borders. The PFLOAG saw the PDRY as a 
‘symbol of freedom’ and ‘the backbone of the escalating liberation revolution in the 
entire Gulf and Arabian Peninsula’. As such, the consolidation and development of 
‘combative relations’ and ‘comradeship’ between the PDRY and other revolutionary 
groups in Arabia and the Gulf were critical. To prevent the liquidation of the revolution, 
the PFLOAG created a united revolutionary front among the cadres in the Gulf and 
Palestinian people under attack by imperialists and Zionists. This solidarity shown by 
the PFLOAG went beyond ethnic differences, while the PFLOAG affirmed its support 
for popular revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America, especially in 
Vietnam and the peninsula of Indo-China41.    
The PFLOAG related itself to anti-imperialist movements in the third world and 
located its revolution in the international context, and this process changed how the 
role of imperialists in existing capital relations and geopolitical competition was 
reconceptualised within popular Arab nationalism. The relationship between 
imperialist states and Arab nationalist movements was no longer within a British 
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protectorate relationship like before. Now, it was evolving alongside both geopolitical 
competition in the global Cold War context and capitalist formation pursued by a new 
hegemony, the US. As such, the PFLOAG saw the role of the US as a new form of 
imperialism that was more influential than Britain. As the PFLOAG understood it, on 
the one hand, the ultimate aim of the US was to liquidate Marxist revolutions in Arabia 
and the Gulf by consolidating US ties to the newly independent Gulf monarchical 
regimes and prevent them entering the Soviet orbit. On the other hand, it was also to 
supress the Palestinian resistance movement and ‘pave the road for a peaceful solution’, 
which was seen by the PFLOAG as ‘a surrender to the Zionists and imperialists’. And 
the US security pact, as the PFLOAG termed it, was consolidated via US support for 
two regional states, i.e. Saudi Arabia and the Shah’s Iran. Saudi Arabia gave backing 
to the Jordanian regime in favour of the Zionist influence against Palestinian resistance, 
and the Shah’s Iran intervened in the Dhofari revolution and was given the privilege 
of occupying strategic spots in the Strait of Hormus as a reward42. 
For the PFLOAG, the political struggle in the Gulf never just involved Arabs. It 
was the epitome of the Cold War and represented the struggle between hegemony and 
counter-hegemony across the world. In an interview, M. Ahmed Abdullah, spokesman 
and member of the executive committee of the central command of the PFLOAG, put 
it straightforwardly:  
There have never been so many Baluchs, Indians and Pakistanis in the Omani 
army. All the higher officers, beginning with the Minister of Defence, the 
Commander of the Army and the Head of Intelligence are Englishmen … The 
Americans are preparing to take over from the British in Sharjah and Bahrain, 
and they are already active through the mediation of Iran and Saudi Arabia. They 
supply them with weapons sold at the highest price, and in exchange receive new 
oil concessions ate the cheapest price.43  
A grand revolutionary reflection on the geopolitical surroundings seen through 
a Marxist-Leninist lens was inherited by the successor of the PFLOAG, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), which carried on the Dhofari revolution 
until 1976. Moreover, it was shared with some left-leaning activists in Iran. In February 
1975, the PFLO held a meeting with the left-wing Iranian revolutionary organisations, 
                                                        
42 The Gulf Committee, ‘The Gulf Bulletin No.4’, 6. 
43 The Gulf Committee, ‘The Gulf Bulletin No.5: Eight Years of People’s War in Oman’, 10. 
124 
 
delivering the idea of Gulf solidarity and a joint front against imperialism. They 
denounced closer links between their homelands and the global capitalist market 
facilitated by the imperialist countries. The most noticeable agenda items revealed in 
their joint communiqué was their pledge to ‘continue the decisive struggle and to 
commit all the popular masses totally to the armed struggle’ on the one hand, and 
develop further ‘the nature of the strong, fraternal and historic relations linking the 
Iranian masses and their brothers the Arabs’ on the other hand.44  
The PFLOAG saw a schism into the PFLO and the PFB in June 1974. It was in 
light of that ‘the struggle was supposed to be brought to the local level’45 and ‘each 
country should have its own party’.46 Nonetheless, such a marriage of a Marxist-
Leninist manifesto with Arab nationalist movements had already been prevalent 
among Arab nationalists in Bahrain. Yet, as noted earlier, the idea of ‘class and popular’ 
struggle around Arab nationalism should not be outweighed by its means of ‘violent 
and armed’ struggle. As Abdulnabi Al-Ekry, the representative of PFLOAG foreign 
relations and later member of the PFB exiled abroad, said: ‘[In] Bahrain, the branch 
[of the PFLOAG] there, took the name of the Popular Front in Bahrain, not 
liberation … This is a new stage in the Left where it must be [about] these [movements] 
with local issues, and not considering armed struggle’47. This is a reminder before 
taking a closer look at the case of New Arab Left intellectuals in Bahrain, to which the 
present chapter now turns. 
 
4.3 Counter-Hegemonic Intellectuals in Bahrain: The Popular Front of 
Bahrain 
As noted in previous sections, New Arab Left intellectuals distinguished 
themselves from the ANM and created new social forces for a more popular version 
of Arab nationalism. To them, the ideological infusion of Marxism-Leninism and Arab 
nationalism was mainly to give them intellectual guidelines through which they 
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rejuvenated the momentum of Arab nationalist movements by linking to the grassroots. 
In spite of sharing an overall anti-imperialist agenda with communist parties, New 
Arab Left intellectuals rejected any formal obedience to central command in Moscow, 
China or Iraq. They maintained their strategic resilience, seeking ad hoc alliances with 
other factions in ‘the Left’, and even with religious groups. While Bahraini cadres of 
the PFLOAG in the early 1970s, who later formed the PFB after 1974, attempted to 
establish a leadership role in Bahraini popular movements, they created new counter-
hegemonic forces opposing Al Khalifa’s rule in the 1970s. To elucidate some tenets of 
popular Arab nationalism, this section shows how the PFB understood the historical 
backwardness in the Gulf, built up its leadership in popular movements and ties with 
Bahraini civil society. Also, more specifically, it outlines how the PFB saw the role of 
two major regional powers − Saudi Arabia and the Shah’s Iran − around the internal 
and external issues of Bahrain after formal independence.     
4.3.1 Reading backwardness, charging hegemony 
The 1967 Naksa was indeed a geopolitical strike at the ideological development 
of Arab nationalism and catalysed a new generation of Arab nationalist movements. 
The other important driving force behind the New Arab Left in the Gulf was their 
understanding of social and political development in Bahrain as part of historical 
backwardness in the Gulf. For New Arab Left intellectuals,   
…in general the Gulf region was much behind the other Arab parts … The 
Arabian Peninsula was the poorest at, let’s say, the onset of post-Second World 
War. It was the poorest part of the Arab World, the most backward. The oil 
changed fortunes but it was still behind in many things. Speaking about 
education, political life, so on and so on … Society was backward. It was tribal, 
the economy was backward.48 
While reflection as such prevailed among New Arab Left intellectuals in the Gulf, they 
infused Marxism-Leninism into Arab nationalism so as to re-conceptualise 
international and regional sociopolitical relations in the Gulf. Even though the PFB 
divorced from the PFLOAG and put less emphasis on armed struggle and more on 
localised political groups, it still shared an overarching manifesto with it counterparts 
in Dhofar and popular movements in the third world.         
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The PFB realised that they were dealing with a new form of US imperialism, 
which was different from British imperialism. In the past, relying on protectorate 
treaties as conduits, Britain used to implement a ‘closed door’ policy through which 
British Political Residents or Adviser had de facto political power to oversee Bahrain’s 
foreign relations and even meddle in domestic politics and the economy. But, US 
imperialism was present with an ‘open door policy’ through which it increased its 
influence on the allies and Bahrain related more to the world capitalist market. To the 
PFB, the US-Bahraini relations as such underlay the Al Khalifa’s industrial plans, like 
BAPCO and Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA), thus giving up more privileges to foreign 
capitalists. While some post-independence states demanded full control over oil 
production through nationalisation, Al Khalifa chose to follow the Saudi model, only 
asking for shares from foreign companies. This model preserved the privileges of some 
businessmen that had been the social bases of Al Khalifa’s rule and now became a 
crucial capitalist class along with post-colonial Bahraini social formation. 
Qualitatively, it involved these subaltern classes in a much closer association with the 
interests of imperialism and they evolved along with the commercial boom in Bahrain 
through increased volumes of international trade and finance.49   
I argue that this process underlay Bahraini social formation since the early 1970s 
and reconfigured different social forces around Arab nationalism. As will be shown in 
chapter 5, it formed a societal context from which the old cadres of the ANM and these 
merchants were co-opted as organic intellectuals to the Al Khalifa regime, whereas the 
New Arab Left turned to counter-hegemonic intellectuals, especially during the period 
of what I call ‘interrupted historical restoration’ in the 1970s. It could be argued that 
both currents of social forces ‘sought to increase the capacity’ of the state of Bahrain 
as a late-developing capitalist state, maintaining its ‘sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and strategic survival’, under state geopolitical and capitalist competition, while Arab 
nationalism ‘reinforced the momentum towards territorial consolidation’.50 However, 
while the manifesto was calling for the people to be the major political subject of 
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sovereignty, New Arab Left intellectuals actually represented a more popular version 
of Arab nationalism. This was shown in the political struggle in Bahrain but also 
substantiated by how New Arab Left intellectuals created their leadership among 
different currents of counter-hegemonic forces. 
4.3.2 Establishing leadership in popular movements51 
What societal constituencies did the New Arab Left mobilise from within? And 
how did they pursue those ideas on the ground? To establish its leadership in popular 
movements and highlight the core tenets of popular Arab nationalism, the New Arab 
Left in Bahrain developed close ties with student and labour movements. As Abdullah 
Janahi, a member of the PFB and the National Union of Bahraini Students (NUBS), 
recalled, in the 1970s the NUBS was the nucleus through which the New Arab Left 
connected to civil society and spread its ideas across the Gulf. In addition to those who 
studied in Beirut and Damascus, the numbers of members and sympathisers of the 
NUBS were up to 750 in Kuwait and 500 in Egypt. There were 17 branches outside 
Bahrain, organised by Bahraini students. Not only were these students the major 
financial source for the PFB,52 also they approached and spread New Arab Left ideas 
among Bahraini people while offering educational, social and medical services to the 
society outside more developed areas. For example, some students set up a small 
medical clinic in Muhharaq and established some cells in the neighbourhoods around 
Sitra, Diraz, Nuwaidrat and other deprived areas outside Manama. Having such 
connections with Bahraini people through these channels, student members promoted 
the movement and worked on political education by offering books and PFB pamphlets 
in schools, women’s organisations, university, college and sports clubs. Additionally, 
the PFB also developed some influence within Bahraini labour movements. In some 
major industries like BAPCO and ALBA, the PFB had strong ties with the working 
class and supported the establishment of a general labour union in Bahrain. These two 
groups of students and labourers were fundamental progressive forces upon which the 
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New Arab Left’s leadership in popular movements was founded and through which 
popular Arab nationalism was ideologically linked to civil society. 
Despite sharing a common goal of struggling for popular political participation, 
the leadership of the PFB in popular movements was characterised by its differences 
from the communists and the NFL, and this was shown on a variety of political issues 
in the Middle East. On the Palestinian question, the PFB embraced the idea of full 
liberation of Palestinian lands from Israel and rejected recognising the state of Israel, 
whereas the NFL agreed to a two-state solution, siding with the Soviet Union. On some 
political issues in Africa in the 1970s, the PFB supported the Eritrean People's 
Liberation Front (EPLF) in seeking Eritrean independence from Ethiopia, but rejected 
separation between Western Sahara and Morocco in support of the idea of Arab unity. 
In contrast, the NFL sided with the Provisional Military Government of Socialist 
Ethiopia against Eritrean independence under Soviet influence, but supported the 
separatist movement in Western Sahara. More importantly, on the issue of Arab unity, 
although the PFB saw an Arab union as the ultimate goal of the Arab nationalist 
movement, it only supported a political system that was founded upon the people’s 
will rather than absolutism, whereas the NFL did not completely reject an absolutist 
government if it was supported by the Soviets.53   
As for how the PFB developed its popular support and approached these issues, 
what mainly constituted popular Arab nationalism as upheld by New Arab Left 
intellectuals was the idea that ‘the people’ should be the major political subject of any 
political arrangement. As will be shown in the following chapters, this idea underlay 
the counter-hegemonic forces of the New Arab Left in the political struggle against Al 
Khalifa and, further, had an impact on how Bahrain’s regional policy towards 
alignment was formulated. The connections with students and labourers, as presented 
here, offered fundamental grassroots support for New Arab Left intellectuals, 
especially in a series of labour and popular movements in the early 1970s. Yet, their 
reach into less developed areas where Shia clerics had much more influence in local 
neighbourhoods seemed to face a challenge.  
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4.3.3 Against pillars of hegemony: Saudi Arabia and the Shah’s Iran 
While the US open-door policy resonated with a process of forming social 
relations in Bahrain, it also corresponded to the Gulf geopolitics surrounding Bahrain. 
To New Arab Left intellectuals, it was reflected in US strategic thinking on the Gulf. 
As the PFB argued in its first published text not in Arabic in 1976 and later issued by 
the Gulf Committee in 1977:  
This policy which opened the door to more foreign monopolies and capital has 
been increasingly condoned by the local reactionary classes and particularly by 
the Bahraini ruling family who, for many years, have lived in the shadow of 
British rule … [Al Khalifa] has since discovered that there is a place for it in the 
new order and that it can rely on US imperialism and US major allies in the 
area.54 
This open-door policy was substantiated by the Nixon doctrine of supporting US allies 
militarily rather than intervening directly in the 1970s. To New Arab Left intellectuals, 
while Saudi Arabia and the Shah’s Iran became US proxies and reliable allies in the 
Gulf through the twin-pillar policy, the US then subjected this region to 
‘Vietnamisation in Arabia’.55 Nonetheless, Bahrain and the Gulf were not identical 
cases to Vietnam, given the regional competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The 
Saudi regime was suspicious of Iran’s territorial ambitions to annex Bahrain and to 
wipe out the Arabness of Bahrain. Therefore, ever since Britain left the Gulf, Saudi 
Arabia was keen to develop its economic ties with Bahrain through which it could 
exercise political pressure on Bahrain.56 To the PFB, this was Bahrain’s ‘subservience 
to Saudi reaction’ as shown in two fundamental issues. On the one hand, it was about 
the logistics of oil production. ‘Kuwait took over all the shares of the Kuwait Oil 
company while Bahrain continued to watch her Saudi sister before making any move 
related to marketing or management.’57 On the other hand, it was related to Bahrain’s 
foreign policy. As the PFB added:  
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[The Al Khalifa regime] takes the same position as the Saudis both in relations 
with socialist countries with whom it refuses to exchange diplomatic 
representatives or to establish economic and trade agreements, and in its 
relations with the PDRY. A number of [Bahraini] officials have said they cannot 
take one step in this direction until they get the green light from Riyadh … [Also, 
Al Khalifa] is seeking total harmonisation with the Saudi reactionary regime but 
it is not oblivious to Iranian influence. It is trying to benefit from the Saudi-
Iranian contradiction to extract more wealth in return for further compromises 
of national sovereignty: signing military and economic agreements which give 
these two reactionary regimes greater opportunities to control Bahrain’s internal 
affairs.58 
Saudi political influence on Bahrain’s domestic and foreign policy through its 
economic ties with the Al Khalifa regime had a far-reaching impact on the struggles 
among different social forces in Bahrain. As will be presented in the following chapters, 
Saudi influence eventually led to the dissolution of the Bahraini parliamentary 
experiment in 1975. The Saudi regime’s suspicion of popular political participation 
continuously impeded the revival of the Bahraini parliament throughout the second 
half of the 1970s. Having Saudi support, Al Khalifa chose to maintain an ideological 
disconnection between itself and civil society. This ideological disconnection was 
incapable of solving the struggles among different social forces, especially around the 
contestation of sovereignty. Having a non-integral state of Bahrain, in a Gramscian 
term, Al Khalifa faced the dilemma of having an open alignment with the US and had 
no choice but to give in to the Saudi leadership. This is what the PFB called ‘Bahrain’s 
subservience to Saudi Arabia’ and was later substantiated in a more sultanistic version 
of Arab nationalism. While it was represented in a series of Bahraini foreign policy 
issues in the second half of the 1970s, it also posed a predicament to the ideological 
development of popular Arab nationalism.   
Yet, in addition to Saudi influence, there was also an ideological shift in Bahraini 
popular movements, these also creating challenges to New Arab Left intellectuals in 
the late 1970s: the rise of Shia political movements that resonated with Khomeinism 
and the Iranian revolution, to which this chapter now turns.  
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4.4 Revolution in Transition 
The emergence of Shia political activism, like the New Arab Left in the Gulf, 
created another current of counter-hegemonic forces in the 1970s.  Focusing on the 
connections among these movements and Khomeinism, most explanations might see 
Bahraini Shia political movements as a product of the Iranian revolution and a 
homogeneous group with shared sectarian identities. Yet, following Laurence Louër 
beyond an essentialist argument as such, I see Shia political activism as very like the 
New Arab Left movement whose emergence and impact are best understood in a more 
historical and sociological way, seeing such an ideological trend as being more 
heterogeneous while this trend was intertwined with the political structure and agents’ 
practices. This heterogeneity pertains to the varying intellectual traditions within Shia 
communities, their dynamics within civil society, the internal split with regard to 
different political strategies and, more importantly, the societal constituencies these 
intellectuals were able to mobilise.     
Rather than an in-depth historical investigation of how it arose, I prefer in this 
section to highlight its manifesto and role as alternative counter-hegemonic forces to 
the New Arab Left in Bahraini popular movements. The purpose of my discussion here 
is not to examine Shia political activism per se but to juxtapose its influence on popular 
Arab nationalism. I argue that the emergence of Shia political activism, which later 
corresponded to Khomeinism and the Iranian revolution, was a test of the leadership 
of New Arab Left intellectuals in popular movements concerning their ideological 
linkages to civil society. More importantly, while it represented a transitional stage in 
the revolution, it was also a test of the ideological development of Arab nationalism.       
4.4.1 Awakening Shia political activism 
An understanding of Shia political activism involves more than just ethnic and 
sectarian issues around the struggles between Shia populations and Sunni tribal 
regimes in the Gulf. Also, it should not be explained exclusively by either its domestic 
or regional dimensions. The origins and development of Shia political activism in the 
Gulf demonstrate some social, economic and political features. Beyond sectarian 
essentialist accounts, the inferior social status of the Shia community, due to 
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longstanding unequal distribution of oil wealth and institutional exclusion, is believed 
to be a catalyst for political sentiments.59 These socio-economic and political issues 
offered Shia intellectuals grounds for political mobilisation in the Gulf that later 
coincided with the breakout of the Iranian revolution. However, the rising Shia 
political movements were not just a product of the Iranian revolution or a 
homogeneous movement. Although the Iranian revolution was a milestone for Shia 
political movements in the region as a way of radicalising their ideologies, it might be 
an exaggeration to argue that awakening Shia political activism could merely be 
attributed to the external influence of Iran, or that the ideological affinities shared 
among Iranian and non-Iranian Shia in the Gulf triggered politicisation. Louër argues 
against an approach that sees Shia as natural advocates of Iran’s hegemonic role in the 
Gulf due to ‘quasi-organic bonds of solidarity’ with Iran, and so the background of 
awakening Shia activism should go beyond an essentialist stance.60 
Just as New Arab Left intellectuals established their leadership in popular 
movements by spearheading a paradigmatic shift of Arab nationalism and 
encompassing Marxism-Leninism, Shia intellectuals also tried to link themselves 
ideologically with popular movements. It must be stressed here that the role of Shia 
intellectuals in Bahrain might not fit perfectly with Gramsci on ecclesiastics as 
traditional intellectuals in two ways. First, these intellectuals did function by linking 
themselves to civil society through Shia traditions, but they included different 
categories. 61  Considering their relations with Al Khalifa, some of them were not 
‘bound to the landed aristocracy’ through which they shared ‘the exercise of feudal 
ownership of land’ and ‘state privileges connected with property’.62 Having no such 
economic and political privileges conceived in Gramsci’s ‘traditional intellectual’ 
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terms, and exercising their role independent from the regime, Shia intellectuals in 
Bahrain rarely acted as intellectual articulators between the ruling regime and the 
people in less developed areas. On the ideological level, they maintained instead close 
links between Bahraini Shia communities and their counterparts in Iraq through 
religious networks linking the ‘centre and periphery’.63   
Thus, second, considering Gramsci’s traditional intellectuals who belong to a 
closed system of ideas and resistance to exotic ideas, not all Bahraini Shia intellectual 
and political movements were the same. The ideology of Shia political activism in 
Bahrain was affiliated to cross-boundary Shia religious networks, which had been built 
long before Bahrain’s formal independence. These ideologies across the Gulf, up to 
the 1970s, circulated through networks that were established and informed by two 
major currents: the al-Da’wa and Shiraziyyin movements, the former joining the 1973 
Parliament and taking a legal approach to politics but the latter keeping a low profile 
until its radical turn to armed struggle in the second half of the 1970s.64 Nonetheless, 
this centre-periphery intellectual linkage was not homogeneous, so the Iranian 
revolution did not have an identical impact across the Gulf. As Louër further adds,  
the impact of the Islamic revolution on the Gulf monarchies varied according to 
the type of position these networks had established in the domestic political 
spaces … [and] the domestic political structures were more important than 
Iranian efforts in shaping the various modalities of the Islamic revolution’s 
impact.65  
For the case of Bahrain, the significance of domestic political structures became 
apparent in the relationship between Shia intellectuals and Al Khalifa before 1979. As 
will be explained in detail in chapter 5, while Al Khalifa and other Gulf monarchies 
were shocked by the victory of the Bahraini Left as a form of the People’s Bloc in the 
1973 Parliamentary, subtle changes came to the political connections among Shia 
intellectuals and Al Khalifa. As a ‘passive revolution’ was initiated through the 
parliamentary experiment, Al Khalifa attempted to co-opt the al-Da’wa current 
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represented in the Religious Bloc in Parliament against the Left, promising to legalise 
some religious ethics and shattering unified counter-hegemonic forces. Yet, it did not 
work out as Al Khalifa expected. The issues of the State Security Law and the US 
military’s presence in Juffair brought the Religious and People Blocs together. Al 
Khalifa dissolved the Parliament in 1975. Furthermore, since Al Khalifa’s promise to 
Shia intellectuals failed to be realised, some of them turned to radicalisation. The 
Shiraziyyin current, which was not present in Parliament like al-Da’wa, took a more 
radical approach to politics by calling for ‘the struggle of Bahraini people’.66 Under 
the leadership of Hadi al-Mudarrisi, who had been in touch with Khomeinist 
movements from the 1960s, the Shiraziyyin current gradually revolutionised even 
before the Iranian revolution. The fall of the Shah in 1979 was ‘a release mechanism’ 
for ‘a new phase of political action: that of mass mobilisation’.67 At this point, while 
most New Arab Left intellectuals were arrested or in exile, revolutionary rhetoric in 
popular movements was extolled by some religious hues in the second half of the 
1970s. Shia political activism in Bahrain appeared to launch a new ideological turn by 
taking over the leadership of counter-hegemonic forces and spreading an alternative 
world view. 
4.4.2 Bahraini Khomeinists: The Islamic Front for Liberation of Bahrain 
Similar to the Marxist-Leninist revolutions in the Gulf between the late 1960s 
and the mid-1970s, the Iranian revolution in 1979 encouraged and inspired a new 
generation of Shia political activists: Khomeinists. As counter-hegemonic intellectuals 
like the New Arab Left, their objectives were also to overthrow the monarchical regime 
and break away from the superpowers’ orbit. Looking at the Khomeinist manifesto, 
the Iranian revolution resembled, though was not identical, to that of the New Arab 
Left in regenerating the ideological dimension of revolution. But instead it emphasized 
the cultural dimension of revolution. This cultural approach to revolution, as a regional 
impulse in Gulf politics since late 1970s, profoundly indoctrinated the political agenda 
of a new generation of Shia political activists, polarised the intra-differences of Shia 
political activism and informed the political struggle in Bahrain via a perspective of a 
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cultural clash. More significantly, the Khomeinist political agenda had an impact on 
the relationship among different social forces of counter-hegemony, and thus the 
ideological development of Arab nationalism.  
The core principle of Khomeinism was ‘neither West nor East’, neither 
liberalism nor communism, that Muslims’ political struggle against superpowers 
should be supported ideologically by and educated through Islam. As Ruhollah 
Khomeini addressed Muslim students from universities in Tehran on 26 April 1980, he 
believed that the meaning of cultural revolution relied on Islamic education, by which,  
…our young people [need] to be truly independent and to perceive their own real 
needs instead of following the East or the West …[As such,] to Islamize the 
universities means to make them autonomous, independent of the West and 
independent of the East, so that we have an independent country with an 
independent university system and an independent culture.68  
In contrast to the New Arab Left drawing on a materialist stance to carry on revolution, 
Khomeini appealed to ‘universal Islamism’ across sectarian differences. For him, it 
was interpreted by a clerical authority rather than the adoption of ‘syncretic ideology’, 
mingled with Marxism and Islam. In this regard, religious leadership was essential for 
the appreciation of ‘true Islam’ and the realisation of an Islamic world order.69 As a 
successful revolutionary model in the world, Iran took responsibility for exporting its 
Islamic revolution, supporting the oppressed of the world against the superpowers.70 
The most striking Khomeinist group in Bahrain, as notorious as the PFLOAG 
for Al Khalifa, was the Islamic Front for Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), which in 
December 1981 was accused by the Bahraini government of plotting a coup to 
overthrow Al Khalifa.71 The IFLB was established in January 1976 and published a 
statement in October 1979 that laid out its concrete agenda. While upholding the 
banner of the Khomeinist revolution, it shared some features of the New Arab Left for 
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an armed-struggle approach before 1974. On domestic political issues, the IFLB 
maintained a popular revolutionary approach to overthrowing Al Khalifa, 
fundamentally opposing the option of a parliamentary reform after the Parliament was 
dissolved in 1975.72 However, its rejection of parliamentary restoration was somehow 
contradictory to some New Arab Left intellectuals in the late 1970s. On regional and 
international issues, the IFLB adopted some revolutionary terminology in framing 
their agenda towards Bahrain’s external relations; and like the PFLOAG in the early 
1970s, they took any scheme for the unification of Gulf monarchies as a puppet of the 
colonial powers. As a result, they rejected the idea of the GCC in 1981, whereas the 
New Arab Left eventually accepted it as ‘the onset of Arab Unity’, but on condition of 
having more popular political participation.73   
Although the IFLB had certain ideological affinities with the New Arab Left, its 
allegiance to Khomeinism informed a distinctive doctrine of revolution. It upheld 
Khomeini as the leader and supported the liberation of Palestine in the name of Islam. 
As the IFLB’s clandestine publication Kifah Sha’b al-Bahrain (the Struggle of the 
Bahraini People) noted:  
Islam is our doctrine. Islam overthrew the Shahansha empire and the Shah − 
policeman of the Gulf − himself whose military arsenal was made of some of the 
most modern American and Israeli weapons available … Imam Khomeini is the 
leader and axis around which our oppressed peoples should rally if they truly seek 
freedom, since Imam Khomeini is the summit of jihad and faith and the symbol 
of challenge and endurance. He is the hope of all the oppressed in the world … 
the way to liberate Jerusalem should be neither eastern nor western. A word of 
advice to those who seek Jerusalem‘s and others’ freedom: rid yourself of any 
dependence on the criminal West and the disbelieving East and hold fast to the 
example of the Iranian people’s slogan that embod[ies] independence.74 
IFLB’s revolutionary agenda did not enjoy much support among Bahrainis, including 
some Shia communities, and failed again in another plot in December 1987. 75 
Nonetheless, its allegiance to Khomeini’s authority and a cultural-clash approach had 
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an impact on the momentum of counter-hegemonic forces around popular Arab 
nationalism. 
For Khomeinists, the manifesto revolved around the idea of universal Islamism 
and Islamic government, velayat-e faqih, which offered the foremost ideological 
foundations and panacea to the oppressed. At first glance, the Khomeinist anti-
Marxism stance was cradled in a type of discourse on a cultural clash between Islam 
and non-Islam. If the New Arab Left’s struggle and political agenda of challenging 
capitalist relations was materialistic, Khomeinism was more like an idealist and 
cultural approach to anti-imperialism. However, the adaptability of Khomeinism was 
evident in its borrowing of revolutionary rhetoric from non-Shia traditions. As Ervand 
Abrahamian notes, ‘[Khomeini] transformed Shiism from a conservative quietist faith 
into a militant political ideology that challenged both the imperial powers and the 
country’s upper class’, and thus Khomeinism shared more commonalities with the 
populist movements in the third world than did Shiism.76 I argue that while Khomeinist 
revolutionary rhetoric alluded to a broader sense of a popular approach, it did not 
essentially delegitimise the Marxist-Leninist rationale of revolution. To a certain 
extent, the Khomeinist approach to revolution was much like the New Arab Left in 
how both criticised the authority of Moscow’s version of Marxism, illuminating the 
role of popular movements and attempting to raise counter-hegemonic forces between 
the two camps in the Cold War context.  
If both the Khomeinist movement and the New Arab Left were on the same 
revolutionary front as counter-hegemonic forces under the banner of anti-imperialism, 
why was there no such unified counter-hegemony after the Iranian revolution? Why 
was the legacy of popular revolutions prior to 1976, the year of a great setback for the 
New Arab Left in the Gulf along with the end of the Dhofari revolution, not carried on 
to organise a national-popular will among these social forces when another 
revolutionary moment came? These are the questions that lead the present chapter to 
the following discussion on what I call ‘fractured counter-hegemonic forces’ of 
popular Arab nationalism.   
                                                        




4.4.3 Fractured counter-hegemonic forces 
As noted earlier, New Arab Left intellectuals in Bahrain became independent 
from the PFLOAG and formed the PFB, which abandoned an armed-struggle approach 
after 1974. Yet, pursuing the objective of the Bahraini people as a major sovereign 
subject remained a core agenda of popular Arab nationalism. On the ideological level, 
the New Arab Left counted on popular Arab nationalism to organise a national-popular 
collective will in contrast to Al Khalifa’s willed ideology on the basis of ethnosectarian 
demarcation. Moreover, it supported popular movements against the Al Khalifa regime 
and its backing of external powers in general. Therefore, when the Iranian revolution 
broke out, most New Arab Left intellectuals saw the revolution as the result of a 
popular struggle against US imperialism and the Shah. To New Arab Left intellectuals, 
this was another revolutionary movement at which point unified counter-hegemonic 
forces could have been formed and rejuvenated. ‘We stood with religious groups in the 
demonstration and distributed pamphlets in the neighbourhood,’ said Abdullah Janafi 
who did not finish last year of university education in Kuwait as his passport was taken 
away by the Bahraini government in 1977. He then remained in Bahrain, carrying on 
in the New Arab Left movement and witnessing a cross-ideological demonstration in 
1979. However, subsequent political developments nonetheless shaped the ambiguous 
relationship between the PFB and Shia intellectuals, having an impact on popular Arab 
nationalist movements. 
I argue that unified counter-hegemonic forces around popular Arab nationalism 
actually failed to form when the revolutionary moment came in 1979. This failure can 
be explained by the contradictions between New Arab Left intellectuals and other 
social forces, which had a weak leadership of New Arab Left intellectuals in the 
movement, especially after the dissolution of parliament in 1975. The PFB faced 
difficulties in forming a strong alliance with different social forces, particularly with 
Shia clerics. Basil Rouf Al-Kubaisi once pointed out in 1971 the reason why the New 
Arab Left ideological turn as a remedy for Arab nationalism might fail:  
For one thing it is necessary to have a ‘political class’ in the Gramscian sense of 
the term to provide it with the vehicle that [will] attain its ends. Owing to the 
nature of agricultural production in the Arab World, the peasants remain, in their 
majority, [an] inert mass. The working class … still lacks the necessary degree 
139 
 
of organization. It goes without saying that the ANM offshoot groups are facing 
a real dilemma. On [the] one hand, they see no hope but in the mobilization of 
the masses to carry on the struggle to achieve the national objectives. On the 
other hand, they lack the organizational tools to do the job … If the petty 
bourgeoisie can be integrated in… national liberation movements, then they can 
provide new vistas for th[os]e movements by supplying the cadres and the 
organizational devices for the mobilization of the less conscious working 
classes.77 
Al-Kubaisi’s prediction is insightful for the retreat of the New Arab Left in the Middle 
East in general. But it needs more elaboration to apply specifically to the case of 
Bahrain whereby the PFB reflected on the contradictions within counter-hegemonic 
forces around popular Arab nationalism. As the PFB noted in March 1976:  
Nothing noteworthy took place after [August 1975]. Things returned to their old 
patterns as a result of mistaken practice and… a subjectivism arising from 
considering joint work as a tactic not a strategy. Various elements of the 
opposition were ready to destroy what had been achieved by unity, to… [erect] 
barriers and to take unilateral positions without consideration for the national 
interest as a whole. They though that nationalist work… [could] be carried out 
by one faction on its own … [T]he opposition must respect the wishes of the 
people and constantly adhere to the mass revolutionary line. The nationalist 
movement is not required to be a substitution for the workers and mass 
movements; but it must be the vanguard of this movement, must lead its struggle 
and educate and organise it so that it can launch more struggles against the 
regime … It is the people who make history. Thus, it is a grave mistake for any 
nationalist unit to form organisations on its own and present them as 
representative of the working class without the participation of… active and 
trustworthy elements of the masses in their region and without consulting the 
nationalist movement as a whole.78     
What the PFB’s statement mainly criticised was the religious currents led by 
some clerics who had comprehensive influence over both peasants and the petty 
bourgeoisie. As such, while New Arab Left intellectuals were suppressed by Al Khalifa 
after 1975, the emergence of Shia political activism and later Khomeinism infused a 
new momentum into anti-imperialism as an alternative ideology to popular movements 
in Bahrain. It ‘strove for Islam as a revolutionary political ideology and as a social and 
political project’, which enabled a wider mobilization among different social ranks 
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from the urban middle classes to students. 79  During the Iranian revolution, this 
intellectual development of adapting miscellaneous ideologies in line with a religious 
form of anti-imperialist agenda appeared to be a successful Islamic revolutionary 
paradigm. It attracted some intellectual attention across the Middle East, and trusted 
intellectual movements encompassing Islamist and Leftist ideologies as the ‘Islamic 
Left’ from the early 1980s. Its aim was to integrate ideologically some legacies of 
Nasserism and Islam, interpellate revolutionary religious consciousness as a substitute 
for class consciousness and thus build ‘authentic’ collectiveness among Muslims; 
furthermore, it stood ‘in contrast to the imported political and cultural ideas of Western 
intellectuals and ideologies’, and enabled Muslims to confront ‘modern conditions of 
inequality, poverty, underdevelopment, domination, Westernization, and alienation’.80 
Compared to the New Arab Left in the 1970s, a relativist version of the Khomeinist 
revolutionary paradigm was represented in a cultural clash between Westernisation and 
Islamisation. For Khomeinists and their sympathisers, the world view of universal 
Islamism appeared to be an alternative solution to popular movements between both 
Western liberalism and Eastern communism.  
The contradictions between the PFB and some Shia intellectuals, particularly 
those shifting towards a more revolutionary approach following Khomeinism, were 
further aggravated alongside the fallout of the Iranian revolution. The revolution would 
have been a critical moment to re-organise unified counter-hegemonic forces against 
Al Khalifa. However, Khomeinism and its idea of velayat-e faqih and exporting 
revolution contradicted the idea of people being the major political subject for 
sovereignty that was embraced by New Arab Left intellectuals. As Ali Qasim Rabia 
commented on the Iranian revolution,  
…we only supported the revolution itself. But when they started talking about 
exporting this revolution to the Gulf area, nobody favoured that ... As a value, 
[we were] totally against their ideas, their system.81 
The contestation of sovereignty made the creation of unified counter-hegemonic forces 
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difficult and the leadership of New Arab Left intellectuals fragile. Instead of taking 
advantage of the Iranian revolution and seeing it as an opportunity to rejuvenate 
popular Arab nationalist movements, the New Arab Left intellectuals eventually found 
that the revolutionary moment did not stand on their side. In contrast, as will be shown 
in later chapters, while the revolution turned to a more religious rhetoric and related to 
the revival interstate geopolitical competition in the Gulf, its interplay with Bahrain’s 
internal sociopolitical dynamics then eventually created a favourable moment for Al 
Khalifa to deal with the political struggle in Bahrain and thus move Bahrain’s regional 
policy towards alignment.   
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has sought to illustrate the role of the New Arab Left movement by 
empirically extending Gramsci on ideology, intellectuals and counter-hegemony. It 
shows that while the New Arab Left heralded a critical ideological shift in Arab 
nationalism, it created a new generation of Arab nationalists as New Arab Left 
intellectuals and counter-hegemonic forces. Informed by a Marxist-Leninist world 
view, they reconceptualised the historical backwardness in the Gulf. By criticising the 
conventional ANM cadres as organic parts of a hegemony of tribal regimes and 
external powers, New Arab Left intellectuals became counter-hegemonic intellectuals 
and worked on building a leadership by harnessing difference social forces against 
established sociopolitical relations. In the case of Bahrain, we found that New Arab 
Left intellectuals attempted to forge their ideological ties with civil society and thus to 
establish their leadership in popular movements. While the movements pursued a core 
agenda of the people as the major political subject of sovereignty, New Arab Left 
intellectuals also manifested a popular version of Arab nationalism. Not only did it 
characterise itself as a new social force for national unity from communist and 
religious groups, but it also infused a new momentum into the political struggle 
between Al Khalifa and Bahraini civil society throughout the 1970s.  
However, the leadership of New Arab Left intellectuals in Bahrain faced 
difficulties from the point that counter-insurgent forces became effective at both the 
national and regional levels since 1975. Unified forces around popular Arab 
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nationalism, I argue, actually failed to form and faced a critical challenge when Shia 
political activism and then Khomeinism emerged as other forces to interpellate popular 
movements alongside the outbreak of the Iranian revolution. Despite standing on the 
same front against Al Khalifa and its allies and in support of the Iranian revolution, 
these different currents within counter-hegemonic forces contradicted each other on 
the subject of sovereignty, particularly Khomeinists versus others, including some 
Shia clerics and most of the nationalists. As a result, compared to the early 1970s, 
popular Arab nationalism came to be made up of fractured counter-hegemonic forces 
after 1975. The dynamics of popular Arab nationalism shown in this chapter 
corresponded constantly to the political struggles among different forces in Bahrain. 
More importantly, as chapter 6 will show, it had an impact on the evolution of 
Bahrain’s policy toward regional alignment, especially from its secret alignment with 
the US to participation in the GCC in 1981.
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5 STRUGGLE AND AL KHALIFA’S INTERRUPTED 
RESTORATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to further apply Gramsci’s insights, examining a 
historical process through which the political struggle between counter-hegemonic and 
hegemonic forces evolved and intertwined with the development of Arab nationalism 
and state formation in Bahrain. Following chapter 4 on the New Arab Left and popular 
Arab nationalism as counter-hegemony, the present chapter centres around the concept 
of passive revolution in Gramsci, elucidating how the Al Khalifa regime attempted to 
weather the revolutionary upheaval at the national and regional levels after Bahrain’s 
formal independence. As such, an attempt was made in a process of top-down 
transformation. Al Khalifa, as the dominant class, partly subsumed the demands of its 
subordinate class and intervened in the struggles among different social forces. This 
process was taken on by Al Khalifa to preserve its social and political privileges in the 
crisis and to prevent political struggle having catastrophic consequences. If successful, 
it would have solved a potential crisis for the ruling class and achieved a historical 
restoration by which Al Khalifa could have linked itself ideologically with civil society 
through organic intellectuals, and thus a hegemonic state of Bahrain could have been 
established based on consent, rather than just coercion, in the post-colonial era.  
This chapter therefore highlights a most illuminating case − the 1973 
parliamentary experiment − for the concept of passive revolution, to which the 
discussion on development and ideology in the previous chapters relates as well. While 
I outline the genesis, evolution and outcome of the parliamentary experiment, a clear 
picture of the struggle between counter-hegemony and hegemony is also presented, 
especially different social forces of the Left (including New Arab Left intellectuals, 
communists, Ba’athists and other nationalist sympathisers), Shia intellectuals (clerics 
from two difference currents and other political activists, Khomeinists in particular) 
and Al Khalifa (and its organic intellectuals of merchants and some old cadres of the 
ANM). This process shows more dynamic and multi-faceted state-society relations 
than some other accounts of Bahraini politics informed by rentierism and sectarianism, 
which allude to a Weberian binary understanding of state and society. In doing so, I 
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follow the insights of Adam Hanieh on class formation in the Gulf.1 Building on his 
elaboration, I argue that the development of the 1973 Parliament extended the political 
struggle from the British protectorate era to the phase of Bahrain’s formal 
independence. It then interrelated to the changes in state geopolitical competition and 
capitalist formation in the 1970s. This case shows that Al Khalifa did not have a high 
degree of autonomy in politics nor successfully seek political acquiescence from civil 
society. In fact, Al Khalifa intended to take the parliamentary experiment as a conduit 
through which popular consent could be obtained from the Bahraini people. Therefore, 
its ideological linkage to civil society could be established through some old cadres of 
the ANM and merchants, or even some Shia clerics at certain points, as organic 
intellectuals. However, the process of passive revolution, as will be shown later, did 
not proceed as Al Khalifa expected due to international pressure for capitalist 
formation. I argue that the dissolution of the Parliament in 1975 represented an 
unfulfilled passive revolution, which turned out to be what I call an interrupted 
historical restoration.  
To outline this historical process of passive revolution and how the Al Khalifa 
regime attempted to implement hegemony alongside this process, this chapter begins 
with an examination of the historical conjuncture at which Bahrain obtained its formal 
independence from Britain in 1971. I argue that Bahrain’s independence was seen as 
the onset of the subsequent process of passive revolution in 1973. Both counter-
hegemonic and hegemonic forces were organised around a variety of issues, which 
were influenced by the Marxist-Leninist revolutions in Arabia, as noted in chapter 4, 
and, more broadly, a different scenario of possible regional arrangement. At this 
historical conjuncture, the political struggles among these forces pushed Al Khalifa 
along a path of passive revolution. Then, I investigate the genesis, development and 
consequences of passive revolution in Bahrain, as shown in two cases − the 1972 
Constituent Assembly and the 1973 parliamentary experiment in particular. In the last 
section, I outline the historical outcomes of the failure of the parliamentary experiment. 
Moreover, I identify three corresponding characteristics of an incomplete hegemonic 
                                                        




state of Bahrain that set the conditions for the development of Arab nationalism around 
Bahrain’s policy toward regional alignment, as will be shown in chapter 6, in the 
second half of the 1970s. 
 
5.1 Historical Conjuncture for Independence 
In existing understandings of the historical moment at which the Gulf Arab 
States obtained their formal independence in the early 1970s, the most common 
account sees it as a transition: it ended the upheaval of Pan-Arab nationalism in the 
previous two decades and began an era of regional tranquillity with confirmation of 
sovereignty norms shared among state actors. A regional consensus was then built 
upon whereby ‘regional states accentuated the role of diplomacy and outlawed the use 
of massive military force. Legitimisation and complementary norms were central to 
the consolidation of regional security.’2 So, ‘the norms and rudimentary institutions of 
the regional system in the 1970s were strong enough to balance the fragile regional 
society and keep a lid on utopian experiments’.3 However, I argue that this historical 
conjuncture was not tranquil when seen through state-society relations. In the case of 
Bahrain, it is best understood through identification of different social forces evolving 
around and struggling for the independence moment, when articulation of ‘the political’ 
and ‘the social’ instances changed qualitatively on the national and international scales, 
and between these two scales. Therefore, this section aims to identify the changes 
around such a historical conjuncture that set the stage for Al Khalifa’s passive 
revolution in the early 1970s.  
5.1.1 British withdrawal and open door   
The first and most important factor relates to changes in the pattern of Bahrain’s 
political and economic connections to ‘the international’. This factor substantiated the 
historical and sociological meaning of Bahrain’s formal independence and fuelled the 
evolutionary momentum of the political struggle in Bahrain. It is investigated through 
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the dynamics of geopolitical competition and capitalist formation in the Gulf in the 
early 1970s, which helps to reveal the ‘national’ context ‘as a point of arrival within 
the international conditioning of capitalist expansion’.4   
As shown in chapter 3, Gulf geopolitics before 1971 was preserved to a large 
extent by a series of treaties between the British informal empire and the Gulf 
shaikhdoms through which the empire protected its geopolitical and economic 
interests by intervening in local politics in the Gulf.5 However, when the US arrived, 
with its military supremacy, the geopolitical configuration of the Gulf changed, along 
with the introduction of the Nixon doctrine, which strengthened the ties between the 
US and its allies through military and financial aid instead of direct and comprehensive 
intervention. For the ultimate goal of preventing the spread of Soviet influence, 
geopolitical partnerships were as such backed up the US as a neo-liberal hegemony. It 
asserted ‘its hegemony through finance … [and] entailed shifting the balance of power 
and interests within the bourgeoisie from production activities to institutions of finance 
capital’.6 Since the Nixon doctrine, the cooperative pattern between the West and oil 
was broken. It was then replaced by a rationale weighing the security of the oil supply 
with oil prices and thus giving necessary income to two of the US’s major allies − 
Saudi Arabia and the Shah’s Iran − as the twin-pillars in the region. The Gulf at this 
point turned to be what Halliday called the ‘Saudi Iranian condominium’. 7  This 
rationale created an overarching structure through which these regional powers 
became more dependent on the international capitalist market and more responsible 
for their task of countering the Soviets.8   
At first glance, the moment of Bahrain’s formal independence alongside the 
political economy changes does not seem to be a case of the advent of capitalist 
modernity and primitive accumulation in a strict sense. This might rule out some 
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conditions for identifying it as the onset of a historical process of passive revolution 
as in Gramsci’s investigation of the Italian Risorgimento, the Italian unification 
movement from 1815 to 1871. However, considering the struggle between counter-
hegemonic forces of the New Arab Left and hegemonic ones of Al Khalifa and its 
allies, I argue that this independence moment can still be seen as the onset of a 
historical process of passive revolution because of two characteristics: crisis and 
molecular process. In addition to a new historical bloc interpellated by New Arab Left 
intellectuals, the international capitalist formation at this point faced its own crisis of 
over-accumulation, as noted by David Harvey. He sees the process of capital 
accumulation as molecular one, ‘operating in space and time’ and generating ‘passive 
revolutions in the geographical pattering of capital accumulation’, that achieved 
temporal and spatial stability in some regions through ‘a certain degree of structured 
coherence to production, distribution, exchange, and consumption’. 9   It was, as 
conceived by Gramsci, a molecular process in which ‘restoration becomes the first 
policy whereby political struggles find sufficiently elastic frameworks to allow the 
bourgeoisie to gain power without dramatic upheavals’.10 And this was the major 
theme and context in which the historical and sociological meaning of Bahrain’s 
independence revealed itself.   
But how did this macro-scale of passive revolution relate to the national scale 
and social relations in Bahrain? In the case of Bahrain, this molecular process of 
passive revolution was appropriated by a critical process of class formation in the Gulf 
at this point, which was revealed by what Adam Hanieh calls accumulation of Khaleeji 
capital (Gulf capital). 11  This process substantiated the transformation of social 
relations in the Gulf from the 1970s and then fuelled the forces for creation of the GCC 
in 1981. The concept of Khaleeji capital denotes ‘those capitalists whose accumulation 
is most thoroughly and consistently grounded in the internationalization of capital 
across the GCC space’12.  Indeed, the role of Al Khalifa and other ruling families in 
the Gulf was as crucial social agents behind the formation of Khaleeji capital and class. 
                                                        
9 Harvey, The New Imperialism, 101–2. 
10 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 115. 
11 Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States. 
12 Hanieh, 2. 
148 
 
But it is also important to note the sociopolitical bases constituted by ‘a network of 
powerful merchant families and colonial backing’, upon which the ruling families 
relied. ‘Many of these early merchant families, alongside new groups that emerged 
with the onset of oil, were the proto-class that came to underlay Gulf capitalism’. In 
consequence, ‘they form the social substratum that was transformed through a complex 
process of development in the subsequent oil era into contemporary Khaleeji 
Capital’. 13  This process of accumulation of Khaleeji capital, I argue, became an 
advanced conduit through which Bahrain’s social relations were rearticulated to ‘the 
international’ along with Bahrain’s independence in a fundamental mechanism of 
combination. It also caused Bahrain to be subjected to more international and regional 
geopolitical competition and capitalist formation after the British withdrawal. More 
importantly, the new social substratum, affiliated to Khaleeji capital, then became 
organic intellectuals, which overlapped to a great extent with the group of the old 
cadres of the ANM, for Al Khalifa rule versus New Arab Left intellectuals who were 
on the counter-hegemonic side. 
5.1.2 Contentious independence and contested sovereignty   
In the revolutionary context expounded by Marxism-Leninism in the late 1960s 
in the Gulf, what followed Bahrain’s formal independence in August 1971 was not 
cheerful national unity. Not only did socio-political contradictions inside and outside 
Bahrain erupt, but also Bahrain’s independence was contentious considering its causes 
and consequences. Although the attainment of independence had been one of the 
objectives pursued by Bahraini nationalist and popular movements, Al Khalifa was 
reluctant to see Britain withdraw when the historical moment came. Until the British 
government relinquished its commitment to and involvement in Bahrain’s internal 
affairs, Al Khalifa appeared to have no choice but to accept.14 The divergent attitudes 
between the Al Khalifa regime and civil society had already made the issue of 
independence contentious in the first place, especially around the contestation on 
                                                        
13 Hanieh, 9. 
14 As Alexander Stirling, the first British Ambassador to Bahrain in 1971, reported that ‘British troops 
are unlikely to be involved in internal security situations nor is the British military withdrawal likely 
to be affected’. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘FCO 8/1639 Political Situation in Bahrain’, 
1971, British National Archives. 
149 
 
Bahrain’s sovereign subject: who would be the main political subject to represent 
Bahrain? During the heyday of Marxist-Leninist revolutions in Arabia, such a 
contestation, therefore, pushed Al Khalifa to promise to undertake political reforms by 
drafting a proposal for the Constitution and popular political participation. As 
Abdulnabi al-Ekry recalls, 
…several prominent [figures] at that time from Al Khalifa went to different 
parts of the country saying: ‘We are confident you are sincere [about] your 
country, [about] Bahrain, [about] independence. We will fulfil all your 
aspirations. There will be democracy. There will be electricity everywhere. 
There will be housing everywhere. There will be education. All [the] things 
you dreamed of will be realised.’15 
At that time, the nine-sheikdom scheme proposed by the British government and 
discussed among Gulf tribal regimes between 1969 and 1971 also faced a dilemma. To 
Al Khalifa, the progress towards an independent and democratic Bahrain seemed to be 
quite an acceptable option, rather than seeing revolution in Manama, or yielding 
exclusive socio-political privileges to an uncertain federal scheme, or turning Bahrain 
into a part of the Shah of Iran’s territories. As conceived by Gramsci and in his 
observation of Risorgimento, the historical process of Bahrain’s independence can be 
seen as occurring,  
…as the reaction of the dominant classes to the sporadic and incoherent 
rebelliousness of the popular masses − a reaction consisting of ‘restorations’ 
that agree to some part of the popular demands and are therefore ‘progressive 
restorations’, or ‘revolutions-restoration’, or even ‘passive revolution’.16  
To a large extent, this process fulfilled the task of de-colonisation and formal 
independence in a political sense, which most Arab nationalists and even communists 
sought. More importantly, it prevented Bahrain’s independence from being realised 
through Jacobin forces allying themselves with bourgeois and other subaltern classes. 
In other words, it was instead achieved by Al Khalifa.     
However, this process appeared not to satisfy some New Arab Left intellectuals 
who maintained that progress towards Bahraini independence and national unity was 
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not yet fulfilled. In critical retrospective comments in 1977, the PFB argued that 
‘independence’ did not completely solve ‘the historic backwardness’ of Bahrain as 
‘political and legal relations had not changed for years’ while ‘the productive forces in 
the country had developed economically, culturally and politically’. Along with 
independence, the new ‘open door policy’ was adopted and it ‘forced the ruling forces 
to change their structures and form a partnership with their class allies in the executive 
and legislative, and extend their network of patronage’. As the PFB further argued,  
…the emerg[ence] of ruling family trade and property interests [along] with 
those of major traders and contractors forced the ruling family to select 
ministers from bug merchants and traditional families. They tried to use the 
nationalists of the fifties and sixties, by bringing them into the executive: they 
wanted to use their experience to reform the system from within… .17 
For the PFB, the struggle was not just against Al Khalifa rule itself but also 
against the established social relations, which were dominated by Al Khalifa and its 
domestic allies, the old cadres of the AMN and merchants, and supported by 
superpowers. Within the New Arab Left manifesto, critiques of the bourgeois 
leadership and elements continued their momentum throughout the 1970s. New Arab 
Left intellectuals kept on denouncing some right-wing Nasserists and Ba’athists who 
were co-opted by Al Khalifa, but in a euphemistic tone. These criticisms were applied 
to New Arab Left intellectuals who tried to avoid elitism in the conventional ANM and 
committed to popular approaches. As noted in the previous chapter, these elements 
featured the New Arab Left as opposed to the conventional ANM as counter-
hegemonic intellectuals. These elements, furthermore, constituted the essential part of 
popular Arab nationalism, around the idea of the people as the major political subject 
of Bahrain’s sovereignty, embraced by New Arab Left intellectuals. While a political 
objective as such was manifested, New Arab Left intellectuals also attempted to 
organise unified counter-hegemonic forces among different social forces. They forged 
their leadership through continuously engaging with popular and labour movements 
and sought to organise a national-popular collective will, informed by popular Arab 
nationalism. 
                                                        




5.1.3 Restless Labour movements 
In light of the idea of the people as the major political subject and the need for a 
complete constitutional reform after 1970, the New Arab Left further criticised the 
substantial meaning of independence. It was also substantiated by their attack on Al 
Khalifa’s inability to manage issues including the rising cost of living and worsening 
working conditions. As shown in the previous chapter, since the late 1960s and 
early ’70s, labour activists and clandestine leftist cells were brought together in a series 
of labour and popular movements calling for labour and political rights in Bahrain. 
When political societies were banned, organising popular and labour movements was 
a major form of cooperation among different social forces, also mobilising a mass 
rally.18 At this time, the first popular movement was organised not on the basis of either 
sectarian or ethnic groups: ‘the Constitutive Committee for the General Federation of 
Workers, Craftsman and Tradesmen in Bahrain’ (the Constitutive Committee). 19 
Resonating with popular approaches adopted widely across the third world at that time, 
the Constitutive Committee took a more bottom-up grassroots approach to the 
mobilisation of its members. Though having different strategies, the Constitutive 
Committee was on the same front as both the PFLOAG and the NFL, the two major 
leftist forces in Bahrain, aiming to improve working conditions and calling for labour 
rights in Bahrain with legal reference to the Bahrain Labour Ordinance in 1957. The 
Constitutive Committee did not see itself as a political movement in the first place or 
an illegal underground organisation like most cases in Bahrain; nevertheless, its 
composition represented some characteristics of an alliance among subordinate classes 
that eventually led to Al Khalifa’s suppression through the security apparatus: the 
Special Branch, the secret service unit led by Ian Henderson, an experienced British 
intelligence agent dubbed by some Bahraini activists the ‘Bahrain butcher’,20 and the 
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police unit led by Jim Bell.21 
The political implications of labour movements concretized in 1972 during the 
campaign for the election of the Constituent Assembly and became increasingly 
influential throughout the sessions of the first Bahraini parliament between 1973 and 
1975. In March 1972, a series of strikes broke out at Gulf Air, and these spread to 
Salmaniya hospital, Mina Sulman Port, BAPCO and ALBA.22 The strikes involved 
most of the workers from the major industries in Bahrain and students who held 
peaceful demonstrations to support the strikes. At first, the movement made demands 
for better working conditions, e.g. wage increases, free transport and reductions in the 
numbers of expatriate employees, e.g. Indians and Pakistanis.23 It soon progressed to 
asking for more legalisation to allow setting up trade unions and constitutional reform 
that mapped out a clear political agenda. Compared to the politicisation of this 1972 
labour movement, Bahraini labour movements in the past, as Emile Nakhleh argues, 
had not been ‘ideologically orientated’ or ‘influenced by any particular doctrines’.24 
At the outset of the movement, in March 1972, it was ‘an expression of the frustrations 
that have built up over the years within the working class of Bahrain’, and was seen as 
an effect of the impracticable 1957 Labour Ordinance and the regime’s failure to 
manage labour issues.25 Its subsequent politicization derived from the participants’ 
impatience with Al Khalifa’s indifference towards labour issue management and 
objection to the legalisation of trade unions. 26  However, what Nakhleh argues 
somehow oversimplifies the causes of a political turn, as such, in the movement. He 
overlooks, on the one hand, how these factors related and corresponded to patterned 
social changes toward capitalist formation around Bahrain’s independence and, on the 
other hand, how ‘the political’ practices were informed by social forces led by New 
Arab Left intellectuals who continued the revolutionary momentum from the 1960s 
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and awakened class consciousness to some extent.   
From AlShehabi’s ethnographic analysis of the 1972 uprising and his interview 
with the members of the Constitutive Committee, it is argued that New Arab Left 
intellectuals were actively leading the movement through coalescing different 
ideological fractions in the form of the ‘Shehabi bloc’, which named after Hesham 
AlShehabi and later succeeded by the People’s bloc in the 1973 Parliament. The 
influence of the New Arab Left on the labour movements was clearly shown 
throughout its campaign in the street. The Constitutive Committee received 2,500 
membership signatures in August 1971 and later reached 5,000 during the March 
uprising in 197227. The Constitutive Committee’s campaign for labour rights, better 
working conditions and wages and releasing political prisoners won popular support 
increasingly and left its footprints on movements and even Bahraini politics. In 
addition to a petition with 15,000 signatures demanding the release of political 
prisoners that were arrested in June 1974, there were 28 strikes across Bahrain in the 
first half of 1974 during which trade unions were also established at ALBA, BAPCO 
and public sectors like the health department even though such actions were not 
legalised yet28. This awakening class consciousness resonated among Bahraini leftists, 
including New Arab Left intellectuals, communists and among oversea Bahraini 
students. From 1972 until 1978, these students who organised the National Union of 
Bahraini Students (NUBS) across Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Britain, 
Sweden and the Soviet Union claimed to ‘work side by side with the National 
Movements in Bahrain and to work for democratic rights, plus for the building of 
labour unions’29. 
The class consciousness was shown in a Bahraini activist pamphlet, entitled 
Labour Movement and the Struggle for Self-Determination and published in 1975 in 
Sweden: one of the countries where the NUBS developed its branches and Bahraini 
political exiles resided after 1975.30 It considered the history of Bahraini popular 
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movements from the 1920s until the mid-1970s, stating ‘the battle … being fought by 
the Bahraini working class and popular forces has taken the character of that of all 
workers in the world for indeed their enemy is the same’.31 As it further added, the 
battle was ‘for national self-determination’ and evolved ‘from anti-colonial struggle to 
the struggle against imperialism’ for substantial Bahrain’s independence in the 1970s:  
If the independence of Bahrain meant that the country acquired the 
qualification of a state, a proper flag, … membership [of]… international 
organisations and the creation of … [its] own armed forces but nothing more, 
then this independence is needless and contains nothing other than new 
imperialist schemes.32 
Class consciousness of this kind ideologically cemented Bahraini leftists together and 
was manifested in popular and labour movements in the first two years of Bahrain’s 
independence. Moreover, they saw that the intertwined interests of tribalism and 
colonialism, rooted within society along with capitalist formation, impeded the 
achievement of substantial independence of post-colonial and late-developing states. 
While such a manifesto echoed widely the wave of anti-imperialist movements in the 
third world, it created a challenge to Al Khalifa that sought the preservation of its 
political and economic privileges from the colonial phase and avoided national unity 
being driven by popular nationalist movements. 
To sum up the moment of Bahrain’s independence, it was given birth in a 
historical conjuncture that set out a molecular process through which the ruling class 
attempted to weather a crisis while a new generation of Bahraini nationalist 
movements began to set its foothold in the post-colonial Bahraini politics. This hinged 
on qualitative changes in Bahrain’s political and social ties to ‘the international’, which 
then reconfigured social relations in Bahrain and fuelled different social forces around 
the issues of sovereignty and labour rights. While these issues were raised and mainly 
informed by New Arab Left intellectuals and their manifesto of popular Arab 
nationalism, Al Khalifa’s passive revolution began.    
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5.2 Setting Out on Passive Revolution: the 1972 Constituent Assembly 
This section begins to historicise the first specific case relevant to the concept of 
passive revolution: the 1972 Constituent Assembly. It was seen as a nascent stage of 
Al Khalifa’s top-down ‘revolution without revolution’. In this stage, Al Khalifa 
attempted to connect ideologically to civil society through its subaltern classes as 
organic intellectuals, and thereby began to forge its hegemony following Bahrain’s 
independence.    
5.2.1 Making organic intellectuals 
Passive revolution, which serves to reconfigures ‘the political’ of social 
formation and prevents catastrophic revolutions, represents a process through which 
the ruling class attempts to forge its hegemonic status by exercising coercion on and 
obtaining consent from society. Accordingly, as Morton argues, it can also be seen as 
a ‘technique of statecraft which an emergent bourgeois class may deploy by drawing 
in subaltern social classes while establishing a new state on the basis of the institution 
of capitalism … or the expansion of capitalism as a mode of production’.33 In the 
context of the Middle East and the Gulf in particular, it might be contested to categorise 
a tribal regime as ‘an emergent bourgeois’ at face value. Yet, what Morton argues still 
has some implications. Passive revolution is a critical stage in which the ruling class 
attempts to solve a looming crisis that accompanies modern state formation evolving 
from any other social relations to capitalism. While such a process is practised by a 
political leadership through organising an alliance with subaltern classes, if successful, 
it leads to the establishment of the dominant class’s hegemony. In other words, these 
subaltern classes play a role as organic intellectuals in ideologically linking ‘political 
society’ and ‘civil society’ and help the ruling class to create a historical bloc. As a 
consequence, unity through re-articulation of ‘the political’ and ‘the social’ instances 
of a capitalist state is achieved, facilitating the progress of capitalist state formation.  
While the historical moment of Bahrain’s independence revolved around a 
variety of sociopolitical issues, Al Khalifa tried to reconnect its political ties to civil 
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society, seeking solutions to a looming ruling crisis but, nonetheless, without giving 
up its political grip. After the March 1972 movement, Al Khalifa started working on 
the idea of a new constitution and a ministerial reshuffle while the campaign led the 
New Arab Left went on. Shaikh Khalifa bin Sulman, the Bahraini Prime Minister, 
organised a succession of majlis at which ‘the people’ were given opportunities to air 
their views, especially on the issue of what forms of political representation would best 
serve the interests and customs of Bahrain. The discussion concluded with striving for 
‘an equal balance between elected and officially nominated representatives’ for the 
following political reform. 34  Al Khalifa’s intention to draft a Constitution was 
delivered to the society through a Decree announced in June. As a British diplomat to 
Bahrain observed, the Decree contained ‘no surprises and the initial local reaction [was] 
one of quiet satisfaction’.35 Just as Al Khalifa promised, the first election was held on 
1 December 1972, and the elected members worked together with the Council of 
Ministers in the Constituent Assembly as a whole to review the Constitution. However, 
Al Khalifa’s promise did not bring all the intellectuals from different ideological 
backgrounds onto the same page. Instead, they were divided in terms of whether they 
should follow up an institutional approach to reform or carry on the popular struggle 
in the streets.  
On the nationalist side, the division was mainly seen between some old cadres 
of the ANM and the New Arab Left. The case of Abdulaziz Al-Shamlan is worthy of 
notice. He was a prominent figure on the National Union Committee (NUC) in the 
mid-1950s and later sent to prison with Abdulrahman Al-Bakir and Abdulali Aliwat on 
St. Helena, a small island in the South Atlantic where Napoléon Bonaparte was exiled 
after 1815. After being released in 1961, Al-Shamlan was exiled to London. 36  In 
December 1971, Al-Shamlan’s return to Bahrain was documented by Alexander D. 
Sterling, former British Political Agent to Bahrain between 1967 and 1969, and the 
first British Ambassador to Bahrain in 1972:  
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[Abdulaziz Al-Shamlan] went to the Amir [Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al Khalifa] to 
make a kind of submission, promising to behave and explaining his past actions 
as being inspired by patriotic resentment against British influence. The Amir said 
that Shamlan had become corpulent, looked older than his years (early fifties) 
and [gave] the impression of wanting only a quiet life. The Amir felt that Bahrain 
had changed sufficiently since Shamlan went to St. Helena in 1956 to offer little 
provocation to a retired rebel. This may be true but it is also over-optimistic: if 
Shamlan wants to lend himself to subversion or lead it, the mere existence of the 
Amir would give him grounds enough. However, the police are confident that 
they can handle him if need be and, while he certainly needs the surveillance 
which he is getting, I think on balance that his return is one up for the 
Government.37 
Al-Shamlan was only one example of old cadres of the ANM becoming less 
radical. Unlike Al-Bakir and Aliwat, who were exiled to Lebanon and Iraq and never 
set foot on Bahraini homeland again, Al-Shamlan pledged loyalty to the state of 
Bahrain under Al Khalifa’s sovereignty. He chose to deflect from labour activist 
strategies and participate in coming electoral politics, whereas some New Arab Left 
intellectuals continued to commit to popular movements outside institutions, working 
at the grassroots.38 His case shows that Al Khalifa attempted to incorporate the ANM 
forces into the process of political reform. While the revolutionary upheaval swept the 
Gulf and positioned New Arab Left intellectuals as counter-hegemonic forces of Arab 
nationalism, these old cadres of the ANM were less threatening and very helpful to Al 
Khalifa. In addition to elected members, the Constituent Assembly in 1972 included 
eight nominated members constituted by people mainly from middle-class 
backgrounds and Cabinet members. 39  These people later became critical figures, 
helping to facilitate Al Khalifa implement a variety of state developmental projects in 
the 1970s. As Hanieh argues, such political co-option was buttressed by Al Khalifa’s 
‘gift’ given to ‘sections of the older merchant class and new social elites’ through the 
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and Rashid Al-Zayani (member of a well-known family in Bahraini new industries and Head of the 
Zayani merchant clan). Gulf Mirror, December 10, 1972, Bahrain Fiche, AWDU, Exeter University; 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘FCO 8/1822 Political Situation in Bahrain’, December 12, 1972. 
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intervention of the state apparatus into the redistribution of land and oil-wealth.40 More 
importantly, they functioned as organic intellectuals who bridged ideological 
connections between Al Khalifa and Bahraini society in the process of passive 
revolution. 
5.2.2 Between Assembly and Street 
A division between some old cadres of the ANM and the New Arab Left, as noted, 
registered different ideological currents within Arab nationalism. At the same time, 
divergence also emerged within ‘the Left’, between New Arab Left intellectuals who 
rejected institutional reform approaches and those who accepted them. In the first place, 
their division was shown in their campaign for the election of the Constituent 
Assembly. Communists, nationalists and Ba’athists willing to join the election paid 
much attention to domestic issues including press freedom, labour rights, checks on 
the Police and Security Service. It seemed that foreign affairs did not feature on their 
major agenda, nor was xenophobia brought up. 41  However, for New Arab Left 
intellectuals, even though they also wished to see these issues raised, they resisted the 
institutional approach dictated by Al Khalifa and colonial remnants in the Gulf. As will 
be shown later, their resistance was clearly demonstrated in their boycott of the 1973 
parliamentary election. Regarding the activities and political agenda of New Arab Left 
intellectuals, Robert Tesh, British Ambassador to Bahrain between late 1972 and 1975, 
noted: The New Arab Left managed to indoctrinate some candidates and to interfere 
in the election by calling for a larger scale of popular movement that could discredit 
the Assembly. But it seemed that the election was going smoothly under the Special 
Branch’s and Al Khalifa’s control. Some contentious issues during the election were 
constrained and not revolutionised into anti-regime ideas. Al Khalifa’s philosophy of 
working with the ‘goodies’ and suppressing the ‘baddies’, as Tesh termed it, appeared 
to be effective in fulfilling the democratic experiment and also maintaining its 
legitimacy.42 
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The election of the Constituent Assembly took place on 1 December 1972, with 
a high turn-out, ‘between 82 and 97 per cent of the electorate voted’.43 The organic 
intellectuals organised with the ANM forces and under Abdulaziz Al-Shamlan’s 
leadership won 7 seats out of 22 seats in total. The result was acceptable to Al Khalifa 
as those candidates having affiliations with more radical ideologies outside Bahrain 
were seemingly ineffective in the election. As Tesh observed, although the Assembly 
only served as a transitional stage to the Constitution and the future Parliament, the 
political landscape composed of the organic intellectuals should reassure Al Khalifa 
and the rest of the members nominated by the Amir could become back-up for the 
regime’s rule. In particular, most of the nominated members were ‘solid and fairly 
senior representatives of the business community’44 and the reshuffle of the Council 
of Ministers also brought some Shia businessmen into the Constituent Assembly.45 
These middle-class-oriented forces with less radical views gave, to a large extent, Al 
Khalifa confidence in the subsequent parliamentary election in 1973. Moreover, the 
election result in 1972 also showed that the religious forces, which had had a low 
political profile prior to Bahrain’s independence, began to be involved in formal 
politics from then on. Shia members of the Constituent Assembly, especially the al-
Da’wa current, won their votes largely from villages in Muharraq and Sitra that, as 
observed by a British diplomat to Bahrain, were ‘conservative-minded’ and different 
from other nationalists in urban areas.46 In the Constituent Assembly, they formed 
another opposition voice that did not adhere to nationalist or communist ideologies. 
To Al Khalifa, the political landscape in the Constituent Assembly seemed to have a 
favourable balance among different groups. Even though the Shia members were keen 
to lead Bahrain on a more religious path and ‘not so much in favour of the Al Khalifa 
[regime]’, they were ‘against the revolutionaries’.47 Nonetheless, at this point, the 
political rise of the Bahrain Shia did no harm to Al Khalifa and somehow played a role 
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in curbing any progressive actions taken by nationalists and leftists. 
5.2.3 Marching to the Constitution 
From 16 December 1972, the Constituent Assembly started to discuss the draft 
constitution designed by Al Khalifa’s government. In the discussion, the most notable 
issues revolved around those of women’s right to vote, an Islamic State, the Privy 
Purse, 48  Security laws and the Amir’s power to make Treaties. 49  Throughout the 
process, some nationalist members proposed a couple of amendments that were seen 
as subversive by Al Khalifa. But Shia members checked these radical elements with 
their local community support, as Al Khalifa expected to see. At the same time, Al 
Khalifa kept using tactics of suppression and conciliation. On the one hand, Al Khalifa 
managed to balance itself rather successfully between nationalist and Shia members in 
the Constituent Assembly.  On the other, the Special Branch frequently arrested 
activists who were suspected of having close connections with underground cells 
outside Bahrain, especially the PFLOAG50 , described by Sterling as ‘the rats … 
working in the Bahrain basement…[and developing] a nasty situation’.51  
In June 1973, the Constituent Assembly completed the amendments to the draft 
constitution and announced that a parliamentary election would take place at the end 
of 1973. To Al Khalifa, it made some concessions to society through organic 
intellectuals, showing good will to the people in a democratic game, but without losing 
substantive powers. First, Al Khalifa supported Al-Shamlan to run as Speaker of the 
Constituent Assembly. Although he was beaten by Ibrahim Al Arrayed, a well-known 
Shia poet and scholar in the Arab world, Al Khalifa seemed to successfully redirect 
popular attention away from the street to a formal political platform. Second, Al 
Khalifa made some concessions to Shia members in support of legalisation for Islam 
as Bahrain’s state religion.52 It also felt satisfied when Shia members constrained 
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themselves in their discussion of religious affairs, even though they were largely 
following the direction of the Al Madani clan, one of the influential Shia communities 
in Bahrain, outside the Constituent Assembly.53  
Having as such a favourable experience in the Constituent Assembly, Al Khalifa 
had more confidence in incorporating different social forces under its reign during the 
crisis and upheaval led by the New Arab Left within and without Bahrain. After the 
PFLOAG headquarters in Bahrain were demolished due to an accidental explosion 
caused by two members in July 1973, it was believed that Al Khalifa then had a better 
grasp of dealing with remaining revolutionary activists in the street.54 Yet, for New 
Arab Left intellectuals, the Constituent Assembly was not a cheerful political 
achievement spearheaded by the people, let alone a representation of the Bahraini 
people as the major subject of sovereignty. It was rather ‘the political change’, as they 
put it, that ‘the imperialists wanted to introduce as part of their strategy’ for the Gulf 
in support of the ‘appearance of independence’, while Al Khalifa ‘sift[ed] through the 
old dossiers of nationalist demands to find what could be done now and got away 
with’.55 As noted earlier, these ideas were appeared in the New Arab Left’s campaign 
during the election and connected to their demand for labour rights.  
At this point, nationalist forces were split between the ANM and the New Arab 
Left. The latter was identified as an external revolutionary stretch from outside Bahrain 
and supressed continuously by the Special Branch, whereas the former played a critical 
role in letting Al Khalifa forge its ideological links to Bahraini society and continue 
the momentum of passive revolution into the 1973 Parliament.   
 
5.3 Struggle within Passive Revolution: the 1973 Parliamentary Experiment 
The present chapter has so far shown: while geopolitical and social changes 
came to the Gulf around the time of Bahrain’s independence, Al Khalifa took 
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advantage of this moment, taking the old cadres of the ANM and some merchant 
classes as its organic intellectuals and forging its hegemony for the nascent stage of 
passive revolution. In what follows, this section proceeds further with the concept of 
passive revolution by investigating the second case of the 1973 parliamentary 
experiment. The reason why it is called an experiment is revealed, with hindsight, via 
a historical investigation of its development. Nonetheless, it shows some 
characteristics of passive revolution that are able to explain state formation in the 
Bahraini case going beyond Gramsci’s original ideas. That is to say, as a critical 
historical process responding to a crisis and moving towards modern capitalist state 
formation, the process and consequences of passive revolution in a post-colonial state 
like Bahrain were unstable and unpredictable, considering the dynamic political 
struggles among different social forces. As Stuart Hall reminds us, ‘Gramsci warns us 
in the Notebooks that a crisis is not an immediate event but a process: it can last for a 
long time, and can be very differently resolved by restoration, by reconstruction or by 
passive transformism. Sometimes more stable, sometimes more unstable.’56 As will be 
shown later, the case of the 1973 Parliament resonated with Hall’s reminder. It shows 
how the struggles among different social forces inside and outside Parliament evolved 
in a broader context of geopolitical competition and capitalist development and 
eventually led to dissolution in August 1975. 
5.3.1 Rise of the Bahraini Left 
The election for the first Bahraini parliament was held on 7 December 1973; yet 
its subsequent development did not appear to be substantive ‘national unity’ in 
Bahrain’s independence era. Although some New Arab Left intellectuals took both 
independence and the Parliament to be an ‘imperialist design’ or an imperfect political 
achievement, those who participated in the Parliament nonetheless considered it a 
turning point and a stepping stone for tackling Bahrain’s ‘historic backwardness’ in 
many aspects. They drew lessons from other Arab states, e.g. Kuwait, in drafting 
Bahrain’s constitution with certain modifications, which were accepted by Al Khalifa, 
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the nominated members and even other external powers.57 However, the result and 
developments following the 1973 election gave Al Khalifa and its allies an unexpected 
shock: the rise of the Bahraini left around counter-hegemonic forces. Apart from 14 
members nominated by Al Khalifa out of 44 seats in total, the radical leftists won eight 
seats, equal to the independent nationalists and some other independent candidates, 
and the Shias, including clerics and other intellectuals, won six seats of the other 30 
seats. Beyond Al Khalifa’s expectations guaranteed by Special Branch, there was a 
dramatic political landslide towards the leftists as a primary force that could 
strategically ally itself with others in Parliament. 58  For Al Khalifa, the organic 
intellectuals of its hegemony lost their advantages to counter-hegemonic forces. This 
political landslide reignited the political struggle between Al Khalifa and New Arab 
Left forces. It not only changed the political agenda of New Arab Left intellectuals in 
Bahrain, but also shifted Al Khalifa’s attitude towards the issue of popular political 
participation. 
From Tesh’s report on the 1973 election, it is argued that both Britain and the Al 
Khalifa regime did not expect the result. Their confidence in the previous year in 
containing New Arab Left forces was replaced by anxiety, and even paranoid thinking 
that rarely appeared before the election. As an appendix to the post-election report on 
11 December, Tesh provided the list of the elected parliamentary members with all 
members’ ideological background and their political affiliations in the Parliament. The 
group of ‘the Left’ conceived by Tesh seemed to become larger with some Ba’athist 
and anti-West members being identified as nationalist sympathisers. Among these 
members, Ali Rabia was noted as a communist in the report. However, in fact, he has 
never been a communist but a nationalist left whose ideological affiliation was with 
the New Arab Left instead of communists 59 . Despite Britain’s paranoid thinking, 
Bahrain’s political dynamics did change along with the rise of the Left, which carried 
on the momentum led by New Arab Left intellectuals from the 1972 campaign and 
created a crisis to the regime in several aspects, leaving some legacies to Bahraini 
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politics afterwards.   
The List of Elected Members of the 1973 Bahraini Parliament60 













Communist/ People’s Bloc 
2nd  Abdul Hadi Khalfa Communist/ People’s Bloc 
Hasan Jawad al-Jishi Ba’athist/ Nationalist Bloc 
or Sympathisers 
3rd  Mohammed Salman 
Ahmed Al-Hamad 
Ba’athist 





Communist/ People’s Bloc 
5th  Ali Abdullah Saleh Ba’athist/ Nationalist Bloc 
or Sympathisers 
6th  Hamad Abdulla Ali Abul Ba’athist/ Nationalist Bloc 
or Sympathisers 














8th  Jassim Ahmed Murad Anti-West, anti-
Communist/ Nationalist 
Bloc or Sympathisers  
Abdullah Ali al-Muawadah PFLOAG/ People’s Bloc 
9th  Ali Qasim Rabia Communist/ People’s Bloc 
Mohammed Jabber Sabbah PFLOAG/ People’s Bloc 
10th  Isa Hassan al-Thawadi Ex-ANM/ People’s Bloc 
Ibrahim Fakhroo Anti-West, anti-Khalifa/ 
Nationalist Bloc or 
Sympathisers 
11th  Khalifa Ali al-Bin Ali Ba’athist/ Nationalist Bloc 
or Sympathisers 
12th  Abdullah Mansoor 
Mohammed Ali 
Independent 
13th  Mustafa Mohammed 
Nasser al-Qasab 
Religious Bloc 
Alawi Sayyed Mafoodh al-
Sharakat 
Religious Bloc 
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14th  Abdullah Mohammed al-
Madani 
Religious Bloc 
15th  Shaikh Isa Ahmed Qassim Religious Bloc 
 Shaikh Abdul Amir 
Mansoor al-Jamri 
Religious Bloc 
16th  Abbas Ahmed Ali Independent 
Isa Town 17th  Yousuf Salman 
Mohammed Kamal 
Moderate Nationalist, anti-
Ba’ath/ Nationalist Bloc or 
Sympathisers 
18th  Abdul Aziz Mansoor al-
A’ali 
Independent 








Khalifa Ahmed al Darani Independent 
 First, in 1972, some New Arab Left intellectuals had boycotted formal politics 
of the Constituent Assembly, staying in the street to disseminate pamphlets for their 
campaign. Despite still embracing the idea of popular approaches to politics, they now 
adjusted strategies cooperated with a de facto political party－the People’s Bloc, 
including Ba’athists, Communists and some New Arab Left intellectuals in Parliament, 
and attempted to include other independent nationalists. Most of the agendas in the 
1972 campaign proposed by Shehabi bloc were raised in the parliamentary politics that 
showed how pervasive the New Arab Left was. Second, on a closer inspection of the 
component of the votes going to the People’s Bloc, eight elected Members of 
Parliament were from the urban constituencies of Manama and Muhharaq (see the List 
of Elected Members of the 1973 Bahraini Parliament), with more than 4,000 votes out 
of about 16,000 votes in total. They beat up some old cadres of the ANM and then 
became the voice of urban areas in Parliament, most of their supporters were young 
Bahrainis who shared popular Arab nationalist ideas.61 This sent Al Khalifa a warning 
sign that its major support from urban areas and the middle classes was undermined. 
The socialist and nationalist manifesto of the People’s Bloc became attractive and 
largely accepted by urban voters, especially the demand for ‘51% participation in the 
oil industry, the nationalisation of foreign firms, freedom for trade unions, curbs on the 
                                                        




power of the police, Bahrainisation, and no foreign military bases’.62   
To Al Khalifa, the People’s Bloc brought all the different social forces within 
Parliament together, which resonated with the New Arab Left manifesto in the street. 
As Tesh observed: 
The danger is rather that the People’s Bloc will be able to maintain their alliance 
with the National Bloc [of Ba’athist and nationalist sympathisers], play their 
cards cleverly so as to extend their support in…Parliament, build up an 
organisation particularly among Labour, and force the Government into a series 
of compromises which will weaken [Al Khalifa’s] position.63 
This political change meant that the effort to penetrate and crush the Bahraini left by 
Al Khalifa and Special Branch had little success and backfired, as the election result 
showed. To the regime, the trajectory of passive revolution initiated earlier could go 
out of control at any point and then be hijacked by unified counter-hegemonic forces 
increasingly organised within and outside Parliament. Soon after the opening of the 
first session of Parliament on 16 December 1973, these crises to the Al Khalifa became 
more tangible. The key issues in Parliament were no longer inward looking like the 
phase of the Constituent Assembly in 1972. Instead, these issues were related to a 
broader political agenda. This not only criticised Al Khalifa’s failure in managing 
socio-economic problems, but also denounced the remnants of Western colonialism: 
The State Security Law and the US military presence in Juffair, both of which 
fundamentally contradicted the idea of the people as the main political subject of 
Bahrain’s sovereignty promulgated by the New Arab Left. At this point, a historical 
bloc heralded by the New Arab Left was forged among social forces within and without 
the Parliament. Its substantial meaning lies at  
…the public alliance of the different forces in society, whether communist, 
Arab nationalist, or Islamist, based on the common goal of achieving 
democracy in an undemocratic state, regardless of the fundamental differences 
between their respective ideologies and belief. Thus, the aim of democratic rule 
is to serve as a tool to unite the different forces as well as common end-
goal…[It was] the only way to counteract the regime’s entrenched system of 
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divide-and-rule 64.  
5.3.2 Al Khalifa’s concession 
To establish a hegemonic status through a passive revolution in Parliament, Al 
Khalifa as the dominant class inevitably faced a first challenge of solidifying necessary 
material bases for its hegemony. As Gramsci reminds us, ‘though hegemony is ethical-
political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function 
exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity’.65  While 
an open-door policy was introduced after the British withdrawal and was followed by 
the emergence of new capitalist classes for the regime’s ruling base, Al Khalifa was 
nonetheless still subject to its inability to deal with labour issues and the rising cost of 
living. Accordingly, these issues became the kernel around which counter-hegemonic 
forces unified and mobilised their support from civil society in the first place. 
Following some demands made by labour movements in March 1972, calls for 
the legalization of trade unions and Bahrainisation soon preoccupied the People’s Bloc 
in Parliament. Regarding Bahrainisation, it aimed to give Bahrainis preference in 
employment and to tackle unemployment by limiting the increasing numbers of 
expatriate workers in Bahrain and trying to provide more job opportunities to Bahrainis. 
As for trade unions, the People’s Bloc hoped to give labourers more powers to organise 
as legal groups to negotiate with Al Khalifa’s government on issues of improving 
working conditions and pay-increases. However, at this point, Al Khalifa felt 
threatened and the previous promise made in March 1972 to legalise trade unions was 
aborted. As Yusuf Shirawi, Minister of Development and Industry, recounted to Tesh 
about how Shaikh Khalifa bin Sulman Al Khalifa, Bahraini Prime Minister, saw these 
issues: now, ‘having delegated [Shaikh Khalifa’s] powers first to a Council of 
Ministers and then to [Parliament], Bahrain is not going to create another centre of 
power in the shape of a trade union organisation within the four-year lifetime of the 
present [Parliament]’.66 To the Al Khalifa regime, alongside the strikes at the Post 
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Office in Manama and the Bahraini Slipway Company, seen as rash, in March 1974, 
the legalisation of trade unions would give away more power to the Left who were 
collaborating with more forces in the street and within Parliament, and thus posing an 
enormous threat. 
Without having the option of setting up trade unions legally, the Al Khalifa 
regime chose to implement a series of socio-economic reforms to reinforce its tottering 
ruling status. On 16 March 1974, the Council of Ministers announced that,  
…the pay and social allowances of all government employees were increased by 
amounts ranging up to 33%; the national minimum wage was put up by 33%; 
[more than 3.5 million Bahrain dinar] was to be provided for subsidies on basic 
imported foods such as rice, sugar, flour, meat and vegetable oils; an agency was 
set up to keep a watch on prices and to stop unjustified increases; Trade Ministers 
of other Gulf States were to be invited to a conference aimed at unifying export 
and import practices for essential commodities; and low-cost housing plans were 
to be speeded up in cooperation with the World Bank.67  
These proposals, intending to deflect the challenge from the Left, seemed to work well 
during the oil boom in 1973 and 1974. Nonetheless, this also exposed the divergent 
attitudes among some government figures toward the function of Parliament. Other 
than the hard-core conservatives within Al Khalifa, a group of less conservative figures, 
including Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak, Bahraini Foreign Minister, Yusuf Shirawi, 
Minister of Development and Industry, Ali Fakhro, Minister of Health, and Jawad Al 
Arrayed, Head of Cabinet Affairs, were more optimistic about Parliament. Some of 
them were from a Ba’athist background, expecting that some socialist ideas could be 
put into practice through an institutional approach instead of by radical means. For 
example, Ali Fakhro, an ex-Ba’athist studying medicine at the American University of 
Beirut (AUB) in the 1950s and later one of the critical figures in Al Khalifa’s 
government, recalled his appointment at that time:  
I believed in social justice. I believe that differences between the very rich and 
the very poor should be reduced…we brought [these ideas] from AUB Pan-
Arab nationalism, [they] included…freedom, independence and socialism … 
Shaikh Khalifa, our Prime Minister knew I was a Ba’ath but he said, ‘It’s okay. 
He is good, let him come.’ Of course, I did not act like a Ba’ath, I still acted 
                                                        




like a person who was liberal in his thoughts and his ideas. I did not hide 
anything. Shaikh Khalifa knew that I was only trying to be a fair human being. 
That is all. The ideology does not matter. It is not about words. It is not [about] 
the name. It is the essence of what you do. If the essence is fairness and 
empathy with those who are weak, with those who are marginalized, with those 
who are in need, what is wrong with that?68 
He added his views about Parliament: 
[In Parliament,] I…[was] very big [on] being Liberal minded and Leftist, [and 
I] had [a] very close relationship with…elected members, very close. [However, 
I told them:] be careful. Be careful, don’t go to extremes. Let this experiment 
mature. Let it become stronger, let it become more rooted in Bahrain. Then it 
will be difficult for anybody to try and destroy it. [It is] exactly the same now 
in Kuwait [with] the ruling families … They will never dare to destroy it.69 
Some figures like Fakhro believed that the unrest could be settled by making a few 
concessions in Parliament, a steady pace of socio-economic reform and Al Khalifa’s 
full commitment to the Arab cause and the Palestinian issue. These tactics could beat 
the Left in the street and redirect people’s attention to the more sublime goal of Arab 
unification. 
5.3.3 Ad hoc alliance and dissolution 
While Al Khalifa made some concessions, the demands over sociopolitical 
issues at the same time created ad hoc cross-ideological forces in Parliament, organised 
among elected members from both the People’s Bloc and the Religious Bloc. This 
cooperation forged, to a large extent, a more independent role for Parliament and was 
represented in the issues of the presence of the US navy in Juffair and the Security 
Law after 1965.70 To Al Khalifa, the challenges became troublesome when unified 
counter-hegemonic forces became more mature, creating a collective will among 
different social groups on the national and regional scales. On 17 November 1973, the 
NFL in Bahrain decided to collaborate with the Iraqi Ba’ath. It meant that a cross-
border revolutionary connection was working substantially, in a way whereby financial 
support could come from Iraq and sustain leftist underground activities.71 In addition, 
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Al Khalifa was beset by the ongoing reorganisation of PFLOAG underground cells 
continuously informing Bahraini popular movements and parliamentary politics. In 
particular, after a top-level conference of Marxist groups in Beirut, more action could 
be taken in the military and industry and within Parliament72. 
The alarm over the formation of unified counter-hegemonic forces resulted in Al 
Khalifa’s attitude turning harsher and firmer and wishing to crush them. Al Khalifa 
intended to take advantage of the rift between the People’s Bloc and the Religious 
Bloc, instigating the later to isolate the former in Parliament.73 For example, when the 
People’s Bloc opposed the Religious Bloc’s proposal for ‘rigid segregation between 
the sexes in hospitals, schools and the administration’, the Religious Bloc in turn 
rejected the proposal to make 1 May a public holiday.74 In addition to ‘divide-and-rule’ 
tactics, those ministers who used to be more liberal towards Parliament were losing 
their patience with its slow progress, impeded by the People’s Bloc. Along with some 
radical agendas fermenting in the street, Al Khalifa decided to act tough. As Ian 
Henderson told Robert Tesh, he was ‘back on the line that the Government ought to 
introduce some form of security legislation, so as to stop the leftists going on apace’.75 
Meanwhile, when strikes broke out among maintenance welders in an aluminium 
smelter in June 1974, Al Khalifa refused to make any further concessions and sent the 
riot police to arrest the demonstrators, including Abdulhadi Khalaf, one of the 
influential active Marxists in Bahrain.76 While Al Khalifa displayed its coercive power, 
the physical means brought back Al Khalifa’s confidence to crush ‘the rats’. As Shaikh 
Mohammed bin Mubarak, Bahraini Foreign Minister, said to Tesh after the session of 
Parliament on 23 June 1974: ‘for once we have taken the initiative’.  
While New Arab Left forces strengthened their foothold, Al Khalifa would rather 
abandon the idea of political dialogue so as to prevent revolutionary seeds from taking 
root. As Michael Herb notes, ‘faced with a choice of abdication or repression when 
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revolutionary pressure builds, the leader represses’, as political reform might 
undermine ‘the [established] patron-client network on which the regime rests’.77 After 
the crackdown in June 1974, Al Khalifa started to draft a new State Security Law to 
replace the 1965 Emergency Law during the Parliament recess in September. The law 
was enacted as the Amiri Decree and announced in October. Even though it clearly 
said that a detainee has the right to appeal to the High Court, it nonetheless gave the 
Ministry of Interior the power to arrest and detain suspects for up to three years. At the 
same time, the Al Khalifa regime also drafted a law permitting trade unions. But, it 
was on condition that no political, religious and inter-union activities were allowed, 
any dispute would be settled by conciliation and arbitration by the Al Khalifa 
government, and strikes and lockouts were banned. 78  As Tesh observed, these 
measures seemed to repel for a moment the People’s Bloc overt ambitions, diverting 
their interest away from the issue of the US military presence.79 The new State Security 
Law gave Al Khalifa the confidence to dissolve Parliament and suspend parts of the 
Constitution in August 1975, which was followed by suppression of the New Arab Left 
under the Security Law throughout the following two decades or so. The idea of 
popular political participation was never revived until the early 2000s.  
At this point, the process of passive revolution since Bahrain’s independence 
was terminated in 1975, after which Al Khalifa’s ruling status merely relied upon 
exercising coercion, rather than obtaining consent from civil society. A historical 
restoration by which Al Khalifa tried to forge its hegemony in the State of Bahrain was 
interrupted. 
 
5.4 Historical Outcome: Incomplete Hegemonic State of Bahrain 
Why did the parliamentary experiment in Bahrain fail? What was its impact on 
the political struggle within Bahrain? And more importantly, how can this failed 
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experiment help us to explain the ideological development of Arab nationalism and its 
interplay with Bahrain’s policy towards regional alignment? In most research on 
Bahrain, it is maintained that the unsolved antagonism between Al Khalifa and other 
social forces on the issues of the US military presence and the State Security Law was 
the final blow bringing Parliament to an end. In what follows, I intend to add to the 
existing understanding by giving a supplementary explanation which sheds light on 
the social bases of dissolution, and furthermore outlines its outcome. I argue that the 
dissolution of Parliament in 1975 was an interruption to the process of passive 
revolution since the early 1970s in Bahrain, which then had the historical outcome of 
an incomplete hegemonic state in Bahrain. To substantiate my argument, this section 
begins with a discussion of the dissolution under international pressure. 
5.4.1  ‘International’ pressure and its solution 
As this thesis has asserted, in chapter 2, Gramsci did realise the significance of 
social change on the international scale to socio-political dynamics on the national one. 
In this vein, I further argue that the foremost factor explaining the failure of the 
parliamentary experiment derives from the international pressure of capitalist 
formation. With this argument, I do not intend to embrace a fully structuralist account 
but to show how international pressure lays the ground, and the struggle between 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces mediates the result. What is more important 
was how Al Khalifa dealt with the international pressure of capitalist formation as it 
required more material resources to sustain its ruling status and preserve corresponding 
social relations to ‘the international’.  
From the preceding discussion, conceived in Gramsci’s insights, we know that 
one of the notable characteristics of a successful passive revolution by the dominant 
class is to partly subsume the demands of subordinate classes into its political project 
of hegemony and to satisfy some of their interests. In doing so, this overall political 
project is supposed to include ‘the articulation of different modes of social, cultural 
and economic leadership’.80 As shown earlier, in sections 5.1 and 5.2, though faced 
with some challenges from the New Arab Left, Al Khalifa’s project appeared to 
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proceed smoothly at first with the realisation of Bahrain’s formal independence and 
then a series of political reforms in the early 1970s. As new capital classes emerged 
along with what Hanieh calls a process of capital accumulation in the Gulf, they played 
critical roles through which Al Khalifa set out its historical restoration and linked itself 
to society. Moreover, their demands and ideas were partly accepted and pushed 
forward by Al Khalifa (see the case of Ali Fakhro in section 5.2). These demands not 
only met some expectations of the old cadres of the ANM and the People’s Bloc, but 
also reconciled with state-led economic development plans without undermining Al 
Khalifa’s ruling status. For example, on the issue of the nationalisation of oil 
production, Yusuf Shirawi, Bahraini Minister of Development, announced in 
September 1974 that the Bahraini government was now a 60 per cent majority 
shareholder in BAPCO.81 This announcement was also later supported by the Bahraini 
Prime Minster, in March 1975, saying that Bahrain ‘will seek nationalisation of its oil 
resources following Kuwait’s step in this regard’.82  However, it seemed that this plan, 
among others, did not solve a lasting political struggle within Bahraini society that was 
represented concretely in the issues of unemployment, labour rights and high living 
costs. Nor did these plans pacify and demoralise the leadership of New Arab Left 
intellectuals of counter-hegemonic forces around popular Arab Nationalism, both 
within Parliament and in the street.  
The issue of the nationalisation of oil production, to New Arab Left intellectuals, 
was a case of whether they could achieve the objective of the people as the major 
political subject, just like other Arab States did, so as to realise popular sovereignty in 
light of Arab nationalism. If this was the case, Bahrain’s economic ties to the 
international capitalist market could have been rearticulated. Al Khalifa’s ruling status 
and the overall social relations upon which its rested could have been undermined. Yet, 
between seeking consent and exercising coercion, Al Khalifa surrendered to the latter 
and chose to dissolve the Parliament as ‘some of the neighbouring states on which 
Bahrain’s prosperity depends had threatened to break relations if the communists were 
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not controlled’.83 As such, Al Khalifa demonstration of coercive power won support 
from some newly formed capital classes within Bahrain. Furthermore, it allayed 
external actors’ suspicions of revolutionary seeds being sown in the Gulf, especially 
Saudi Arabia. For Saudi Arabia, its political influence in the region grew along with 
the accumulation of oil wealth since the early 1970s, a notable case being its leading 
role in the 1973 oil embargo. The Saudi regime established its leadership within a 
conservative inner circle through an economic conduit of patron-client ties, seeking to 
maintain its strategic interest of counterbalancing the radicals of Arab nationalism and 
communism, as well as maintaining an advantage in the competition with the Shah’s 
Iran.84 To Al Khalifa itself, before a series of state development projects was fully 
fledged, from which it acquired sufficient material resources, the toughness towards 
the idea of popular political participation preserved Saudi-Bahraini economic ties. In 
other words, Al Khalifa’s political choices in response to the international pressure of 
capitalist development led to the failure of the parliamentary experiment. 
At this point, reference to Peter Thomas’ account of the conditions for a 
successful passive revolution might help to sum up my discussion of why the 
parliamentary experiment failed. As he argues for passive revolution: 
There were indeed objective conditions … that had led to its emergence at 
around the same time: namely, the threat of militant working class movements 
demanding…the continual revolutionizing of the mode of production and the 
new forms of collective social life in modernity − in the labour process, in 
urbanization, and so forth − were extended to include substantial equality at 
the level of the economic structure of the society. However, passive revolution 
had not been necessitated by this economic structure or inscribed in modernity 
as its telos. Rather, its successful imposition had involved conscious, political 
choices: on the one hand, the choice of the ruling classes to develop strategies 
to disaggregate those working classes and confine them to an economic-
corporative level within the existing society; on the other, the political choices 
of the subaltern classes that had resulted in a failure to elaborate their own 
hegemonic apparatuses capable of resisting the absorptive logic of the passive 
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Following Thomas’s account, however, I do not imply that the case of the dissolution 
of Parliament in 1975 registered the failure of passive revolution. Rather, what I 
highlight in this case is that the process of passive revolution as a historical restoration 
could be seen as being interrupted by considering the ways in which the dominant class 
dealt with political struggle under international pressure. When it was interrupted, the 
characteristic of ‘passive’, or conservative, therefore dimmed that of ‘revolution’, and 
coercion prevailed over consent in the assemblage of hegemony. 
5.4.2 Al Khalifa’s ‘dictatorship without hegemony’ 
The result of an interrupted historical restoration brought about an outcome for 
Bahrain: Al Khalifa failed to represent the general interests of ‘the people’ through the 
means of popular political participation, and thus a process of forging an integral state 
of Bahrain − hegemony constituted of both coercion and consent − was also interrupted. 
The significance of this interruption as such lies particularly in the characteristic of the 
non-equilibrium of domination (coercion) and leadership (consent) of Al Khalifa’s rule. 
With the predominance of domination over leadership, the state of Bahrain was 
founded upon material bases overweighing ideological ones after 1975. This outcome 
shows one of two consequences of passive revolution in Gramsci’s observation of the 
function of Piedmont in the Italian Risorgimento, which shows how some nuclei of 
ruling class perceived their role in the process of Bahrain’s state formation: 
They wished to ‘dominate’ and not to ‘lead’. Furthermore, they wanted [the 
ruling class’s] interest to dominate, rather than their persons; in other words, they 
wanted a new force, independent of every compromise and condition, to become 
the arbiter of the Nation: this force was Piedmont and hence the function of the 
monarchy.86 
It denotes that the state is strengthened to ‘the detriment of civil society’87, or that ‘the 
state replaces class as the motor of socio-economic development’. 88 Conceived in 
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Gramsci’s own terms,  
…a State replaces the local social groups in leading a struggle of renewal. It is 
one of the cases in which these groups have the function of ‘domination’ without 
that of ‘leadership’: dictatorship without hegemony. The hegemony will be 
exercised by a part of the social group over the entire group, and not by the latter 
over other forces in order to give power to the movement, radicalise it, etc. on 
the ‘Jacobin’ model.89 
Following this passage, one of the characteristics of the concept of hegemony 
needs to be reiterated, as theoretically outlined in chapter 2. What Gramsci calls 
‘dictatorship without hegemony’ does not imply that ‘the state acting as the protagonist 
of a passive revolution can do without a minimum of consensus’.90 Nor does it resonate 
with Perry Anderson’s influential statement of the relation between consent and 
coercion as one of many antinomies of Gramsci.91 Rather, ‘Gramsci’s analysis [of 
consent and coercion] demonstrates in increasingly concrete and precise terms that 
their relationship can only be rationally comprehended as a dialectical one’. 92 
Therefore, as Gramsci himself puts it,  
…the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways: as ‘domination’ 
and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’. A social group dominates antagonistic 
groups, which it tends to ‘liquidate, or to subjugate perhaps even by armed forces; 
it leads kindred and allied groups.93 
This is the case with the period of the 1972 Constituent Assembly, the 1973 Parliament 
and the post-parliamentary phase in particular. While Al Khalifa continuously 
incorporated some old cadres of the ANM and other newly formed middle-classes into 
its political reforms, it also cracked down on popular and labour movements led by 
New Arab Left intellectuals in the street. Following the announcement of the new State 
Security Law and what the New Arab Left called ‘the August onslaught’, in which 
most members of the PFB and the NFL were sent to prison, the Amiri Decrees were 
issued to dissolve Parliament, suspend Article 65 of the Constitution and postpone 
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further elections with no definite timeframe.94 Such a demonstration of the coercive 
power of Al Khalifa as a dominant class was self-evident in this series of events in 
August 1975. It then turned Al Khalifa’s rule into dictatorship without hegemony, or a 
dominant class with non-equilibrium of coercion and consent. 
5.4.3 Floating national-popular collective will 
What does Al Khalifa’s dictatorship without hegemony as an outcome of the 
process of passive revolution mean to the development of Arab nationalism? And what 
was its impact on Bahrain’s policy towards regional alignment? These are the 
questions to which I now turn now, to conclude the present chapter, before proceeding 
to the next chapter on the investigation of Bahrain’s regional policy, from its 
independence to the dilemma of forming an alignment with the US and its participation 
in the GCC.  
While the dissolution of Parliament registered as an interrupted passive 
revolution and thus Al Khalifa’s dictatorship without hegemony, the most significant 
implication for the development of Arab nationalism, I argue, was represented in Al 
Khalifa’s ideological disconnection with the national-popular collective will 
fermenting in civil society. To help explicate my argument, it must refer back to 
Gramsci on two different types of ideology as already shown in chapter 2: willed 
ideology and organic ideology. The former, says Gramsci, are ‘arbitrary, rationalistic’ 
and creating individual ‘movements’, polemics and so on, whereas the latter, which 
resonates strongly with Gramsci on ‘philosophy of praxis’, are historically ‘necessary 
to a given structure’ for organising ‘human masses, and creat[ing] the terrain on which 
men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.’.95 In this regard, 
organic ideology is historically embedded within civil society and tied to the people, 
the subordinate classes in given social relations. Although such an organic ideology 
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might relate to a consciousness and world view for transforming the reality, they can 
also be consciousness ‘inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed’ or politically 
inert.96 If the people and an organic ideology are interpellated by intellectuals or the 
State into ‘the political’ terrain, then an ideological congruency can be established 
between willed and organic ideologies that constitute an essential part of hegemony. It 
could be argued that this was the case for Arab nationalism in most Arab states prior 
to the late 1960s.       
However, as presented in chapter 4, the ideological development of Arab 
nationalism split in response to the changes in geopolitics and capitalist formation in 
the 1960s. The left-leaning current turned radically and then incorporated Marxism-
Leninism in light of the popular will as the foundation of Arab nationalism. While this 
ideological shift emerged, it also transformed some Arab nationalist into New Arab 
Left intellectuals as counter-hegemony. Thus, the relation of willed and organic 
elements of Arab nationalism was rearticulated after the late 1960s. Until the historical 
conjuncture of Bahrain’s formal independence and its subsequent passive revolution 
led by Al Khalifa and its allies, Arab nationalism as a whole was not a unified ideology 
‘capable of representing the general interests of the whole ‘people-nation’’.97 When 
Parliament was dissolved and the passive revolution was interrupted, Al Khalifa’s 
willed ideology through a colonial lens of a late-coming capitalist philosophy 
(corresponding to economic liberalism on the international scale) and a top-down 
approach to political reform still failed to represent it as a unified political project. In 
other words, Al Khalifa’s hegemony at this point was incomplete as the national-
popular collective will was not yet organised by its leadership.  
But who actually did organise such a national-popular collective will after 1975? 
And what were its components? From a joint statement made by the PFB, the NFL and 
the Ba’ath Socialist Party in October 1975, it could be argued that the national-popular 
collective will was yet to  be organised, even by these counter-hegemonic forces that 
tried to rejuvenate it.98 New Arab Left intellectuals also seemed to realise that their 
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leadership was undermined alongside Al Khalifa’s crackdown. Unified counter-
hegemonic forces around popular Arab nationalism, as noted in chapter 4, were 
fractured. As such, the PFB then called for a transformation in the movement ‘from 
defensive to the offensive’ in its statement issued in 1976. The PFB claimed that ‘the 
fundamental contradictions lie in the contradiction between the people and its national 
democratic forces on the one hand, and imperialism and its reactionary allies on the 
other’. National unity must be achieved by abandoning ‘subjectivism arising from 
considering joint work as a tactic not a strategy’ and avoiding ‘unilateral positions 
without consideration for the national interest as a whole’. Furthermore, from the 
experience of the failed Parliamentary experiment, the PFB urged adherence to popular 
movements and ‘the mass revolutionary line’, stating ‘it is the people who make 
history’. The nationalist movement cannot ‘substitute for the workers and mass 
movements, but it must be the vanguard of this movement, must lead its struggle and 
educate and organise it so that it can launch more struggles against the regime’. For 
the PFB, the lesson of disengagement from the people and misrepresentation of the 
working class should be learnt from the failure of Parliament. In practice, ‘the struggle 
against political factions’ thus needs to be undertaken and wielded as a weapon in a 
movement that can prevent the regime’s tactics of polarisation of the masses99. 
While Al Khalifa’s hegemony rested more on coercion than consent, and New 
Arab Left intellectuals suffered suppression and attempted to rebuild their leadership 
of counter-hegemony, the post-parliamentary phase after 1975 was characterised by a 
phase of floating national-popular collective will. The political struggle between 
counter-hegemonic and hegemonic forces within Bahrain was not resolved. Also, 
different social forces on the counter-hegemonic side found difficulties in establishing 
an alliance. These internal socio-political dynamics then created the social bases for 
Bahrain’s policy towards regional alignment in the second half of the 1970s, leading 
to Al Khalifa’s participation in the GCC in 1981.  
 
                                                        





This chapter has sought to highlight the usefulness of the concept of passive 
revolution from Gramsci by examining a historical process, from Bahrain’s formal 
independence to the dissolution of the first Bahraini parliament in 1975. In doing so, I 
first investigate the historical conjuncture of Bahrain’s independence in 1971, putting 
this moment under the scrutiny of political economy analysis on the national, regional 
and international scales. Furthermore, I identify that passive revolution in Bahrain 
during this period was appropriated by what Hanieh calls the process of accumulation 
of Khaleeji capital. This process was the foundation upon which Al Khalifa initiated 
the process of historical restoration and incorporated newly-formed subaltern classes 
as its organic intellectuals linking to Bahraini society. However, due to the 
international pressure of capitalist formation and Al Khalifa’s response to it, the 
historical process of passive revolution was interrupted in 1975, which turned the state 
of Bahrain into an incomplete hegemonic state. It characterised itself in that neither Al 
Khalifa and its allies nor New Arab Left intellectuals could organise a national-popular 
collective will. Although the analysis presented in this chapter mainly centres on the 
dimension of state formation, it has offered a different rationale from an eclecticist 
approach, as noted in chapter 1, which focuses on identity and state formation. By 
drawing on Gramsci’s passive revolution, I also highlight how the struggle between 
hegemony and counter-hegemony in my analysis, and the role of New Arab Left 
intellectuals in particular, could advance our understanding of the ideological 
development of Arab nationalism and its interplay with Bahrain’s state formation. 
Following the findings of the previous chapters and some characteristics of the 
incomplete hegemonic state of Bahrain noted in this chapter, the next chapter takes 
these characteristics as social bases upon which my analysis of Bahrain’s policy 
towards regional alignment develops and proceeds with a historical investigation of a 




6 BAHRAIN FROM INDEPENDENCE TO ALIGNMENT 
This chapter investigates Bahrain’s policy towards regional alignment from 
1971 to 1981 by highlighting what internal socio-political dynamics drive the 
formation of alignment. The previous chapters have sought to examine the social bases 
of formation and evolution of Arab nationalism in Bahrain through the interrelated 
concepts of development, ideology and struggle in light of Gramsci as presented in 
chapter 2. The present chapter discusses how such an evolution set constraints and 
alternatives to the ways in which Arab nationalism influenced Bahrain’s regional 
policy during this period. By drawing on Gramsci, I have elaborated on the emergence 
of different social forces around the rise of Arab nationalism in the British colonial era 
(discussed in chapter 3), the rise of the New Arab Left in the Gulf as a political 
leadership of counter-hegemonic forces for nationalist and popular movements in 
Bahrain (discussed in chapter 4) and the Al Khalifa regime’s response to counter-
hegemony through linking itself to the old cadres of the ANM and initiating the 
parliamentary experiment (discussed in chapter 5). This chapter further outlines the 
struggle between counter-hegemonic intellectuals and Al Khalifa in the 1970s, which 
explains Bahrain’s policy towards regional alignment, especially its contentious 
alignment with the US and later participation in the establishment of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981.   
In doing so, I further illustrate the utility of Gramsci in examining the interplay 
of Arab nationalism and Bahrain’s regional policy. Rather than seeing Al Khalifa’s 
participation in the GCC as an outcome driven by the ideas of omni-balancing, 
economic integration or shared identity with others, I argue in this chapter that this 
alignment was intertwined with the struggles between popular movements and Al 
Khalifa and contingent to a series of extended foreign policy events. It can be seen as 
an alternative to Al Khalifa’s open alignment with the US as well as a result of the 
regime’s response to the continuously unresolved struggle within Bahraini society. 
The struggle was mainly underpinned by two different social forces: Al Khalifa and 
its organic intellectuals on the one hand, and the New Arab Left, its ad hoc allies and 
popular movements on the other. These polarised social forces in the struggle 
influenced the ideological development of Arab nationalism and how the regime 
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responded to a series of foreign policy issues in the 1970s, one notably being the US 
presence in Bahrain. This was a process mainly derived from the result of the failure 
to create a hegemonic state of Bahrain and related to Al Khalifa’s responses to the 
national, regional and international socio-political dynamics. While the struggle 
remained within Bahraini society, Bahrain’s regional policy was formulated in an 
ideological disconnection between the regime and civil society: a disconnection 
between will and organic ideology. For this, I further argue that, as this process 
proceeded, Arab nationalism was actually tied closely to the contestation of a 
sovereign subject − who should be the major political subject to represent Bahrain’s 
sovereignty − rather than just Arab unity. Such a contestation was a clear 
representation of ‘an incomplelte hegemonic state of Bahrain’ under Al Khalifa, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, and it then underlay Al Khalifa’s dilemma in making 
alignments in the 1970s. 
This chapter develops as follows. First of all, I outline the existing explanations 
of the genesis of the GCC, most of which revolve around the ideological challenge 
posed by the Iranian revolution in 1979. Against these explanations, I revisit this 
historical conjuncture in Gulf political development and ask: was the Iranian 
revolution a challenge to Al Khalifa? For this question, I offer an alternative historical 
explanation of it: The Iranian revolution was an opportunity for Al Khalifa to remain 
its ‘dictactorship without hegemony’ and corresponded to its continuous practice of 
using a British colonial lens on the ruling class’s will ideology in Bahrain’s regional 
policy. This seemingly controversial argument, which negates the common 
understanding of international relations in the Gulf, certainly needs to be further 
examined. Therefore, I conduct a historical investigation of a series of foreign policy 
issues. These issues centre around the presence of the US in the Gulf and the Iranian 
revolution. But some other associated events, such as the Palestinian question, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the non-alignment movement in the third world and 
the nascent development of the Iran-Iraq war, will be included. For most of these 
events, their impacts interrelated to different social forces around Arab nationalism 
within Bahrain in various ways and brought about contingent factors that influenced 




6.1 Genesis of the GCC as Alignment: Existing Understanding 
In the past three decades, the study of international relations in the Gulf has been 
around the very reason for the establishment of the GCC and its impact on regional 
politics. The question of how and why collectiveness has been shown among Gulf 
Arab monarchies has received considerable scholarly research interest.  
In IRME scholarship, some lenses have examined the question within a specific 
research agenda on security. Regarding the puzzle of this thesis on the role of Arab 
nationalism in explaining international relations in the Middle East, they appear to give 
a negative answer. The obvious implication in these analyses is that Gulf regional 
politics became turbulent after the early 1980s vis-à-vis its tranquillity in the 1970s 
following the 1967 Naksa. In politics, the Gulf States in the 1970s accepted the 
sovereignty and legitimacy of neighbouring states when ‘disputes over the domestic 
bases of political legitimacy among the regional states were muted … the agenda 
pursued by these states was limited’.1 What occupied the Gulf States’ concern at this 
time after the British withdrawal was not to change the status quo of the regional order 
but to consolidate their domestic authority with the resource of oil-wealth. To achieve 
this goal, these Gulf States initiated a series of cooperation arrangements among each 
other throughout the 1970s. For instance, the Gulf International Bank in 1975 and the 
Arab Gulf Organization for Industrial Consultancy in 1976 both include six 
monarchies and Iraq.2 Regional cooperation of this kind restrained to a great extent 
potential inter-state conflict and brought the Gulf States’ attention to state 
developmental projects. It served as a tentative scheme and provided a basis for six 
Gulf Arab monarchies’ subsequent cooperation. However, since 1979, as 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami says, the Gulf saw that ‘locality surfaced and local power 
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seized on the vacuum of power to magnify their own role and assert themselves’ and 
‘the course of this formative period of sub-regionalization’.3  
In these interpretations of the GCC, their underlying rationale is that the rupture 
in the evolution of Gulf politics was the outbreak of the Islamic revolution in Iran. It 
fundamentally changed the ideological foundations on which Gulf politics was 
reconstructed and recalibrated. It was a catalyst for a new security configuration that 
gave birth to the GCC and collectiveness among Arab monarchies in the Gulf. Most 
interpretations as such, however, neglect one side or the other of the historical process 
through which the Gulf states have gone. It falls into a dualistic debate, either between 
politics and economics or between ideational and material factors that drive 
international relations in the Gulf. These existing accounts of the genesis of the GCC 
are categorised into three different types of rationale: alliance for balancing threat, 
collaborative regime survival and regional norms.    
6.1.1 Balancing threat and security 
In a departure from a revised neo-realist standpoint, some scholars considered 
the genesis of the GCC to be the product of a state alliance against a common threat. 
Stephen Walt argues that the driving force behind the alliance is constituted less by 
ideology per se than by balancing ideological threats in a specific way. What ideology 
offers states is not solidarity but division, just like the ideological quarrel within the 
Pan-Arabist community. 4  Ideology might influence state foreign policy, but it is 
usually fragile when states confront conflict by considering interests among others 
who share a similar ideology, like the decline in Pan-Arabism.5 In the case of the GCC, 
Walt identifies the GCC as an organisation led by Saudi Arabia, which is due to the 
perception of threat shared among member states and in order to balance ‘potential 
pressure from both Iran and the Soviet Union’.6 For Walt, the implication of the Iranian 
revolution is to change the Gulf monarchies’ perception of threat. As a result, it 
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reshaped the security features of the Gulf and then generated regional unity on an 
ideological basis of common threat perceived by the monarchies.  
Rather than identifying Iran as an external threat to the Gulf monarchies as Walt 
notes, David Priess maintains that a more compelling reason for the alliance among 
the GCC members was domestic subversion, an internal threat instigated by the Iranian 
revolution since 1979. As Priess says, ‘the most severe threat to each of the Gulf 
regimes was the Iranian intent to undermine their security though aggressive pan-
Islamic and anti-monarchical statements and subversion which led to demonstrations 
and violence’.7  These subversive elements triggered socio-political unrest, e.g. in 
Saudi Arabia’s the Grand Mosque Seizure during Haji in 19798, in Bahrain’s coup led 
by the IFLB and allegedly supported by Iran, in Oman the Qaboos regime denounced 
by Iran for its support for Sadat’s policy towards Israel and close relations with the US, 
and in Qatar pro-Khomeini demonstrations breaking out,9 In both of Walt’s and Priess’ 
accounts, how the perception of either an external or an internal threat influences 
regimes’ decisions on alliances has been presented respectively. The catalyst for an 
alliance shifts from a classic neo-realist rationale of ‘power’ to ‘threat’ in their work. 
For Priess, internal threat was a significant causal factor leading to the Gulf monarchies’ 
alliance decision. The GCC member states’ major concern was domestic stability, 
which is as critical as the external challenge argued by Walt. 
6.1.2 Collaborative regime survival 
Regardless of its concerns over an internal or external threat in neo-realist 
accounts, others interpret the case of the GCC by taking a rather liberalist perspective. 
The GCC was formed as a multi-functional framework on which the regime survival 
relied for both security and economic incentives. As features of the economic and 
security dimension of the GCC, Ayubi argues that the GCC is the need for state 
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revolution, Priess nonetheless argues that the Iranian revolutionary propaganda somehow encouraged 
the opposition forces within Saudi Arabia. For the discussion on the Grand Mosque Seizure, see 
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development and dealing with security vulnerabilities.10 On the one hand, the birth of 
the GCC, in fact, followed the regional multilateral cooperation in the 1970s for state 
developmental schemes and the economic future. The GCC, as a ‘piecemeal and 
functional’ organisation like the European Common Market, is rather than 
‘comprehensive and ideological in the way that had characterised mots integration 
thinking among the Arabs in the 1950s and ‘60s’.11 On the other hand, until 1981, six 
Gulf Arab monarchies sensed their security was vulnerable when the regional order 
began fluctuating after the Iranian revolution, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These reasons set the backdrop giving birth to the 
GCC. That is to say, the monarchies founded the GCC for instrumental purposes to 
deal with broad sociopolitical problems, not just for balancing an external threat in a 
rigid sense of state security.     
 Likewise, Scott Cooper sees the GCC as a ‘hybrid institution’ that ‘integrates 
security fear and real economic cooperation’, and its multi-functional features are 
designed to sustain regime survival.12 As Cooper adds, ‘the key to understanding the 
GCC is that the greatest threat to member states was neither spill-over from the Iran-
Iraq war nor Iranian invasion, but the spread of internal unrest’.13 For Cooper, the GCC 
states are at the intersection of national and interstate relations. When they confront 
dual environmental constraints, they can choose a variety of means to deal with both 
levels of threat. By sharing intelligence information among member states, Gulf 
monarchies protect themselves from potential internal subversion in advance. In the 
field of economic cooperation, via the United Economic Agreement and the Gulf 
Investment Corporation approved by the GCC, Gulf monarchies have been working 
on creating jobs, promoting trade and increasing state revenues, by which they placate 
the social dissent deriving from socio-economic issues. In addition to extracting 
material resources from the GCC, the principle of Arab unity and Islam enshrined in 
the GCC charter constitute the basis of Gulf unity, and validate their ruling 
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legitimacy. 14  These measures, through external cooperation, were, above all, for 
counterbalancing Iranian revolutionary propaganda and potential social unrest. 
6.1.3 Regional norms and identity 
Going beyond the above accounts of the creation and needs of inter-state alliance 
and economic cooperation in the Gulf, the genesis of the GCC was also treated as a 
result of changing the political culture, norms and identity politics by constructivists. 
As Arshin Adib-Moghaddam argues, ‘between 1968 and 1978 [Gulf] states 
accentuated the role of diplomacy and outlawed the use of massive military force’, and 
this political culture cradled ‘legitimisation complementary norms [that] were central 
to the consolidation of the regional society’.15 However, since 1979, Islamic Iran and 
Khomeinism have changed the Gulf’s political culture and norms qualitatively, 
stimulating the creation of the GCC founded upon a shared identity among Gulf 
monarchies. For Michael Barnett and F. Gregory Gause, this shared identity was 
constituted more specifically of the ‘tribal political structure’ and ‘Sunni Muslims’ that 
distinguished six Gulf Arab monarchies from other neighbouring republican states. It 
also set a threshold for GCC membership. Moreover, Gulf unity then gave rise to a 
common perception of other states, seeing Iran and Iraq as threats.16 Through this top-
down approach, the Gulf monarchies benefited from the creation of a Gulf identity of 
stability for the Gulf monarchical regimes.17 As an ideational bond, it is expected to 
underline the collectiveness among Gulf monarchies that resist the common threat 
from Iran and Iraq, as well as to construct a cohesive identity binding state and society 
that prevents subversion ignited by Khomeinism and Pan-Arabism.                                       
It is not difficult to find that ‘regime security’ does indeed lie at the heart of the 
primary concern of the GCC and constitutes one of the bricks building an ideological 
foundation for Gulf alignment. In other words, ideology as the initial driving force 
behind the GCC was bound up with security concerns and internal security in 
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15 Adib-Moghaddam, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural Genealogy, 14. 
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Development of Community in the Gulf Cooperation Council’, in Security Communities, ed. Emanuel 
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particular. Even though an understanding of the GCC cannot rely solely on a 
materialist reading, as Priess once criticises, it is misleading to naively accept idealist 
accounts that the creation of the GCC was because of a shared identity among Gulf 
monarchies. ‘Identity and ideas are as important as material power in driving 
international politics’ but ‘[they] need to be instantiated in tangible and material forms’. 
In the case of the GCC, that is ‘the form of overt threats to domestic regime stability, 
for them to play a major role in leaders’ calculations about threat and alliances’.18 This 
common threat did give rise to Gulf monarchical unity and a common foreign policy 
orientation for the GCC states in response to the Iranian revolution. But the argument 
that the Iranian revolution catalysed an overarching ideological context, constituted by 
Khomeinism, for the Gulf monarchies’ regional policy has been overstated in existing 
explanations, as shown above. And for a long time, it has been founded uncritically on 
a presumption, widely accepted by academics and rooted in a vernacular understanding 
of Gulf politics: in any case, the Iranian revolution was a challenge, and it was all about 
regime security.   
In the case of Bahrain, alignment issues surely related to regime security like its 
other neighbours, and more broadly like most authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. 
But there are more nuances to be added to the current wisdom. This reflection leads us 
to a conceptual question and helps revisit the sociological and historical underpinnings 
of Bahrain’s alignment: if the Iranian revolution was not a challenge to Al Khalifa, 
could it have been an opportunity instead? If it was an opportunity, how does one 
understand Al Khalifa’s decision on its participation in the GCC? And how does the 
case of Bahrain help to solve the puzzle of this thesis? My tentative answer thus far is 
that although the ideological upheaval due to the Iranian revolution was threat, it was 
rather an opportunity than a challenge for the Al Khalifa regime. Considering the 
socio-political context from which popular movements derived and to which Al 
Khalifa responded, the Iranian revolution was a favourable juncture for forming 
Bahrain’s policy towards regional alignment. This tentative argument does not, of 
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course, prove its validity unless it is justified by further empirical explanations. This 
is the task to which this chapter now turns.    
 
6.2 Missing Piece in the Puzzle: Sovereignty in Contestation 
What is left by the above existing explanation of the genesis of the GCC or the 
rationale of the Gulf Arab states’ participation in it? What is the difference between 
these explanations and the alternative one this thesis proposes? And how does this 
thesis solve the puzzle − the role of Arab nationalism in international relations in the 
Middle East in the post-1967 phase − through an alternative account given for the case 
of Bahrain and Gulf alignment? My answers to these questions are offered by 
addressing the contestation of sovereignty and its ideological ties to Arab nationalism.  
In the existing understanding, especially that of IR constructivism noted in this 
thesis, Arab nationalism has been considered as an alternative, or contradictory, 
parochial regional norm to a more universal and institutionalised one of sovereignty. 
A divergent political connotation is that the former pursued the norm of Arab unity 
beyond state boundaries, but the latter that of ‘defining the territorial and sovereign 
basis of [Arab leaders’] authority and power’19. However, in the case of Bahrain, such 
a dichotomous reading of Arab nationalism and sovereignty might not be legitimate. 
Nor is their relationship as contradictory as IR constructivists might argue. For this, I 
contend that the analytical locus is not about the ‘norm’ of sovereignty but about its 
‘subject’. The contestation does not lie at the norm per se but with who represents the 
major political subject of a modern sovereign state. Such contestation, as already 
shown in previous chapters, was constantly represented in Bahraini popular and 
nationalist movements since the 1950s and ’60s and throughout the 1970s. Despite 
envisaging Arab unity as the ultimate goal, Bahraini Arab nationalists seemed not to 
fundamentally reject the norm of sovereignty, nor did a more radical current of the 
New Arab Left. In other words, their revolutionary and utopian reading of Arab 
nationalism was not to wipe out the norm of sovereignty. Instead, it was to contest a 
sovereign subject through a political struggle against the existing authority and the 
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social basis of its rule: a contested sovereign subject that had been granted by a colonial 
authority to the regime in the British protectorate era and has been represented by Al 
Khalifa even after Bahrain’s formal independence.   
To highlight such contested sovereign subject is important to my analyses of 
Bahrain’s policy towards regional alignment and its interplay with Arab nationalism. 
Following the previous chapter on Al Khalifa’s interrupted historical restoration, I 
have argued that the political struggle between Al Khalifa and Bahraini civil society 
was not resolved with the dissolution of Parliament in 1975. While such a political 
struggle continued and Al Khalifa’s ideological disconnection from the people 
remained, a national-popular collective will was not yet organised around Arab 
nationalism. Nor had it become an ideological foundation of Bahrain’s sovereignty, 
which appeared at this point to be only based on Al Khalifa’s will rather than the 
people’s will. As such, the political struggle had a continuous ideological impact on 
Bahrain’s regional policy after independence. If there was a claim that state regional 
policy was pursuing general national interests, it could be contested in such a context, 
not least when it came to the highly contentious issue of forming an alignment with 
the US. As Abdulnabi Al-Ekry recalls: 
When the new Parliament came [in 1973], of course, they [Al Khalifa and its 
allies] … want[ed] this agreement [with the US] to be available to Parliament… 
[However,] the army and the government refused saying that this is a sovereign 
issue decided before Parliament and [Al Khalifa] will not bring it to 
Parliament.20 
Al Khalifa’s alignment with the US became the most contentious foreign policy issue 
throughout the 1970s. It reflected the contestation of Bahrain’s sovereignty between 
Al Khalifa and the Bahraini people. Furthermore, it was also related more broadly to 
Bahrain’s policy towards the Palestinian question, the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-
Iraq war, to which the chapter now turns.   
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6.3 US Presence in the Gulf 
In December 1971, soon after Bahrain attained formal independence in August, 
the Al Khalifa regime agreed to lease the previously British-held naval base in Juffair 
to the US. This agreement registered a new era for US military and political influence 
in the Gulf, but through an alternative conduit to its British predecessor. More 
importantly, it was born in a contentious context, later developed along with the 
struggle in Bahrain and related to the Palestinian question. 
6.3.1 The question of Juffair 
Following the announcement by Harold Willson’s Labour government in 1968 
that Britain would withdraw from East of Suez by the end of 1971, the US delivered 
its regional strategic framework, the Nixon Doctrine, in July 1969. The US could have 
been adhering to its grand strategy of containing and counter-balancing the Soviet 
Union in the Cold War. But, Nixon’s new strategy of ‘opening to China and détente 
with the Soviet Union’ through international cooperation somehow changed the ties 
between the US and its traditional allies in the Middle East. It gave up US direct 
military intervention in regional conflict. And it asked for more responsibility from 
US regional allies to set the front line against the spread of communism but promised 
to offer sufficient military aid to them. As a result, the twin-pillar policy evolved as 
the US’s principle policy in the Gulf. The policy supported two monarchies − Saudi 
Arabia and the Shah’s Iran − in maintaining regional stability with ‘credible local 
policemen’21. The US naval base in Juffair, in the southeastern corner of Manama, 
then became part of the twin-pillar policy. Although Al Khalifa was desperate for a 
powerful external ally that could fill the power vacuum left by Britain, the question of 
Juffair was indeed a contentious foreign policy issue and dilemma for the regime.  
What mainly constituted Al Khalifa’s dilemma of approaching the US came 
from the objection of the counter-hegemonic forces of the New Arab Left and its ad 
hoc allies the People’s and Religious blocs in the 1973 Parliament. For these forces, 
the US presence at Juffair was a legacy of colonialism and neo-imperialism that 
                                                        




corresponded to a grand scheme of counter-insurgency attempted by the US. It 
impeded Bahraini people from pursuing popular sovereignty and retained Al Khalifa’s 
privileges within the broader geopolitical and capitalist competition of the Cold War 
confrontation. While the US-Bahraini agreement had been discussed secretly on the 
eve of independence, to the New Arab Left it was a breach of the will of the Bahraini 
people, turning the Gulf into another version of the ‘Vietnamization’ of the US war on 
communism.   
In such a contentious context, why was Al Khalifa still so desperate to keep a 
US presence onshore? The reasons that follow offer an alternative account and some 
nuances to the existing explanation, as noted earlier. The rationale concerning how Al 
Khalifa dealt with the issue of the US presence was beyond the effect of omni-
balancing, balancing the internal and external threat. This decision was an alternative 
arrangement among various options of security proposals that implicated the 
contradictions among different social forces. The first option was proposed by Kuwait. 
In response to the British withdrawal, the Kuwaiti newspaper An Nahda reported in 
May 1970 that Kuwait was ready to ‘give Bahrain military token aid’ by sending a 
Kuwaiti Air Force squadron to Bahrain, and this idea had been circulated among Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain according to the observations of British diplomats to 
Bahrain.22 For Bahrain, when the scheme for a nine-shaikhdom federation was still up 
in the air, the Kuwaiti proposal could have opened up an opportunity for Al Khalifa to 
have an ally. But while the British government thought that ‘the excellent defence 
facilities at Bahrain’ were supposed to be the pillar of the future federation scheme, Al 
Khalifa gave an ambiguous response to the Kuwaiti proposal under pressure from 
Britain.23 Al Khalifa was then open to any possible security cooperation with other 
Gulf monarchies beyond an exclusively bilateral deal. In fact, according to Alexander 
Sterling, British Ambassador to Bahrain in 1970:  
Shaikh Khalifa [Bahraini Prime Minister] confirmed that the Kuwaiti 
Government has asked to lease the [British] RAF installations at Muharraq after 
the British withdrawal. [He] said that the Bahrain Government had stalled on 
this partly because [the] Kuwaiti plans were … directed primarily…[at] 
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defending themselves rather than Bahrain and also because Bahrain was looking 
for solid support on the military side. The Bahrain Government hoped that this 
would be provided by [Her Majesty’s Government] since, whatever the merits 
of cooperation with Kuwait, their military support would be useless … Shaikh 
Khalifa [further] added that the Bahrain Government had also been reluctant to 
come to an arrangement with Kuwait because they believed that if the Kuwaitis 
were given facilities Saudi Arabia would demand them as well. Bahrain would 
find this difficult to refuse… .24 
Al Khalifa did not trust Kuwaiti military ability and was suspicious about whether 
Kuwaiti would kindly protect Bahrain or defend itself; moreover, Al Khalifa had no 
intention to irritate Saudi Arabia for giving exclusive privileges to Kuwait. These 
reasons made seeking Kuwaiti military support difficult. The second option was an 
independent Bahraini military force, the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF). Initially, it 
was also created in response to the British withdrawal. To Britain and Al Khalifa, 
however, BDF might be also reminiscent of a possible military coup in the 1950s and 
1960s once planned by radical Arabists,25 let alone its unfledged military capability to 
defend against external threats. All of these reasons and developments seem to single 
out the US presence at Juffair as a more favourable option.   
Since the Juffair agreement was signed in December 1971, Al Khalifa was 
keeping a very low profile within Bahrain and attempted to dilute public suspicion by 
deemphasizing ‘the political implications of the agreement’. 26  Nonetheless, the 
question of Juffair still remained a primary issue in the 1973 Parliament, around which 
the development of the political struggle was centred, and via which the New Arab 
Left mobilised their popular support and coordinated with their ad hoc allies with 
different ideological backgrounds. It was conceived as a sovereignty issue concerning 
whether the Bahraini people could be the principle political subject able to shake off 
the colonial fetters. Furthermore, it was also a sovereignty issue around which a 
collective national-popular will was organised and via which counter-hegemonic 
intellectuals highlighted an essential part of a popular version of Arab nationalism. 
Therefore, the question of Juffair was never just a national security issue. It 
represented the political struggle between the people and the regime within Bahrain. 
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Moreover, it was also related to a broader regional context in which popular Arab 
nationalism emerged as a counter-hegemonic social force informed by Marxism-
Leninism. Within this context, the question of Juffair, or the issue of Bahrain’s 
alignment with the US, then resonated with popular movements against imperialism 
across the Middle East, particularly the Palestinian question.     
6.3.2 Ties to the Arab cause  
The Palestinian question undoubtedly lies in the most inalienable part of Arab 
nationalism. Drawing from the sources of anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism, the 
ideological mainstay of the Arab cause has motivated the course of Palestinian 
liberation. For some IR constructivist understanding, it has also designated a normative 
framework for Arab states, orienting their foreign policy. Within this framework, Arab 
states’ alignment with the US, if successful, can be seen as a result of a normative shift 
between two seemingly conflicting norms, Arab nationalism versus modern 
sovereignty. However, an investigation of Al Khalifa’s attempted alignment with the 
US demonstrates different sociological connotations of the Arab cause and the role of 
Arab nationalism in state foreign policy. As I will argue in the following sections, the 
ideological linkage between the question of Juffair and the Arab cause posed a 
dilemma for the Al Khalifa regime. But the national, regional and international 
dynamics in the 1970s nonetheless changed the implications of the Arab cause for Gulf 
politics and its ties to Arab nationalism. Along with this course on the ideological level, 
Al Khalifa gradually detached the Arab cause from the question of Juffair while 
seeking an alternative option to its alignment with the US.  
To Al Khalifa, it had been realistic to remain aloof from the Arab cause before 
1970. While much discourse on the Palestinian question had been revolving around 
Nasserism, an element of it could have brought sociopolitical change to Bahrain in a 
revolutionary fashion. Therefore, it could be argued that, in the 1967 war, Bahrain and 
other Gulf Arab states played no influential part.27 However, as a newly independent 
Arab state since 1971 in the post-Nasserism era, it seemed that Al Khalifa had no 
legitimate reasons for not dedicating to the Arab cause, let alone the pressure from the 
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New Arab Left that had strong ties to Palestinian migrant workers within Bahraini 
society. When Anwar Sadat’s de-Nasserisation followed the defeat of the 1967 war 
from the early 1970s, this ‘correctiveness’ alleviated the confrontation between Egypt 
and the Gulf Arab monarchies through reconstruction of the regional political and 
economic ties between them. 28  In this context, the Palestinian question was 
approached by Al Khalifa via cooperation among the Arab states in accordance with 
the principles of the Arab League and the United Nations. Meanwhile, Al Khalifa 
joined the non-alignment movement in 1972. These decisions, on the one hand, 
alleviated the tension within Bahraini society concerning the question of Juffair, and 
on the other hand this platform allowed Al Khalifa to air its voice in support of the 
Arab cause in the international arena. Al Khalifa’s seemingly determined stance 
towards the Arab cause was also shown in the Ramadan War in October 1973, when 
compared to its reaction ‘in a much more muted manner to the 1967 war’.29 Ten days 
after the war broke out, Bahrain joined other Gulf Arab states and Iran in a decision to 
raise the price of crude oil by 70 per cent. As historian Rosemarie Said Zahlan argues, 
‘it was during this war that the linkage between the Gulf and the Palestinian problem 
rose to the surface and dominated affairs for several months’.30 And this linkage then 
opened up a conduit through which Al Khalifa engaged in the Arab cause under Saudi 
leadership and away from the more revolutionary approach of popular Arab 
nationalism. 
While Al Khalifa ‘committed’ itself to the Arab cause, its efforts nonetheless 
seemed not to pay off in diverting popular movements from heading towards radical 
intent. With the victory of the Left in the parliamentary election in December 1973, 
two months later Bahrain’s participation in the oil boycott, the regime’s fear and 
suspicion of the New Arab Left did not fade away throughout the following sessions 
of Parliament in 1974 and 1975. To a certain extent, Al Khalifa’s political commitment 
to the Arab cause was just paying lip service in the international arena. Compared to 
improving the relationship with neighbours in the Gulf, the Palestinian question was 
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somehow a marginal one on Al Khalifa’s political agenda31. In the heyday of the New 
Arab Left, Bahraini popular and labour movements had revolutionary ties with the 
Palestinian community in Bahrain. The ideological power allowing Al Khalifa to form 
policy on the Palestinian question was hardly drawing from an ideological 
cohesiveness linked to civil society. This gave Al Khalifa no choice but to rely 
externally on consensus among regional Arab states.32 To conceive Arab nationalism 
in support of the Arab cause in this way gave Al Khalifa an opportunity to engage with 
the Palestinian question. Also, it attempted to divert it from an overarching agenda 
brought up by popular movements, which included abolition of the US naval base in 
Juffair as part of an expression of solidarity with the Palestinian people. This approach 
offered more latitude for Al Khalifa when dealing with the question of Juffair 
separately from the Arab cause. Therefore, when the question of Juffair later became 
a trigger for terminating the parliamentary experiment, Al Khalifa legitimised its 
commitment to the Arab cause through regional and international frameworks.  
However, Al Khalifa’s support for the Arab cause through external frameworks 
was faced with challenges when Anwar Sadat made his agreement with Israel at Camp 
David in 1978. In July 1977, Al Khalifa announced its intention to cancel the 
agreement with the US whereby the US Navy would reduce its presence and no longer 
use military facilities in Juffair. But, the US military presence was still there. When 
the Camp David agreement was made between Egypt and Israel, the question of Juffair 
was rising to the surface again. With Sadat’s aggressive and unilateral move, the 
challenge to Al Khalifa now was to seek an alternative and reliable external framework 
for its policy towards the Arab cause. This challenge was then followed by Al 
Khalifa’s reconfirmation of its rationale for dealing with the Palestinian question. Al 
Khalifa criticised the Egypt-Israel agreement, especially the US for ‘no longer being a 
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reliable friend’.33 In calling for ‘a just and lasting solution’ that would ensure the return 
of occupied Arab territories and ‘recognise the legal rights of the Palestinians’, Al 
Khalifa reiterated the significance of stability and security in the oil-producing Gulf 
and Middle East order.34 It kept representing itself as a ‘moderate Arab’ state that 
would not take ‘the stand of the Steadfastness Front’, like Libya, Algeria, Syria, South 
Yemen and the PLO.35 At the same time, it also sought international cooperation on 
the Palestinian question through non-alignment summits; however, the non-aligned 
states did not give much substantial support to the Arab cause. For the majority of 
these states, their concern with the Palestinian question was about the occupied 
territories from the 1967 war, but not ‘recognition of Israeli’s existence with the 1967 
pre-war lines of control as a de facto boundary, subject to negotiated adjustment 
necessitated by security considerations’.36 In a sense, there was inconsistency between 
the non-alignment movement and the Khartoum Resolution of the Arab League after 
the 1967 war with regard to the Three Nos − no peace with Israel, no recognition of 
Israel and no negotiations with Israel. Additionally, according to a telegram from 
Harold Walker, British Ambassador to Bahrain in 1979, on the report of what Shaikh 
Mohammed bin Mubarak, Bahraini Foreign Minister, thought about the summits of 
the non-alignment movement, the movement was ‘heavily weighted in favour of the 
Soviet Union’.37   
The above messages reflected Al Khalifa’s fear and dilemma in keeping the US 
alignment and making a commitment to the Arab cause at the same time. For Shaikh 
Mohammed, the deadlock over the Palestinian question, between polarised social 
forces taking different approaches, might trigger a proxy war in the third world and 
bring changes to ‘legitimate regimes in some other states’38. Even though Al Khalifa’s 
coercive measure of suppressing popular movements in Bahrain continued throughout 
the 1970s, the deadlock over the Palestinian question might once again aggravate the 
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political struggle within Bahrain. Furthermore, it might motivate another wave of 
popular movements criticising the alignment between Bahrain and the US. Hence, Al 
Khalifa attempted to deliver a message to the US: Bahrain would not take a radical 
approach to the Arab cause, but Gulf security would be under threat if the radicals 
prevailed. In doing so, Al Khalifa turned to the British Conservative government that, 
as Shaikh Isa bin Sulman, Bahraini Amir, saw it, shared more sympathy with Al 
Khalifa’s thoughts about the Arab cause than did the Labour party.39 It asked a favour 
from the British government, to persuade the US to change its pro-Israel stance, given 
the relation between Gulf stability and Western interests. For, as Bahraini Foreign 
Minister commented,  
…the regime[s] in the Gulf were vulnerable. Sooner or later one of them would 
fall to this pressure [from Iraq and Syria,] and a chain reaction would… [be 
triggered]. The only way in which the pressure could be relieved was to get 
progress over Palestine.40 
Nonetheless, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 could have 
turned Al Khalifa’s dilemma into an opportunity, especially after the announcement 
of the Carter Doctrine in January 1980 that shifted Nixon’s passiveness in US policy 
towards the Gulf into something more active.41 But the dilemma remained, no matter 
how much effort Al Khalifa put in, constantly sending a message to the US that: the 
threat from the Left was more important than taking a side on the Palestinian question 
as it was related to the security of moderate Arab states in the oil-producing Gulf region. 
To Al Khalifa, since there have always been divergent views between the regime and 
the people on the Palestinian question and the US role in the area,42 the dilemma would 
continue if the US remained partial. In seeking US support against Soviet ambitions in 
such a dilemma, Al Khalifa was forced to find alternative legitimation for Bahrain’s 
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alignment. As a result, the Islamic Conference at Islamabad in May 1980 and the 
ongoing talks on Gulf security cooperation then became alternatives. Moreover, 
alongside the sociopolitical fallout of the Iranian revolution within and outside Bahrain, 
these contingent options paved Al Khalifa’s road to the GCC. 
 
6.4 Iranian Revolution: Challenge or Opportunity? 
The Iranian revolution in 1979 marked a historical juncture for the geopolitical, 
societal and ideological development of different social forces in the Gulf. It changed 
a geopolitical landscape designed by the US’s twin-pillar policy and infused new 
revolutionary momentum into popular movements in societies across the Gulf and 
beyond. While the principles of ‘neither West nor East’ and ‘universal Islamism’ were 
represented in Khomeinism and Iranian territorial claim on Bahrain revived, the 
Iranian revolution gave birth to alternative counter-hegemonic forces of Bahraini 
Khomeinists to the New Arab Left in the 1970s and its impact on Bahraini politics was 
shown in changing Al Khalifa’s relations with some Shia groups.  
6.4.1 Khomeini’s universal Islamism 
The theoretical basis of Khomeinism was a revision of Shia political thought and 
could only be found in the social, political, economic and cultural dynamics of modern 
Iran.43 Khomeinism was a distinct form of modern fundamentalism that did not merely 
represent itself as a legacy of Islamic political traditions, its departure showing that the 
‘modern Islamic group are operating ideologically and politically within the context 
of the modern nation-state and the political concepts related to it’.44 ‘The Islamic 
character of the Iranian revolution did not arise from the religious worldviews of 
particular social classes, but from the peculiar historical position of the religious 
institutions in Iran’.45 Resonating with what Kamran Matin argues, this position was 
as a result of the combination and infusion of European republicanism and the notion 
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of ‘velayat-e faqih’ by counter-hegemonic intellectuals like Ali Shariati and 
Khomeini. 46  At this revolutionary movement, ‘the people’ were once again 
interpellated as the political subjects for sovereignty, yet under Shia religious 
leadership.    
Going beyond calling for a return to the Islamic golden age, as former 
fundamentalists did, Khomeinism also included critiques of challenges to the 
established international and regional socio-political relations, dominated by the US 
and its monarchical allies and demarcated by two superpowers. To a considerable 
extent, Khomeinism, as previously argued in chapter 4, shared some ideological 
affinities with the New Arab Left and represented itself as a permanent Islamic 
revolutionary paradigm. Khomeinism rejected the contemporary international order, 
originating from the Westphalian system of nation-states, and abandoned the binary 
world views propagandised by either liberalism or communism in the Cold War 
context. What Khomeinism was calling for was a world of Islamic universalism by 
which the oppressed continued their political struggle against ‘satanic’ powers and 
their lackeys and realised the establishment of a global Islamic government.47 As such, 
Khomeini made his criticisms of communism without reserve on different occasions. 
In his speech on the eve of the Iranian New Year in March 1980, Khomeini attacked 
both East and West, as shown below: 
We are fighting against international communism to the same degree that we are 
fighting against the Western world – devourers led by America, Israel and 
Zionism … Both superpowers have risen for the obliteration of the oppressed 
nations and we should support the oppressed people of the world.48   
To carry on the universal revolutionary goal, Khomeini expanded the social bases of 
his support beyond the religious networks. Not only did Khomeini attempt to exert his 
influence on non-Iranian Shias through the traditional networks and among the clergy, 
but also emerging radical Shia movements and younger mullahs became another 
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central conduit.49 Also, Iranian youth and diplomats were seen as significant to support 
exporting revolution.50 Khomeini’s mobilisation of these networks to achieve his goal 
of exporting revolution represented his understanding of the international and regional 
order. This was fundamentally different from the Shah’s intimate ties with the US in 
maintaining Iran’s regional primacy and alleviating a potential clash with the Gulf 
Arab states under the Nixon Doctrine. As R. K. Ramazani notes, ‘Khomeini’s views 
about government and international politics in general and his conception of the 
requirements of security in the Persian Gulf in particular make it mandatory for Iran 
to export its Islamic revolution.’51 As a result, the way in which Khomeini called for 
exporting revolution through intellectual networks became the mainstay of Iranian 
foreign policy after 1979.   
How does this Khomeinist revolutionary moment relate to our discussion on 
forming Bahrain’s alignment, especially with the GCC, and different social forces 
around the development of Arab nationalism? As previously argued, most current 
understandings see the Iranian revolution as a security threat and thus a challenge to 
the ruling status of Gulf Arab monarchies. It created a geopolitical and ideological 
crisis for Gulf Arab monarchies and thus led directly to the formation of the GCC. But 
in conducting an investigation into Bahraini domestic political dynamics, as already 
shown in chapters 4 and 5, along with Al Khalifa’s response to a series of events 
following the Iranian revolution, I argue that the Iranian revolution, though a threat, 
might not have been a challenge to Al Khalifa. Instead, while Al Khalifa faced an 
internal political struggle, the Iranian revolution created a favourable historical 
moment for finding alternative alignment options to one with the US. While the 
revolution offered a way out of the dilemma of Al Khalifa’s alignment, Al Khalifa 
continued its ‘dictatorship without hegemony’ without a national-popular collective 
will being organised between itself and civil society. 
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6.4.2 Shia demands and Iranian territorial claim 
Around the issue of the State Security Law and the question of Juffair, ad hoc 
unified counter-hegemonic forces across ideological terrains within Bahrain were 
created. As shown in previous chapters, these ad hoc unified forces were organised in 
the 1973 Parliament and evolved with the outcome being the dissolution of Parliament 
and Al Khalifa failing to establish its ideological linkage to civil society. While the 
Iranian revolution broke out and received support from the New Arab Left, concerning 
the shared objectives of toppling the monarchies and the US-dominated regional order, 
the political struggle between civil society and the regime was not new. It was 
somehow the residue of an interrupted passive revolution from 1975 that, to Al Khalifa, 
could be taken advantage of by the New Arab Left again if a revolutionary moment 
came. In this regard, although the Iranian revolution came as a shock, it was not an 
absolute challenge to Al Khalifa and its Arab neighbours due to the essential difference 
in religious and national identity. Instead, the impact of the Iranian revolution and its 
consequence of leading to Al Khalifa’s decision on alignment mirrored more 
complicated socio-political dynamics. That is, the interplay of the regime’s response 
with the internal political struggle and geopolitical and capitalist surroundings played 
a significant role in the course of Al Khalifa’s alignment.  
The Iranian revolution could have given Al Khalifa another chance to link itself 
ideologically to civil society through some conservative-minded Shia clerics. Under 
its objective of anti-insurgency of the Left, Al Khalifa appeared to continue with its 
tactic of making deals with them and undermining the New Arab Left’s leadership in 
popular movements. In the first few months of Iranian President Mehdi Bazargan’s 
provisional government after February 1979, Al Khalifa and other Gulf Arab 
monarchies were not very suspicious of the religious aspects brought about by the 
revolution. Although suspicions came with the fall of one of Nixon’s pillars in the Gulf, 
Al Khalifa maintained a rather good relationship with Iran after the Shah fled. On the 
one hand, they were on the same page of preventing the Left from taking the political 
leadership in the post-revolutionary phase; on the other hand, they agreed to create a 
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regional order without any external intervention.52 
But history was nonetheless leading the whole development along another path. 
On 16 June, Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq Rouhani of Qom, one of the key Shia clerics 
against the Shah, announced that Iran should reclaim Bahrain as part of its territory ‘if 
the Arabs did not abandon their claim for the return of the Tunbs and Abu Musa’. 
Rouhani’s announcement was later reiterated by the Nationalist Iranian Party that 
negated Bahrain’s independence referendum in the early 1970s. In spite of the 
statement issued by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Rouhani’s views were 
personal and did not reflect official Iranian policy, Al Khalifa’s nervousness about 
Iranian ambitions remained. This was shown in an article, denouncing Iran’s 
‘irresponsible statements and an unacceptable position’, published by a local pro-
government Bahraini newspaper, Akhbar Al-Khaleej (Gulf Daily). 53  Al Khalifa’s 
suspicions were proven legitimate when the Bahraini Shia community responded to 
the Iranian revolution. A group of Shia clerics distributed leaflets and demanded socio-
political reform in July 1979, aiming to turn Bahrain into an Islamic state.54 A Shia-
led demonstration marched from Manama suq to the PLO office in support of 
Khomeini’s call for ‘the recovery of Jerusalem’ from Zionist Israel in August.55  With 
the notion of ‘velayat-e faqih’ received seemingly well among Bahraini radical Shia 
activists, the Shirazyyin faction, Al Khalifa held back from responding positively to 
the Shia community.  In spite of retaining its ideological disconnection from civil 
society, Al Khalifa found that Rouhani’s statement and the rise of Bahraini 
Khomeinism could be an opportunity to demolish united popular forces. The Bahraini 
Foreign Minister told Harold Walker, the British Ambassador to Bahrain, that when 
the political aspects of the Iranian revolution reveal far more than its religious ones,  
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…the extremes to which Khomeini’s puritanism was going had also been of 
help to the Bahraini authorities: the people in the villages would like to see that 
sort of thing but [Khomeinism] would get no support from the people in the 
towns.56 
 
Such a message showed that Al Khalifa seemed to have enough confidence to retrieve 
its support from urban areas, which was lost in the 1973 Parliament. Moreover, the 
most important implication from these events was that the emergence of the 
Khomeinist movement in Bahrain, like the later political action led by the IFLB in 
December 1981, nonetheless had disadvantages for the unified social forces of popular 
movements. Bahraini Khomeinists attempted to establish their leadership and counter-
hegemonic forces and carried on the New Arab Left’s revolutionary legacy. But their 
allegiance to Khomeini nonetheless distinguished themselves from their revolutionary 
predecessors who insisted on a popular approach without a hierarchical leadership by 
which a national-popular collective will was to be organised. Bahraini Khomeinists 
somehow undermined the integrity of popular forces around Arab nationalist 
movements regarding pursuing a popular political subject for sovereignty in Bahrain. 
Thus, the Khomenist manifesto backfired. New Arab Left members abandoned their 
initial support for the Iranian revolution and defended the complete sovereignty of 
Bahrain.57 More importantly, it created a favourable opportunity for Al Khalifa to 
postpone the idea of reopening the parliament and drew popular attention to the crisis 
of foreign subversion from Iranian intervention.  
 As a consequence, the issue of the contested sovereign subject of Al Khalifa, 
affected for a long time by counter-hegemonic intellectuals as a colonial legacy, was 
now diverted to the issue of the sovereignty norm. The notion of non-intervention 
outweighed the concept of the people as the primary political subject for sovereignty. 
At this point, while a more active Saudi leadership emerged to convene a Gulf security 
framework in the fallout from the Iranian revolution, the geopolitical conflict around 
the Palestinian question and the Iran-Iraq war also accelerated its pace. These 
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developments then set the stage for the birth of the GCC as Al Khalifa’s alternative 
alignment choice, to which the discussion now turns.     
 
6.5 Setting the Stage for the GCC 
Ever since the parliamentary experiment was dissolved under the pressure from 
Saudi Arabia in 1975, following the Saudi leadership seemed to be a harmless optional 
alignment for Al Khalifa’s economic and political needs. The Saudi leadership opened 
up a conduit through which the Khalifa showcased itself in the regional and 
international arena. While using coercive methods on popular movements, the political 
struggle between Al Khalifa and Bahraini counter-hegemonic intellectuals from both 
secular and religious sides was not an urgent issue to be solved. Moreover, the regional 
geopolitical and capitalist development also created a favourable juncture for Al 
Khalifa that could retain its ideological disconnection from civil society rather than 
have any further political dialogue with the people. From this point, the scheme of 
Gulf alignment organised by six Gulf Arab monarchies came gradually into a shape 
and then had feedback influence of the ideological development of Arab nationalism 
in Bahrain.  
6.5.1 Saudi leadership 
After the Ramadan War in October 1973, Sadat’s Infitah (open-door) policy and 
the oil crisis gave Gulf Arab States more political leverage in the Middle East. The war 
then set the stage for Al Khalifa to join the action of oil reduction led by Saudi Arabia 
when the Saudi regime was acknowledged, allegedly, as a rising power to influence 
the Palestinian question, rather than Sadat’s Egypt.58 It also gave the impression that 
Saudi Arabia saw the oil weapon as a power foreign policy tool, using such leverage 
in the Palestinian question and its ties with a developing state that was against 
communism.59 In this context, Saudi-Bahraini ties were fortified through a bilateral 
cultural and economic agreement after November 1974, including a significant 
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construction project for a causeway, which was expected to be the primary driver for 
boosting the Bahraini economy by linking two lands. At the same time, while Gulf 
regional cooperation was launched, Al Khalifa was also desperate to see further 
coordination in the military field. 60  These developments gave Al Khalifa some 
confidence to make a further move on the question of Juffair. In June 1975, Shaikh 
Mohammed bin Mubarak, Bahraini Foreign Minister, said in an interview with the 
Beirut weekly As-Sayyad that,  
Bahrain could terminate facilities granted to the American fleet if all other Gulf 
states removed centres of big-power presence from their territories … Bahrain 
will commit itself to any clearly-defined Gulf consensus calling for the removal 
of centres of international influence in the area.61  
This statement was then finalised in June 1977 when the Bahraini Foreign Ministry 
announced it was terminating the leasing agreement. But US ships were still able to 
use Bahraini facilities. The termination of the Bahraini-US deal did not alter US de 
facto military presence in Bahrain.   
This Saudi-Bahraini alignment was apparently asymmetrical but nonetheless 
gave material resources for maintaining the ruling status of Al Khalifa. With Saudi 
economic backing, te Al Khalifa took advantage of state development projects to tie 
itself further to the Bahraini middle classes, including the religious right and some 
veteran Arab nationalists in the 1960s, in order to resist the New Arab Left. Despite 
the sectarian divergence between Bahraini Shias and Sunnis, in the mid-1970s, some 
Shia intellectuals and veteran Arab nationalists became the regime’s ‘organic 
intellectual’ linkage to Bahraini society under state developmental projects and 
propaganda of counter-revolution against the Left. To some extent, they might have 
informed Al Khalifa’s understanding of the Arab cause that could compete against the 
New Arab Left’s popular and revolutionary approach to the Palestinian question. This 
rationale echoed with Saudi Arabia’s intention of de-radicalising the revolutionary 
approach to the Arab cause by upholding Pan-Islamist solidarity via the Organisation 
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Pan-Arabist collaboration through the inter-Arab 
state framework in the 1970s.  
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Alongside the emergence of a more active Saudi leadership of counter-
insurgency towards popular movements and political participation, which had 
interrupted the progress of Bahraini political reform, the Bahraini socio-political 
context tilted the scales in the political struggle between the people and the regime. 
While rumours that the Sabah regime of Kuwait would revive the suspended 
parliament in the late 1970s spread among Gulf rulers, the Saudi regime was 
determined not to give ‘free expression to radical and anti-regime ideas’ nor to ‘toy 
with similar democratic experiments’.62 This tough Saudi stance on popular political 
representation was reflected in the Al Khalifa regime’s hesitation to revive the 
parliament, especially those strong figures within Al Khalifa like Shaikh Khalifa bin 
Sulman, the Bahraini Prime Minister. These doubts and dilemma on the part of Al 
Khalifa were noted by the Middle East Department of Foreign Commonwealth Office 
in London in a report:  
[The Al Khalifa regime needs to be] thinking carefully about how to buttress 
their position, which does not look as strong as it has looked in the past two 
decades. They represent a minority of the population, they no longer have the 
prospect of huge sums of money to ‘throw’ at problems to make them go away … 
They could try to widen their support in Bahrain, perhaps by reviving an 
assembly, but this is going to mean fairly speedy concessions if they are going 
to be effective. And they could try to look elsewhere for support – to Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq who could provide the economic and … ultimately the military 
support to help them remain in power. But lessons from across the water teach 
them that concessions have to be timely to be effective and that foreign support, 
however strong, is no substitute for domestic good-will.63 
However, the revival of the Bahraini parliament was never realised until the early 
2000s. By the time the GCC was established under Saudi leadership, the ideological 
equilibrium of social forces between popular movements and the regime around the 
development of Arab nationalism reversed. While ideological rivalry emerged between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran after the Shia clerics exercised their influence in the Iranian 
government after November 1979,64 the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 
1979 and the Iran-Iraq war broke out in September 1980, Saudi Arabia now 
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demonstrated its more active leadership in the Gulf. Due to its close economic ties 
with Saudi Arabia, Al Khalifa followed the Saudi path, rejecting the idea of popular 
political participation. While Khomeinists failed to establish their widely-received 
leadership in popular movements, Bahraini popular forces were shattered and failed to 
give impetus to a strong counter-hegemonic revolutionary momentum, which had once 
been driving the development of Arab nationalism since the late 1960s. In contrast, the 
escalating regional geopolitical and capitalist competition since the end of the 1970s 
favoured the other trend of reactionary social forces around Arab nationalism.         
6.5.2 Shift in the Arab cause  
 While the rise of Khomeinism alongside the Iranian revolution changed the 
geopolitical landscape in the Gulf, it also injected new social forces into the 
development of Arab nationalism around the issues of the Arab cause and the Iran-
Iraq war.  
 Soon after the Camp David agreement, Al Khalifa and other Gulf Arab 
monarchies denounced Sadat’s arbitrary decision on Egypt’s rapprochement with 
Israel. But, compounded by the fallout of the Iranian revolution, Al Khalifa’s stance 
on the Palestinian question was expected to be challenged at any moment by Syria and 
Iraq, which were upholding a more radical nationalist ideology, and by Khomeinist 
revolutionaries. Having ideological affinities with some factions among popular 
movements in Bahrain, these forces put Al Khalifa in jeopardy, testing the regime’s 
commitment to the Arab cause. Nevertheless, the following geopolitical dynamics in 
the Gulf opened up a favourable movement for Al Khalifa, seeking a solution to the 
dilemma in alignment from outside rather than inside Bahrain.   
 After the occupation of the Grand Mosque at Mecca in November 1979, for the 
Saudi regime, ‘all concerns for the Palestinians’ actually ‘went out of the window…[in 
order to receive] tangible security guarantees from the Carter Administration’.65 The 
Al Khalifa regime followed suit. In June 1981, the Israeli air force flew over Saudi 
Arabia to attack a nuclear reactor in Baghdad, sending the Gulf monarchies a warning 
                                                        




signal. This event awakened these monarchies’ geopolitical concerns about the 
Palestinian question.66 Soon, Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia proposed an 8-point 
peace plan in August 1981. It was seen as the ‘first clear-cut formula put forward 
publicly for the resolution of the 33-year old Arab-Israeli conflict’, and was issued by 
the Gulf Arab states.67 As a milestone in the Arab cause, this plan resonated with the 
Camp David agreement. For the first time, it implied a two-state solution as the core 
of regional peace, on condition that Israel must pull out of the territories it occupied 
after 1967; and it was later adopted in the Fez Declaration of the Arab League in late 
1982. 68  This proposal provided Al Khalifa with an alternative approach to the 
Palestinian question by following Saudi leadership. It pitched in with Al Khalifa's 
policy towards the Arab cause, delivering the goals of ‘land for peace’ and ‘restoration 
of the Palestinians’ rights’ through regional and international collective frameworks. 
Al Khalifa’s stance, however, faced another challenge from the other shore of 
the Gulf. As noted earlier, Khomeinism redefined the established political order 
through his universal Islamist agenda and introduced a cultural approach to the 
relations between Muslim countries and others. Under the overarching agenda of the 
Islamic revolution, the solution to the Palestinian question was unsurprisingly related 
to the Khomeinist project of toppling the Gulf monarchies that chose to stand with US 
imperialism and Zionism. At this critical moment, the Iranian revolution indeed 
‘engendered a paradigm shift in that country’s foreign policy towards Israel and the 
West’ and revived ‘the idea that the regime at home had to be overthrown’ before 
Israel and the West were confronted.69 But while the New Arab Left was struggling to 
remobilise widespread support and Khomeinists were unable to establish cross-
ideological leadership within society, popular forces in Bahrain seemed powerless. 
The New Arab Left’s leadership of counter-hegemonic forces, as discussed in chapter 
4, failed to build itself among various ideological currents, and thus a national-popular 
collective will was difficult to organise around Arab nationalism within civil society. 
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Al Khalifa was somehow relieved from being challenged by its stance on the 
Palestinian question. Even though Al Khalifa was swamped with how to manage the 
impact of the regional conflicts, the development of the Iran-Iraq war was nonetheless 
leading Al Khalifa towards an alternative alignment in the name of Arab unity. 
6.5.3 Iran-Iraq war 
While the Iran-Iraq war, as one of the fallouts of the Iranian revolution, inflamed 
the clash between Iran and Iraq since Ba’ath assumed power in 1968, it subtly changed 
Iraq’s relations with the Gulf Arab monarchies and more importantly the role of Arab 
nationalism in Al Khalifa’s regional policy. As the Iran-Iraq clash escalated in a more 
physically violent way on the battlefield, the conflict also represented an ideological 
rivalry between Arab Ba'athist Iraq and Persian Shia Iran. For Iraqi Ba’athists, 
Khomeini’s universalistic and populist revolutionary ideas were undoubtedly a 
challenge to Ba’athist ideological foundation of nationalism and socialism, especially 
when Khomeinism instigated the rise of Iraqi Shias against Sunnis in power. This 
perceived challenge to Saddam Hussein’s regime eventually brought about his 
decision to invade Iran in September 1980. Military action gave Hussein an 
opportunity to demonstrate his political superiority in both the national and regional 
arenas. Hussein’s war with Iran boosted ‘common ethnic and sectarian affinities with 
the Arab Sunni regimes of the Gulf’ in the confrontation with Persian Shia Islamic 
Iran.70 Nonetheless, Iraq’s ideological affinity with the Gulf monarchies was driven 
more by Ba’athist Pan-Arabism than by sectarian ideas. It was supported by Hussein’s 
de-radicalization in Iraq’s foreign relations after the mid-1970s, especially after the 
1978 Baghdad summit with discussion of the Camp David agreement.71 Hussein’s 
Arabist approach to external relations was overtly shown earlier in the Arab National 
Charter in March 1980. |Reminiscent of Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt in the 1960s, 
Hussein attempted to boost his leadership through the non-aligned movement and Arab 
solidarity, rather than the Islamic coterie dominated by the Saudi leadership.72 As such, 
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‘the minimal utilisation of religious symbolism in war rhetoric and propaganda 
throughout the duration of the conflict is indicative of a much broader and more 
fundamental system of values held by the president and the party leadership’.73 An 
Arab nationalist world view of this kind held by Hussein was being continuously 
expressed during the Iran-Iraq war.  
This ideological and geopolitical competition for Gulf superiority between Iran 
and Iraq featured a turning point in Al Khalifa pursuing alignment. At face value, Al 
Khalifa’s stance towards the Iran-Iraq conflict was anchored in the principle of 
neutrality and a peaceful resolution to end the war. It was delivered publicly by Shaikh 
Mohammed bin Mubarak, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister, in the general debate of the 35th 
session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on 3 October 1980:  
…we support the appeals and call upon both parties for self-restraint and a cease-
fire and [to] resort to negotiations and respond to the good offices of the Islamic 
Conference and Security Council Resolution 479 of 28 September 1980.74  
The Khalifa regime’s neutrality seemed contradictory to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
which supported Iraq openly by offering funding and military facilities. But, in fact, 
behind Al Khalifa’s alleged neutrality was its concern that echoed Kuwait’s decision 
to choose the lesser evil between Iran and Iraq.75 To Al Khalifa, ‘the Iranians were not 
making it easy for [Bahrain] to remain neutral’ if they prevailed in the conflict.76 
Moreover, the most critical issue around the Iran-Iraq war was Al Khalifa's fear that 
the Soviets might take advantage of Gulf conflict and exercise its influence. If this 
were the case, the best strategy would have been to make an open alignment with the 
US to protect the relations between moderate Arab oil-producers and Western 
consumers. In this sense, Al Khalifa stood on the same ideological ground as the West, 
representing a unity of capitalist states against communism. However, while the people 
still saw the US as the primary supporter of Israel, this could sow the seeds of change 
in Bahrain: either the regime became ‘less moderate or risk[ed] being overthrown’.77   
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At this moment, Al Khalifa’s dilemma in forming policy towards alignment 
showed the legacy of the interrupted passive revolution in 1975. On the one side was 
taking a more Arab nationalist approach to the Palestinian question and the Iran-Iraq 
war. But this would fortify the ideological linkage between civil society and other 
societal agents like the New Arab Left, or radical Arab states like Iraq, giving new 
momentum to counter-hegemonic forces around the idea of popular sovereignty. And 
this might escalate the social conflict between Al Khalifa and the people. On the other 
side was a boldly open alignment with the US, for which Al Khalifa was longing. 
However, this decision could have a more catastrophic and immediate impact on Al 
Khalifa. All the different ideological trends of social forces would be able to make 
their alliances again under the banner of anti-imperialism. Whether choosing one side 
or the other, Al Khalifa inevitably faced a long-standing issue around the political 
struggle, i.e. the contested sovereign subject of Al Khalifa vis-à-vis the people as the 
most important political subject for Bahrain’s sovereignty. While Al Khalifa rejected 
reviving the Parliament, this dilemma of forming an alignment could not be solved 
from an incomplete hegemonic state of Bahrain. As such, ideological support for its 
alignment was by no means to be derived from either civil society or other radical 
Arabs. 
6.5.4 Bahrain’s Arab nationalism around the GCC 
Rather than choose between open alignment with the US and a radical Arab 
nationalist path, both of which would have aggravated the social conflict within 
Bahrain, Al Khalifa chose another alternative. As a solution to this dilemma, a 
comprehensive Gulf cooperation framework under Saudi leadership appeared to be Al 
Khalifa’s modus vivendi for both political and economic reasons. The GCC framework 
preserved Al Khalifa’s ideological ties with the Arab cause, and its alleged principle 
of non-intervention of external powers as well. This rationale can be found in the 
speech by Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak, Bahraini Foreign Minister, to the general 
debate of the 36th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in October 
1981 after the GCC was established in May 1981:  
[The GCC] is set up in conformity with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter [and] represents a political, economic and social grouping of the Six 
member states in order to face up to challenges and external threats which 
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confront the region and keep it away from sphere of influence and international 
strife … the security and stability of the Gulf is the responsibility of its States 
only, and that they are able to secure that, and that nobody has the right to 
interfere in its internal affairs. The rejection by the leaders of the region of any 
foreign intervention, of whatever source and kind, reaffirmed the determination 
of these States to resist all endeavours to link the region to international 
conflicts that are inconsistent with the principles of Non-Alignment and the 
United Nations Charter… .78 
His statement corresponded to ‘the sublime objective of the Arab nation’ and ‘the 
conviction [to] coordination, cooperation, and integration’ noted in the preface of the 
GCC Charter, which not only complied with an international framework on the basis 
of the non-intervention principle but also offered a less revolutionary version of Arab 
nationalism.79 Furthermore, the GCC then allowed carrying on with and enhancing the 
forming and accumulating process of Gulf capitals, as noted by Hanieh, that offered 
the social bases for monarchical rule through various capitalist projects.80       
From the above statement, the rationale of Al Khalifa’s alignment decision 
appeared to resonate with the existing understanding in IRME scholarship, either a 
normative shift from Arab nationalism to a sovereignty norm as argued by IR 
constructivism, or the regime’s omni-balancing between the domestic and external 
threats maintained by neo-realists. However, as shown in this chapter, Al Khalifa’s 
alignment with the GCC derived from a more complex process, which constituted 
historical conditions and contingencies in the interplay of domestic, regional and 
international sociopolitical dynamics. Eventually, such a decision became a way out 
from the dilemma of making an open alignment with the US that had been besetting 
Al Khalifa since Bahrain’s independence. More importantly, it was an outcome of the 
political struggle between the people and the regime, conditioned by the sociopolitical 
dynamics following the interrupted passive revolution in 1975. While the political 
struggle was revolving around the issue of contested sovereignty, Al Khalifa’s 
participation in the GCC brought about a geopolitical impact whereby Bahrain’s 
regional policy was brought into Saudi Arabia’s orbit ever after.  
                                                        
78 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘FCO 8/3897 Bahrain External’, October 1, 1981. 
79 The Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 25 May 1981. 
80 Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States, 57–84. 
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At this point, how do we understand Arab nationalism and its interplay with 
Bahrain’s policy towards regional alignment? Al Khalifa’s decision to join the GCC 
actually had feedback influence on the intellectual development of counter-hegemonic 
forces around Arab nationalism. At the time of the British withdrawal, New Arab Left 
intellectuals, as noted in chapter 4, had been strongly opposed to the regional 
monarchical cooperative scheme in the case of the nine-shaikhdom proposal and saw 
such a scheme as a violation of the people’s will. Their attitude towards the GCC at 
the time of its establishment was quite similar, while mocking at the GCC as ‘the Gulf 
Complacency Council’ and ‘a concert of tribal regimes against the people and against 
revolution’. 81  However, while the Iranian revolutionary agenda and suspicious 
territorial claims remained and seemingly rosy future plans were initiated by the GCC, 
some New Arab Left intellectuals changed their attitude. They thought ‘it would solve 
our social and economic problems and raise the [living] standards of the people’.82 
Moreover, ‘the GCC seemed to be welcomed by people. We [the Popular Front] 
always support the people’s will and expected that the GCC could represent more the 
people’s voice.’ 83  As such, although Al Khalifa and the New Arab Left were 
interpreting the GCC in different ways, the GCC appeared to be an alternative 
alignment that was accepted by counter-hegemonic and hegemonic social forces 
around Arab nationalism in Bahrain. Yet, the equilibrium between these forces was 
now tilting towards the latter. In the 1980s, history saw that New Arab Left movements 
were continuously cracked down upon by the Al Khalifa regime, whose ruling status 
was increasingly fortified by acquiring resources through its ties with Saudi Arabia 
and other GCC members.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered a historical analysis of the formation of Bahrain’s policy 
towards regional alignment in the 1970s. By extending some arguments presented in 
previous chapters through a Gramscian lens, this chapter has shown how the struggle 
                                                        
81 Interview with Abdullah Janahi, Manama, January 3, 2016. 
82 Interview with Ali Qasim Rabia, Manama, December 13, 2015. 
83 Interview with Abdullah Janahi, Manama, January 3, 2016. 
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between counter-hegemonic and hegemonic forces around Arab nationalism 
continuously played its role in Al Khalifa’s policy on alignment. For this, arguing 
against the existing literature informed by the approaches of omni-balancing, regime 
survival and shared identity, I hold that Bahrain’s policy towards the GCC is best 
understood as a result of the political struggle around the contested sovereign subject 
of Bahrain in a more complex societal context. Under the pressure of capitalist 
development and geopolitical competition, such a context was also interrelated to both 
the historical conditions of the failure of the parliamentary experiment in 1975 and the 
contingencies of Al Khalifa’s response to a series of extended foreign policy issues. 
While the political struggle evolved and was a social driving force in Bahrain’s 
regional policy, the meaning of Arab nationalism changed qualitatively within Al 
Khalifa’s decision on alignment over time. With the end of my empirical analyses of 
Arab nationalism and its interplay with Bahraini’s regional policy, this thesis now 
turns to the concluding chapter, which will summarise each chapter, reflect on some 
implications of the findings and limitations of this thesis, and point out potential 
directions for further research following a Gramscian approach in IRME and more 





7 CONCLUSION: FINDINGS, REFLECTIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis has sought to elucidate the case of Bahrain’s policy towards Gulf 
alignment in the 1970s and thereby revisit the relationship between Arab nationalism 
and foreign policy in the Middle East. The empirical investigation has been conducted 
through a reconstructed Gramscian lens as a historical sociological framework, which 
follows in particular the tradition of historical materialism but is distinctive to the 
Coxian one. As a proposed viable historical sociological approach to the relationship 
of ideologies and foreign policy, this framework has attempted to bring other histories 
of Arab nationalism into IRME through three interrelated concepts of development, 
ideology and struggle, informed by the revival of Gramscian insights. It explains how 
the evolution of Arab nationalism in a social context of political struggle became a 
driver for state regional policy in the Middle East after 1967. By integrating both the 
empirical and theoretical discussion around the thesis puzzle − the role of Arab 
nationalism in the international relations of the Middle East in the post-1967 phase – 
the final chapter of this thesis serves its purpose of reviewing the preceding chapters 
in the thesis and then self-reappraising the themes laid out in it. Not only does it recount 
the findings of this thesis in comparison with the other existing explanations reviewed 
in the introductory chapter, but it also reflects the lessons and limitations of the thesis 
and proposes some potential avenues for further research drawn from a theoretical 
reconstruction of Gramsci for the case of Bahrain in the 1970s.   
 
7.1 Summary of the Findings 
Through a reflection on a widely accepted statement concerning the demise of 
Arab nationalism in the post-1967 phase, the contribution of this thesis has been to 
give alternative accounts of such a statement through a historical sociological lens and 
the case of Bahrain. It has shown two aspects: tracing the provenance of Arab 
nationalism on the one hand and examining the context in which Arab nationalism 
influenced state foreign policy on the other. The introductory chapter of this thesis has 
critically reviewed the existing explanations in IRME scholarship through these 
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aspects. With the exception of historical sociological approaches to relocating ideas in 
social change in the Middle East, the lacuna in other approaches of IR constructivism 
and eclecticism has been demonstrated in their more or less shared understandings. 
First, Arab nationalism and the sovereignty norm are as contradictory as two 
distinctive normative structures of parochial versus universal culture, informing 
different identities, national interests and the state system. Thus, second, the ways in 
which Arab nationalism influenced foreign policy depended on the extent to which an 
ideational congruency between national and state identity could be achieved through 
the process of international socialisation and state formation. These perspectives seem 
to be nicely juxtaposed with the claim for the demise of Arab nationalism after 1967 
and an anchoring process for a sovereignty norm in the 1970s. This claim is supported 
by an observable regional tranquillity in the Gulf among the states during the 1970s 
that allows an explanation of Arab nationalism being of less political significance to 
Bahrain’s regional policy among others, whereas other histories of Arab nationalism 
were still alive within Bahraini society beneath the radar of inter-state relations in the 
Middle East, even after 1967. Such divergent understandings of Arab nationalism in 
relation to the discussion on foreign policy raise the question of what explains the 
interplay of Arab nationalism and Bahrain’s policy toward regional alignment in the 
post-1967 and the independence phase, and how.  
The theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2 was, therefore, designed to 
address this question through a reconstruction of Gramsci as a viable historical 
sociological approach. The framework provides an alternative and reformulated 
Gramscian lens for IR beyond the existing Coxian approach. The chapter argues that 
the Coxian brand of a historical materialist approach to IR is subject to a general 
critique like other mainstream IR theories: compartmentalising the national-
international boundary instead of seeing international relations as a social totality. 
Therefore, its analysis of the transition of contemporary international orders is located 
in the history of inter-state competition rather than unpacking the transition under the 
theme of social formation. As such, a reconstruction of Gramsci is proposed to rectify 
the Coxian drawbacks and offer another avenue for a Gramscian intervention in IR. 
This framework follows the recently revival in scholarly interest in international social 
theory, especially the school of uneven and combined development, by which it teases 
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out Gramsci’s own understanding of international relations. The chapter further argues 
that, on the one hand, Gramsci’s insights into capitalism − its expansionary nature 
leading to uneven social formations among societies and a ‘historical combination’ in 
the international sphere − founds a ground for his understanding of international 
relations. Therefore, on the other hand, such unevenness and combination create social 
bases for the formation and evolution of ideologies and social forces along with 
capitalist formation. As such, a reconstructed version of Gramsci through the notion 
of uneven and combined development sets the ontological foundation for how this 
thesis conceptualises international relations. More importantly, it offers a tool to flesh 
out historical sociological analyses of Arab nationalism and Bahrain’s regional policy 
by taking late-coming capitalist formation into account.  
Chapter 2 then conceptualises three interrelated key terms − development, 
ideology and struggle − informed by Gramsci for the analytical framework employed 
in this thesis. By ‘development’, following Gramsci’s understanding of capitalism and 
international relations, I define development as changes in the social relations of the 
mode of production and refer to two historical conjunctures in the case of Bahrain. The 
first one is the encounter of Bahrain’s tributary social relations and international 
capitalism through British tutelage in the early twentieth century. The encounter 
created the effect of a combined social formation, generating contradictions within 
Bahrain and then deriving different social forces of class around the rising moment of 
Arab nationalism, under British colonialism. The second conjuncture registers the 
moment of Bahrain’s formal independence from being a British protectorate in 1971. 
It further relates to and is conceptualised through Gramsci as a ‘passive relation’, 
addressing a political transition corresponding to Bahraini social transformation after 
the British withdrawal. The concept of development elucidates the late-coming 
capitalist formation of Bahrain under British colonialism and after Bahrain’s formal 
independence. Moreover, it conceptualises a historical sociological context for 
subsequent analyses in this thesis and relates to two other two concepts: ideology and 
struggle. These two concepts allow a historical sociological investigation of ‘the 
second image’, unpacking the ways in which international pressure intertwines with 
socio-political dynamics on the national level. Through these two concepts, Arab 
nationalism can best be understood by its ideological components which, I argue in 
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the case of Bahrain, are linked to movements within civil society but are contradictory 
to the sociopolitical establishment designed by the regime. The contradictions on the 
ideological level between Bahraini society and Al Khalifa are then represented in two 
polarised social forces of counter-hegemony and hegemony around Arab nationalism. 
They continuously fed momentum into the political struggle that became a locus at 
which this thesis explained the interplay of Arab nationalism and Bahrain’s policy 
towards regional alignment in the 1970s. 
Conceived in these three concepts informed by Gramsci, chapters 3–5 offer 
evidence for and analyses of the origins and evolution of Arab nationalism in relation 
to the political struggle among different social forces from the British colonial era to 
Bahrain’s independence phase. Chapter 3 extends the concept of development by 
drawing on insights from an investigation of nationalism and capitalism in peripheral 
areas, or in the context of late-coming capitalist formation. It mainly focuses on the 
theme of Bahraini capitalist formation under British colonialism. I argue in chapter 3 
that the characteristics of uneven and combined capitalist development of Bahrain 
under British colonialism created antagonistic social forces between the Al Khalifa 
regime and Bahraini people, along with inceptive class formation. This process 
realising capitalist sociality in Bahrain, however, brought with it some corresponding 
political effects. On the one side, Al Khalifa’s rule was ideologically founded on a 
colonial view of demarcating ethnosectarian lines informed by British colonialism, 
whereas on the other side Bahraini popular and nationalist movements evolved and 
gradually shaped a ‘collective will’ around Arab nationalism as unified social forces 
against existing political authorities. In a Gramscian sense, the former represents an 
arbitrary and rationalistic ‘willed ideology’ of the dominant ruling class. However, the 
latter is a historical ‘organic ideology’ of the subordinated classes, deriving from civil 
society in a given structure designed, in the case of Bahrain, by colonialism. For this, 
I further argue that a disconnection between the two raised difficulties in organising a 
collective will between Al Khalifa and Bahraini civil society during the British 
colonial era. Moreover, such an ideological disconnection continued to exist even in 
the independence phase, being reflected in the political struggle within Bahrain when 




Chapter 4 extends the discussion on the political aspects of Bahraini late-coming 
capitalist formation under British colonialism covered in chapter 3 and focuses on the 
concept of ideology around the evolution of Arab nationalism in Bahrain. It is designed 
to highlight the thesis’ rationale of bringing other histories of Arab nationalism into 
IRME. The chapter outlines the role of the New Arab Left as a rising revolutionary 
current of Arab nationalist movements in the 1960s and major counter-hegemonic 
forces in the 1970s. The chapter provides a historical analysis of why New Arab Left 
intellectuals emerged across the Middle East in the 1960s by drawing on Marxist-
Leninist ideologies, and how they impacted on some Arab nationalist movements in 
Arabia and the Gulf, which led to the revolutions in South Yemen and Dhofar. I argue 
that the movement had a conspicuous impact on changing the evolution of Arab 
nationalism in Bahrain and catalysing the leadership of New Arab Left intellectuals in 
Bahraini nationalist and popular movements in the 1970s. This process demonstrates 
that the Bahraini New Arab Left attempted to unify different social forces, including 
communist and some Shia factions, into a unified counter-hegemony and then organise 
a ‘national-popular collective will’ of Arab nationalism. However, I further argue that 
due to the setback of the other revolutionary movements in Arabia, Al Khalifa’s 
colonial view being practised through its tactics of ‘divide and rule’ and constant 
suppression of ‘the Left’, and with the ambiguous alliance and ideological rift among 
these counter-hegemonic forces, the New Arab Left’s leadership was fragile, so that 
unified counter-hegemonic forces around Arab nationalism were fractured. The New 
Arab Left’s fragile leadership then faced a much more severe situation when the 
Iranian revolution broke out and catalysed another current of counter-hegemonic 
forces, along with the rise of Khomeinism. 
Following chapter 4 on the rise of counter-hegemony against the context of the 
Marxist-Leninist revolutions in Arabia, chapter 5 examines the historical conjuncture 
of Bahrain’s formal independence and the continuing political struggle within Bahrain 
through Gramsci’s theorisation of ‘passive revolution’. It anatomises the process of 
Bahrain’s state formation in which Al Khalifa attempted a ‘historical restoration’ for 
its rule, resolving the continuing political struggle between itself and civil society 
extending from the previous colonial era. Such a restoration was triggered by Al 
Khalifa’s compromise in launching a series of political reforms, especially the 1972 
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Constituent Assembly and later the 1973 Parliament. During this process, Al Khalifa 
tried to link itself ideologically to Bahraini civil society through the reforms. 
Following the US open-door policy, social transformation in the Gulf in the early 
1970s entered another stage and generated new momentum for class formation in this 
area. In Bahrain, Al Khalifa co-opted newly formed subaltern capitalist classes, most 
of which were from the old cadres of the ANM in the 1950s and ’60s, as its ‘organic 
intellectuals’. Nonetheless, with seemingly well-organised social forces under the 
leadership of the New Arab Left both in Parliament and in the street, Al Khalifa failed 
to co-opt this new generation of Arab nationalists and continuously played the 
sectarian card to undermine counter-hegemonic forces. Eventually, under the pressure 
of other conservative forces like Saudi Arabia, the Parliament was dissolved in August 
1975 after its inception about two years before. I argue that the end of the Parliament 
equated with Al Khalifa’s interrupted historical restoration. It had several outcomes 
for Bahraini politics in the second half of the 1970s: first, Bahraini political 
development was from then on encapsulated in the Saudi orbit including Bahrain’s 
regional policy shown in chapter 6; second, Al Khalifa’s ideological disconnection 
from civil society remained and its rule became what Gramsci calls ‘dictatorship 
without hegemony’, which mainly relied on coercion rather than consent; and thus, 
finally, a national-popular collective will was floating at the point of the New Arab 
Left’s fractured counter-hegemonic forces, as shown in chapter 4, and Al Khalifa’s 
incomplete hegemony. This floating national-popular collective then created a 
dilemma for the regime’s open alignment with ‘the West’, particularly the US.  
Chapter 6, as the final chapter of this thesis, examines Bahrain’s policy towards 
regional alignment in the 1970s, analysing the ways in which Arab nationalism was 
intertwining with some foreign policy issues during this period and how this process 
led to Bahrain’s alignment with the GCC in 1981. In support of a historical 
sociological investigation of Bahrain’s regional policy, this chapter therefore extends 
the findings of the previous chapters with a focus on how the political struggle among 
different social forces intervened between the interplay of Arab nationalism and policy. 
Resonating with the thesis’ puzzle and the existing literature in IRME reviewed in 
chapter 1, I argue that there is a pierce missing from current understandings, which is 
a significant implication from the previous chapters. It is the contestation over 
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sovereignty and its ideological ties to Arab nationalism. I further argue in the case of 
Bahrain that contestation over sovereignty does not lie in its assumed incompatible 
norm with Arab nationalism, as constructivists and eclecticists might argue. Rather, it 
is about the sovereign subject with respect to who represents the major political subject 
of the post-colonial state of Bahrain. Such a contestation was particularly revealed 
between two polarised forces: on the one side, the New Arab Left which attempted to 
organise a national-popular collective will around Arab nationalism and called for 
popular political participation after Bahrain’s independence; on the other side, Al 
Khalifa who was suspicious of such a national-popular collective will comprising 
unified counter-forces against its ruling status. This contestation along with the 
political struggle then set the context for how Arab nationalism having an impact on 
Bahrain’s policy towards Gulf alignment is analysed. 
This contestation, arguably deriving from the British colonial era, and evolving 
along with the rise of the New Arab Left and remaining unsolved after Bahrain’s 
independence, made Bahrain’s alignment with external powers in the 1970s very 
contentious, especially with the US. On such a contentious issue of forming an 
alignment with the US, the ideological ties of Arab nationalism to it resonated more 
broadly beyond Bahrain. The political struggle within Bahrain at each point of the 
discussion of Bahrain’s alignment with the US was further related to the Palestinian 
question and the Arab cause, the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union 
in the region, the rise of Khomeinism and the Iranian revolution, and the Iran-Iraq war. 
This series of extended foreign policy issues, however, opened up a contingent way 
out for Al Khalifa as regards the dilemma of forming an alignment with the US and 
paved the way towards Bahrain’s participation in the GCC. On this point, I further 
argue that the genesis of the GCC might not have been, as has been argued, as a result 
of a direct response to the challenge brought by the common threat of the Iranian 
revolution in the existing literature, the result was omni-balancing, collaborative 
regime survival and a shared sectarian identity. Instead, in terms of maintaining 
authoritarian sovereignty in Bahrain, the Iranian revolution could be understood as an 
opportunity for Al Khalifa. Not only did the revolution allow the regime to 
continuously exercise a colonial approach of demarcating Bahraini society along 
sectarian lines and preventing unified counter-hegemonic forces rising again, but it 
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also allowed Al Khalifa’s authoritarian rule to rely mostly on coercive power without 
seeking the people’s consent or reviving the idea of Parliament. In this regard, the 
relationship of Arab nationalism and state policy towards regional alignment may be 
more complex than the existing literature argues and go beyond a dichotomous 
understanding of Arab nationalism and sovereignty. 
 
7.2 Lessons of the Thesis 
As this thesis has suggested, the formulation and evolution of Arab nationalism 
is best understood by taking the societal context and political struggle among the 
different social forces around it into consideration. This claim is empirically supported 
by the case of Bahrain via a historical sociological theoretical framework of a 
reconstruction of Gramsci. But what are the lessons to be drawn from the case of 
Bahrain under a Gramscian theoretical scrutiny for IRME?  The lessons of the thesis 
centre around an overarching theme: shedding light on other histories of Arab 
nationalism and thereby addressing the problem of what explains the interplay of Arab 
nationalism and state policy towards regional alignment in the Middle East. These 
lessons reflect two key aspects. They have been shown in reviewing the existing 
literature on Arab nationalism and foreign policy in IRME in the introductory chapter, 
employed in reconstructing an alternative theoretical framework of Gramsci, and then 
justified through the remaining empirical analyses of the thesis.  
The first lesson is about the provenance of Arab nationalism under the theme of 
colonial history and late-capitalist formation. It follows the traditions of historical 
sociology in ‘relocating ideas in social change’ through a particular lens of 
international social theory of uneven and combined development. In the existing 
accounts reviewed in the introductory chapter, particularly that of IR constructivist and 
eclecticist literature, the notion of Arab nationalism is uncritically and interchangeably 
used as a term for Arabism, which registers an overarching cultural norm hovering 
above the region. Resonating with a cultural turn in IR reflectivism against the 
dominant rationalist paradigm, Arab nationalism is seen as a particular identity and an 
ideational product deriving from a parochial culture. Between the late nineteenth and 
225 
 
the mid-twentieth century, such an identity played a role in a transitional period of 
regional order from the Ottoman Empire to the creation of the modern state system in 
the Middle East. Its meaning is embedded in the theme of the constructivist version of 
international socialisation and digested as pre-modern residual ideas against modern 
sovereignty.  
The thesis, however, offers an alternative and critical account of the origins of 
Arab nationalism, going beyond existing cultural-orientated explanations and applying 
a more historical and sociological notion to it. Such a lesson is undertaken in chapter 
3. By specifying Bahraini social formation under British colonialism, chapter 3 then 
identifies the context in which Arab nationalism evolved with the support of 
intellectual and popular movements in Bahrain. It also suggests that the origins of Arab 
nationalism are best understood alternatively under the theme of late-coming capitalist 
social formation with respect to what changes in social relations as a structure underlie 
the rise of modern political ideology and movements. The lesson is substantiated by 
what Tom Nairn called the ‘the machinery of [the] world political economy’. This 
machinery features in the characteristic of ‘uneven development’ between late-coming 
and advanced capitalist formation and is further manifested in Gramsci’s 
understanding of international relations as a ‘historical combination’ on the basis of 
the expansionary nature of capitalism. The characteristics of uneven and combined 
development reveal the origins of Arab nationalism in Bahrain under the history of 
British colonial inspired social formation rather than that of a gigantic and timeless 
Arab cultural norm. Here, for the case of Bahrain, a more crucial meaning of Arab 
nationalism does not lie in the contradictions between itself and modern sovereignty 
in the international sphere of inter-Arab-Anglo competition. Instead, it is about the 
contradictions within the national context as the arrival point of the pressure of 
capitalist formation: the contradictions between the ruling authorities of the Al Khalifa 
regime tied to British colonialism and the newly formed middle class linked to 
Bahraini civil society as the major social forces driving the evolution of Arab 
nationalism. Conceived in Gramsci, the contradictions associate Arab nationalism with 
a more agent-focus approach to political struggles around the formation of modern 
ideology. In this vein, the lesson around the provenance of Arab nationalism redirects 
the existing scholarly research agenda away from hinging on unpacking the process of 
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international socialisation of the sovereignty norm. Furthermore, it opens up an avenue 
via which the thesis attempts to bring other histories of Arab nationalism into IRME 
through a political economy approach.  
The second lesson is about how Arab nationalism influenced foreign policy 
through the anatomy of a societal context beyond a presumed state autonomy. Such a 
context shows that the impact of Arab nationalism on foreign policy is more complex 
than how a state leader autonomously chooses an item from ‘a menu of choice’ 
comprising many identities for instrumental purposes. Rather, the impact is suggested 
as being translated through political struggles among different social forces around 
Arab nationalism at the national level. This is why a reconstruction of Gramsci is 
crucial for this thesis, beyond the Coxian brand of historical materialism. While most 
of the existing literature follows a more or less idealist rationale and places the origins 
and evolution of Arab nationalism under the theme of the international socialisation of 
the norm of sovereignty, a research agenda for how to understand Arab nationalism in 
IRME is set for these approaches. It is closely tied to the political history of how state 
leaders assimilate themselves into a universal norm of sovereignty and then build their 
autonomy with the creation of a modern state. It implies that there is a fault-line 
between so-called pre-modern and modern phases, between which one could delimit a 
normative shift from a parochial culture to another with a universal culture. In the 
Middle East, such a normative shift usually brings about the coexistence of various 
identities in the political arena. Among these presumably incompatible identities, state 
leaders either choose between or omni-balance their objectives delivered in foreign 
policy.  
However, this thesis challenges the presumption of state autonomy being a 
crucial instance of making a device through which Arab nationalism is linked to state 
regional policy. It further argues that such a device is best understood through 
anatomising political struggles in a societal context, which is the lesson demonstrated 
in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Taking political struggles into reconsideration, a more complex 
and dynamic picture around Arab nationalism and state regional policy is painted 
through the interactions among different social forces. Having no such assumed state 
autonomy in the case of Bahrain, Al Khalifa did not always deliver and represent its 
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political will in regional policy. Following the ‘interrupted historical restoration’ 
attempted through the 1973 parliamentary experiment, its dilemma of forming an open 
alignment with the US seemed to become severe. As such, in the political struggle 
between the regime and civil society, Arab nationalism is not one of the items on a 
menu of choice that could be utilised arbitrarily by Al Khalifa, nor did it represent a 
total system of culture. Instead, it shows nuanced ideological components within itself 
and among different intellectual orientations, corresponding to continuing 
contradictions as a result of Bahraini late-capitalist formation and regional geopolitical 
competition. The total meaning of Arab nationalism, that of Arab unity, is actually 
deconstructed along with different intellectual lines, polarised in the existing political 
struggle between counter-hegemonic and hegemonic forces, and even shown to be 
fragile among different forces on the counter-hegemonic side. How Al Khalifa solved 
the political struggle and how New Arab Left intellectuals organised unified counter-
hegemonic forces are rather contingent. These contingent factors then intervened in 
the societal context through which this thesis explains the relationship between Arab 
nationalism and Bahrain’s policy towards Gulf alignment.  
In this vein, a further lesson can be highlighted through the utility of Gramsci’s 
insights into the ‘national-popular collective will’. It is a key finding from a Gramscian 
historical sociological investigation of state regional policy employed in this thesis. 
The concept of a national-popular collective will is a subaltern concept below 
‘hegemony’ and ‘counter-hegemony’, shedding light on the ideological dimension of 
a state. Its existence is an ideological product of a stable historical bloc, which 
represents the general interests of the people being coordinated by a hegemonic class. 
In contrast, its absence reflects an unstable state-society ideological equilibrium, 
which delivers a message that the rule of a hegemonic class over the people heavily 
relies on coercion rather than consent. These two scenarios of a national-popular 
collective will, in the case of Bahrain, are related to the contestation of Bahraini 
sovereignty along with the process of Bahraini state formation in the independence 
phase. The concept of a national-popular collective will then intersects analytically 
with the relationship of Arab nationalism and Bahrain’s regional policy. Therefore, 
through this concept, the existing claim of seeing Arab nationalism and sovereignty as 
two conflicting, or even incompatible, norms is challenged in chapter 6. For this, the 
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lessons of political struggle are further developed to suggest that: Al Khalifa’s 
dilemma in forming open alignment with the US does not lie in a presumed normative 
conflict between sovereignty and Arab nationalism, but in the contest over the 
sovereign subject itself in the Bahraini context. While New Arab Left intellectuals 
attempted to organise a national-popular collective will around Arab nationalism, they 
also interpellated the idea of the people as the major political subject for Bahraini 
sovereignty around Bahrain’s regional policy in the independence phase. Such an idea 
fundamentally challenged the US-Bahraini deal based on Al Khalifa’s own will and 
contrasted with the existing hegemonic regional order under Saudi leadership in the 
Gulf. As such, from the specific case of Bahrain, the ‘national-collective will’ is a 
contained analytical concept, which continues Gramsci’s discussion on development 
and ideology and shows its usefulness in the context of political struggle. Moreover, it 
opens up an analytical avenue through which historical sociology intervenes in the 
study of state regional policy and more broadly IRME. 
    
7.3 Limitation under Reconsideration 
If this thesis has shown the utility of an alternative Gramscian framework 
through the illustrative case of Bahrain, what are the limitations and further 
implications left by the thesis?  
Concerning the thesis’ task of offering an alternative account of the formulation 
and evolution of Arab nationalism and its interplay with state regional policy post-
1967 by inviting other histories of Arab nationalism, the primary limitations of this 
thesis are data-collection, interpretation of histories and the scope of applicability of 
the theoretical framework. For the data-collection part, the clearest limitation is 
inaccessibility to first-hand Arabic materials for reasons of time and space. Such a 
limitation is shown particularly in the demonstration of materials on the New Arab 
Left movement in this thesis. My data-collection did not encompass Beirut and 
Damascus, which are presumed to be two major locations where researchers would be 
able to collect first-hand documents on the New Arab Left, and therefore does not offer 
complete analyses of other histories of Arab nationalism. To overcome such 
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limitations, apart from referring to historical narratives, this thesis mostly relies on 
English translated versions, e.g. some revolutionary publications from the Gulf 
Committee, collected from different archives in the UK as an alternative. Also, this 
limitation was overcome via some interviews conducted in Bahrain with those who 
were politically involved in the New Arab Left movement in the 1970s. The limitation 
on data-collection might be also reflected in the limited way in which other histories 
of Arab nationalism are presented in this thesis. On this point, the thesis has always 
acknowledged such a limitation in interpreting histories in its analyses. In the 
introductory chapter, I state that other histories of Arab nationalism referred to in this 
thesis mainly denote ‘history from below’ and follow one of the specific currents of 
Arab nationalist movements: The New Arab Left and its understanding of the past, 
especially in the context of Bahrain and the Gulf. Therefore, some other currents of 
Arab nationalist movements, like Ba’athists and Nasserists within and beyond Bahrain, 
are not seen as the main axis of narratives in my analyses. 
Following the limitations noted above, another limitation on the applicability of 
the theoretical framework of Gramsci might arise in IRME: Was it just applied to an 
‘anomalous’ case of Bahraini New Arab Left intellectuals, their political struggle 
against the Al Khalifa regime and Bahrain’s policy on regional alignment in the 1970s? 
If not, could it be extended beyond the New Arab Left and beyond Bahrain?  
To justify these potential critiques, I must reiterate the foundation of a 
reconstructed Gramscian framework introduced in this thesis. That is Gramsci’s own 
understanding of international relations on the basis of his acknowledgment of the 
significance of capitalist formation, which was conceptualised in the notion of 
development with the characteristics of unevenness and combination. As the recently 
revival IR historical materialist interest in following Rosenberg’s attempt at building 
international social theory has shown, regardless of the ongoing debate concerning 
whether the concept of uneven and combined development could be a transhistorical 
abstraction beyond the capitalist epoch1, it has evolved from ‘general abstraction’ to a 
                                                        




rather concrete analytical tool to explain the rise of capitalism, modernity and 
geopolitical alignments.  
Its usefulness has been proven to different extents in the analyses of social 
(trans)formation, particularly with a focus on how the mechanism of combination 
drove changes in the mode of production as the social basis by which the thesis has 
examined various political aspects of capitalist formation. Nonetheless, this does not 
suggest that a deterministic account could be placed in the correspondence between 
‘the social’ (structural) and ‘the political’ (superstructural) instances. Instead, it 
suggests that a universal ‘patterned’ social change, despite its distinctive trajectory, 
can be noted among different societies before one delves into research on a specific 
case. For this, it could be argued that the concept of development offers a common 
threshold to any historical sociological case study in IRME with respect to making 
sense of historical conditions.   
In this regard, although similar conditions shared among cases might be 
identified, it does not necessarily mean either that those conditions would lead to the 
same conclusion of any practices as one might expect and as already informed by 
international social theory. For example, even though this thesis identifies common 
traits of tributary social relations across the Gulf, it does not rush to the conclusion that 
a commonality of foreign policy in the Gulf can be depicted due to those conditions, 
not to mention cultural homogeneity. Here, the concepts of ideology and struggle in 
the framework of this thesis make their theoretical contributions. Analytically, while 
ideology is detached from an assumed total and timeless system of ideas in the thesis, 
its connotations are also referred to as political aspects of a certain social formation 
and revealed in the political practices of social agents who represent different social 
forces. This way of approaching ideology also leads to a common scenario of political 
struggles among these forces in the Middle East. It is not anomaly. It is conditioned 
by the past and its significance lies in leading potential contingent outcomes in the 
future. It then opens a discussion on historical contingencies, brought about by political 
struggles as an intervening factor, situated in the causal linkage between conditions 
and foreign policy. On this point, the case of the Bahraini New Arab Left and its 
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struggle with Al Khalifa is just one example of conducting an enquiry into political 
struggles, as this thesis attempts through a Gramscian lens.  
 
7.4 For Future Research: Beyond Bahrain, Beyond the 1970s  
The foregoing discussion leads one to wonder what potential future research 
could be carried out to overcome the limitations and expand the utility of a Gramscian 
framework. This thesis has attempted to demonstrate its primary research and 
originality through a theoretical reconstruction of Gramsci in IR. Following a recent 
reappraisal by other scholars, it has revived the discussion on some original insights 
of Gramsci. As has been shown through three interrelated concepts of development, 
ideology and struggle, this reconstructed Gramscian lens reformulates the Coxian 
brand of Gramscianism in IR. While such a theoretical lens helps to shed light on how 
sociopolitical dynamics on the national scale interrelates both social transformation 
and geopolitical competition in the region and beyond, some proposals for future 
research are suggested beyond the case of Bahrain and beyond the timeframe in this 
thesis.  
One potential proposal relates to the traditions of revolutionary Marxism 
inherited by Gramsci, reminding us of the significance of taking ‘other histories’ of 
‘struggle’ into account when ones examines ideas in IRME. By collecting data and 
materials on seemingly oblivious histories of Arab nationalism, ‘other histories’ can 
be expected to be brought continuously into existing scholarship around the diplomatic 
histories of states. On the one hand, resonating with and following a proposal for ‘new 
approaches to Arab Left histories’,2 to be encompassed in transnational histories of the 
Left in the Arab world, including different ideological currents, research on ‘politics 
from below’ allows making advances through comparisons of time and space. On the 
other hand, in the case of Bahrain, this can be expanded from the 1970s into the 1980s 
and beyond. Potential research questions might include: What was the ideological 
development of Arab nationalism in Bahrain after the GCC was established? In the 
repressing phase of the 1980s, how did New Arab Left intellectuals rejuvenate their 
                                                        
2 Haugbolle and Sing, ‘New Approaches to Arab Left Histories’. 
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political momentum by mobilising popular support, coordinating between exiles and 
non-exiles,3 maintaining ad hoc alliances with communists and religious groups and 
unifying counter-hegemonic forces against Al Khalifa? These questions are also 
crucial for understanding Bahraini internal sociopolitical dynamics during the 
uprisings in the 1990s and from 2011 onwards under the international and regional 
social changes. More importantly, while the issue of sectarianism has become a locus 
for recent IRME scholarship tracing the historical roots of regional conflict, an 
alternative account could be presented through seeing sectarianism as a modern 
product and a process of politicisation conditioned by historical contexts but mainly 
shaped by sociopolitical dynamics of agent practice. 4  That suggests a further 
investigation of how the recent geopolitical competition seemingly in line with 
sectarianisation on the regional scale intertwines with political struggles on the 
national level could also be conducted through a reformulated theoretical lens of 
Gramsci. 
Resonating with the significance of ‘other histories’, another proposal then 
relates to the role of different social agents and the varying processes of state formation 
among cases. While these agents have often been referred to as ‘elites’ in existing 
scholarship, their sociological connotations are obscure in the context of the Middle 
East. Through the concept of intellectuals informed by Gramsci, such obscurity could 
be overcome. As this thesis suggests, due to the characteristics of a late-coming 
capitalist state, intellectuals also represent rather antagonistic social forces deriving 
from contradictions within society. Quiet often, their political agenda and practices 
manifest themselves as being more than just the opposition. In this vein, the domestic 
contestation around certain foreign policy issues might go beyond a debate on what 
interests a state should pursue and examine who should represent the state, as the case 
of Al Khalifa’s alignment with the US has shown in this thesis. In the Middle East, 
this contestation usually shows some diverse cases of different ideological connections 
between the regime and civil society along with historical progress toward de-
                                                        
3 Beaugrand, ‘In and Out Moves of the Bahraini Opposition: How Years of Political Exile Led to the 
Opening of an International Front During the 2011 Crisis in Bahrain’. 
4 Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, eds., Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle 
East (London: Hurst, 2017). 
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colonisation.  As such, the framework applied to the case of Bahrain in the transitional 
period between the end of the colonial rule and the beginning of the independence 
phase could be useful to other cases in the Middle East, especially those Arab states 
whose formal independence was not achieved through the revolutionary trajectories of 
Egypt, Syria and Iraq. It is worth asking: how did those non-revolutionary regimes 
manage to stay in power by re-linking themselves ideologically to civil society? How 
did they deal with the legacy of colonialism in the process of state formation under 
international pressure from geopolitical and capitalist competition? For these questions, 
taking similar historical, social and political conditions into account, one interesting 
case, which has also been studied less, might arise as a potential comparison with 
Bahrain: Qatar. It attained formal independence in the same year and in the same 
revolutionary regional context but went through a different trajectory afterwards. 
Particularly, it passed through a rather stable process of power transition at the top, 
which then led to a re-configuration of power among royal members and even among 
other intellectuals in civil society.5 It could be hypothesised that the Al Thani regime 
in Qatar in the 1970s went through a relatively successful top-down intra-palace ‘white 
revolution’ in comparison with Bahrain. 
Through the potential empirical research proposed above, a viable historical 
sociological framework of such a reformulated Gramscian lens could be substantiated 
further beyond its current marriage with the Bahraini case in the 1970s. As this thesis 
proceeds to the end, it is helpful to make a concluding remark on what this thesis has 
to say about the scholarship of IRME and HSIR in general.  
My statement follows the recent revival of historical materialism in IR through 
international social theory, particularly the school of uneven and combined 
development, and integrating this intellectual trend with a Gramscian turn within the 
traditions of historical sociology. It is about how we explain the creation, persistence 
and transformation of international relations in the Middle East by transcending a 
binary understanding of some analytical instances − the international versus the 
national scale, the material versus ideational factors and, more importantly, historical 
                                                        
5 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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conditions versus contingencies. Resonating with Benno Teschke and Steffan Wyn-
Jones’ call for ‘a paradigmatic turn for the incorporation of FPA and international 
politics into a revised Marxist research programme’,6 it is imperative to reconsider 
changing international and regional orders beyond ‘putative predicable and 
structurally determined logics’ along ‘the unfolding of capitalism or power politics’.7 
For the first two instances, Gramsci has left us precious intellectual assets that are 
empirically supported by the previous chapters in this thesis. What can lead us to 
improve a Gramscian intervention in HSIR, IR and even FPA in general is taking both 
‘historical conditions’ and ‘historical contingencies’ into consideration. In existing 
mainstream IR, such a consideration is either rarely touched on or just stresses the 
former around what composes such conditions, either material or ideational factors. 
However, it resides within the research agenda of historical sociology. Moreover, 
while Rosenberg’s reformulation of the notion of uneven and combined development 
stimulates the evolution of HSIR, the issue of conditions and contingencies once again 
provokes the debate between Weberian and Marxist traditions within historical 
sociology.8 In the case of Bahrain and by drawing on some reformulated Gramsci’s 
insights, this thesis has not gone that far towards offering a solution for the debate. 
Nonetheless, this thesis has shown empirically how (re)articulation of ‘the political’ 
and ‘the social’ originated and formed under the historical condition of combination 
realised through capitalist formation, as well as how such a (re)articulation brought 
about different outcomes contingent on political struggles. At this point, we might 
come across some interesting theoretical questions: From historical sociology, how do 
we explain the interplay between conditions and contingencies? And how do we 
conceptualise it? Certainly, these questions cannot be solved quickly. Yet, they might 
raise a new research agenda for IR, by which we intervene into the ongoing intra-HSIR 
debate on whether we could anticipate the grand discipline of International Historical 
                                                        
6 Benno Teschke and Steffan Wyn-Jones, ‘Marxism in Foreign Policy’, in Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1, 
http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-372. 
7 Teschke and Wyn-Jones, 20. 
8 Alexander Anievas, ‘History, Theory, and Contingency in the Study of Modern International 
Relations: The Global Transformation Revisited’, International Theory 8, no. 3 (2016): 468–80; Barry 
Buzan and George Lawson, ‘Theory, History, and the Global Transformation’, International Theory 
8, no. 3 (2016): 502–22. 
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Sociology through a reformulated Gramscian lens proposed in this thesis: a trio-
analytical toolkit to re-examine the interplay of history (development), theory 
(ideology) and practice (struggle) in our understanding. More importantly, one thing 
for sure is that these questions do indeed remind us of some perilous pitfalls: While 
history is restoring itself and other oblivious histories are unfolding along with 
struggles, one should avoid making cursory predictions of what consequences will 
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